2007 May Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Approval to modernize the NORAD system

6.32 National Defence should update its analysis of the NORAD system modernization project's expected savings, and should determine when such savings will be realized. (6.8–6.31)

Agree. In response to a meeting of the Senior Review Board on 11 December 2006, the business case for the Region/Sector Air Operations Centre Modernization Project was updated on 15 February 2007. As a significant portion of the original business case was predicated on the possible relocation of the operational elements, much of the infrastructure-related savings originally envisioned will not be realized. The current savings projections are approximately 18 percent of the original 1996 business case estimate; further studies on the actual savings are ongoing.

Although the underground complex has been declared surplus and is currently moving through the surplus property process, two additional challenges have impacted plans for closure of the underground complex. First, the underground complex has been identified as a heritage site. This will entail providing a minimal level of support to the underground complex until a permanent solution is found. Second, due to residual security concerns, a small number of systems have yet to be moved from the underground complex. This should be rectified over the next few months.

Project management and oversight

6.36 National Defence should ensure that any further modernization and upgrade of Canada's air surveillance and control system is supported by a current and clearly defined Statement of Operational Requirement. (6.33–6.35)

Agree. Canada and the US have continued to evolve the system modernization requirements over time. With the full participation of Canada in earlier NORAD requirements documents, our requirements were incorporated into the Battle Control System Operational Requirements Document and the System Capabilities Document. In addition, as the Department determines the need for follow-on effort, all capability deficiencies will be validated as part of the Statement of Requirements for the Canadian Air Defence Sector Upgrade Project.

6.40 The Department should conduct a threat and risk assessment for the air surveillance and control system, to determine the extent to which the Department will provide system back-up and redundancy, and to develop a business continuity plan as necessary. (6.37–6.39)

Agree. The Department agrees that threat risk assessments and business continuity plans are important and necessary. For the Region/Sector Air Operations Centre Project, a threat risk assessment was prepared for the first system and revised for the MASE system. For the current BCS-F system, a threat risk assessment is being performed as part of the Department of Defence Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process. Within this certification and accreditation process, back-ups, redundancy, and continuity will all be addressed. The requirement for site redundancy will be further examined under the Canadian Air Defence Sector Upgrade Project.