What we examined (see Focus of the audit)

Citizens of other countries who wish to enter Canada must have appropriate documentation to travel here and must be vetted by Canadian border services officers to ensure they are eligible to enter. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (the Department) and the Canada Border Services Agency (the Agency) share the responsibility of facilitating travel to Canada and the entry of people and goods into Canada.

This audit focused on whether Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency implemented selected controls—meaning policies, procedures, processes, and activities—to address the risk that immigration and border services staff could be corrupted.

Why we did this audit

This audit is important because Department officials play an important role in determining who can travel to Canada, and Agency officials play an important role in deciding which foreign nationals can enter the country, what goods are admissible, and what level of assessment Canadian travellers require before they can re-enter the country. If these officials can be corrupted, then individuals who do not meet the requirements may travel to or enter Canada—along with any potentially inadmissible goods they are carrying—without the necessary vetting. Visas and entry requirements exist to guard against illegal travel to or entry into Canada in the interest of public safety and security.

What we concluded

We concluded that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency identified the risk that border services and immigration staff could be corrupted, but that these organizations did not fully implement selected controls to address this risk. We found no evidence that the improper actions we observed during the audit were the result of corruption at either the Department or the Agency.

What we found

Identifying corruption risks and controls

Overall, we found that the Canada Border Services Agency and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada had identified corruption as a risk that could result in unauthorized foreign nationals travelling to and entering the country, and in Canadians re-entering the country, without undergoing all elements of a required inspection.

We found that both organizations also developed controls—policies, procedures, processes, and activities—to mitigate the risks. However, neither organization adequately monitored the controls to ensure they were working as intended.

This is important because the Department’s and the Agency’s ability to guard against the corruption of their employees depends on their ability to understand the type and prevalence of the risks to which they are exposed, and on their ability to implement effective controls.

• The Canada Border Services Agency understood its key corruption risks and had controls to mitigate them, but did not know if they worked

  Recommendation. The Canada Border Services Agency should develop a monitoring strategy that specifies how the Agency will systematically:

  • assess its corruption mitigation controls to ensure they are applied appropriately and are achieving the intended results, and
  • define superintendents’ responsibilities to enable them to fulfill their control function at land border crossings.

• Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s International Network branch did not have a comprehensive risk assessment in place

  Recommendation. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada should develop a comprehensive internal fraud risk assessment based on analysis of the effectiveness of its controls.

Applying controls to mitigate corruption

Overall, we found that neither the Canada Border Services Agency nor Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada adequately monitored the controls they had in place to address the risk of corruption. This left the organizations and their officials vulnerable to corruption. For example, neither organization used available information proactively to detect staff activities that could indicate potential corruption.

We found examples of improper (though not necessarily corrupt) actions at both organizations that were similar to known violations of code-of-conduct scenarios. For example, Agency border services officers at land border crossings did not follow all policies or practices consistently. Based on our analysis of a sample, we estimated that over a 12-month period, about 300,000 of 19 million vehicles entering Canada (2 percent) entered without undergoing all elements of a required inspection by border staff.

We found that at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, controls designed to prevent unauthorized staff from issuing visas were effective. However, 14 locally engaged staff acted against the Department’s code of conduct by consulting their own visa records.

We found no evidence that the improper actions we observed were the result of corruption at either the Department or the Agency.

These findings matter because when controls are effective, they minimize the opportunities for corruption or coercion. But when controls are weak, there is more opportunity for corruption to occur, thereby making it more possible for ineligible people to travel to Canada, whether through obtaining visas or through being admitted at land border crossings. This potentially exposes the country to serious security and safety risks.

• Canada Border Services Agency staff did not always follow Agency policies at land border crossings

  Recommendation. The Canada Border Services Agency should develop a monitoring strategy that specifies how the Agency will systematically:

  • assess its corruption mitigation controls to ensure they are applied appropriately and are achieving the intended results, and
  • define superintendents’ responsibilities to enable them to fulfill their control function at land border crossings.

• Agency superintendents did not monitor staff adequately to detect possible corruption

  Recommendation. The Canada Border Services Agency should develop a monitoring strategy that specifies how the Agency will systematically:

  • assess its corruption mitigation controls to ensure they are applied appropriately and are achieving the intended results, and
  • define superintendents’ responsibilities to enable them to fulfill their control function at land border crossings.

• Visa processing procedures successfully prevented unauthorized staff from issuing visas

  Recommendation. We made no recommendations in this area of examination.

• Locally engaged staff viewed their own visa records, contrary to the code of conduct

  Recommendation. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada should conduct systematic monitoring exercises to detect improper actions that can alert the Department to potential corruption.

Training staff and updating security screening

Overall, we found that many of the Canada Border Services Agency’s border services officers and superintendents at land border crossings had not completed mandatory courses related to corruption awareness. Also, we could only confirm that 20 percent of locally engaged staff processing visas had completed a Global Affairs Canada mandatory course related to values and ethics. We also found that almost all security screening was updated as required.

This is important because training helps staff understand what actions are appropriate and when and how to report potentially corrupt activities.

• Many border services officers and superintendents did not complete mandatory training

  Recommendation. The Canada Border Services Agency should ensure that its land border crossing personnel complete mandatory training as required.

• Information on locally engaged staff training was incomplete

  Recommendation. Global Affairs Canada should ensure that locally engaged staff working in Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s visa program complete the Global Affairs Canada values and ethics mandatory training course.

• Almost all security screening was updated as required

  Recommendation. We made no recommendations in this area of examination.

Entity Responses to Recommendations

The audited entities agree with our recommendations, and have responded (see List of Recommendations).

Related Information

Report of the	Auditor General of Canada
Type of product	Performance audit
Topics	Foreign Affairs Public Service Safety and Security
Audited entities	Canada Border Service Agency Global Affairs Canada Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
Completion date	28 February 2017
Tabling date	16 May 2017
Related audits	Report 1—The Beyond the Border Action Plan, 2016 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada Report 2—Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the Citizenship Program, 2016 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada Chapter 5—Preventing Illegal Entry Into Canada, 2013 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada

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