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1990 Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Main Points

15.1 The Canadian immigration control and enforcement system is structured around three main intervention points: overseas screening, port of entry examinations, and inland control and enforcement. The main objectives of control and enforcement activities are to identify inadmissible persons and prevent their entry into Canada; to control the stay of those who are allowed temporary entry; to detain persons who pose a security risk or a serious criminal threat; and, normally, to remove from Canada persons in contravention of the Immigration Act or Regulations (paragraphs 15.13 and 15.14).

15.2 The challenge represented by these objectives is a daunting one. The judicial nature of the process, the high number of appeals of immigration decisions, the pressure exerted by numerous organizations and the volume of activities have a serious impact on the extent to which immigration control and enforcement objectives are reached (15.17 and 15.18).

15.3 Our audit raises concerns about the operational effectiveness of key control and enforcement activities (15.25 and 15.26).

15.4 At the Primary Inspection Line (PIL), the initial checkpoint at Canadian ports of entry, lookout information for identifying persons deemed inadmissible was not effectively used. Training of customs officers in immigration matters was limited and inconsistent. We found that the management control of the PIL had been weakened by the lack of a performance measurement system on immigration matters and limited feedback information on referrals (15.27 to 15.55).

15.5 We found that the results of security screening activities need to be evaluated. Even where reports provide reasons for inadmissibility, few of them result in rejections, and there is no assurance that criminal checks are complete. We found also that medical screening activities lack the control standards necessary to ensure compliance with the Act in preventing entry of persons who would pose a danger to public health or create excessive demands on Canadian health and social services (15.56 to 15.82).

15.6 Our examination further revealed that terms and conditions are not imposed consistently when landing entrepreneurs. Also the majority of entrepreneurs landed with terms and conditions are not required to provide evidence of compliance. Entrepreneurs in breach of conditions have not been removed (15.93 to 15.101).

15.7 Our examination of immigration enforcement procedures revealed that, in spite of improvements since 1989, a serious backlog of investigations still exists in one region and the efficiency in this area needs to be improved. There are long delays in obtaining necessary relevant information from the Canadian Police Information Centre files and other sources (15.108 to 15.120).

15.8 In the majority of cases involving refugee claimants, removals are either delayed or cancelled due to a variety of reasons, which include appeals, temporary suspensions of removals to countries experiencing conditions of war or civil strife, and other humanitarian and compassionate grounds. This has afforded assurance of a protracted stay in Canada for most claimants. We question the economy, efficiency and operational effectiveness of a process where the carrying out of enforcement actions is the exception rather than the rule (15.121 to 15.128).

15.9 Our examination also revealed inefficiencies resulting from the use of Minister's permits to grant temporary status to persons who have violated the provisions of the Immigration Act or who are inadmissible to Canada (15.129 to 15.142).

15.10 Finally, our audit of the Field Operations Support System, a key source of information for immigration officers, indicated that access to the system was unreliable and that the data supplied was incomplete and sometimes misleading (15.144 to 15.152).

15.11 EIC has made significant efforts to overcome the challenges of the program in several of the areas discussed above, including a new immigration security screening project and a review of medical inadmissibility policies and procedures. We believe, however, that implementation of our recommendations would greatly assist EIC in achieving its control and enforcement objectives in a cost-effective manner (15.74 and 15.82).

Background

15.12 The main objectives of the control and enforcement provisions of the Immigration Act are to prevent the admission of people who may be harmful to the health or social or economic well-being of Canadian residents or to the national security of Canada, and to detect and remove from Canada persons in contravention of the Act. Another objective of the Act is to facilitate the entry of bona fide visitors into Canada for the purpose of fostering trade and commerce, tourism, cultural and scientific activities, and international understanding.

15.13 Control and enforcement activities are intended to: identify inadmissible persons and prevent their entry into Canada; control the stay of those who are allowed temporary entry; detain persons who pose a security risk or a serious criminal threat; and, as appropriate, remove from Canada persons in contravention of the Act or Regulations. The activities designed to achieve those results include health, security, and criminality checks, the issuance of control documents, investigations, inquiries, appeals, detentions and removals. In addition, Employment and Immigration Canada (EIC or Immigration) recognizes the need to maintain a high level of service for those who are in compliance with the Act and Regulations.

15.14 The Canadian immigration control and enforcement system is structured around three main intervention points. They are overseas screening, port of entry examinations, and inland control and enforcement.

15.15 As explained in Chapter 12, the delivery of the Immigration Program involves many organizations. The responsibilities in the area of control and enforcement are shared among EIC, the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), which is independent from EIC, the Department of External Affairs (DEA), the Department of National Revenue/Customs and Excise (Customs), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Department of National Health and Welfare (HWC).

15.16 The resources allotted to control and enforcement are substantial. Direct expenditures for control and enforcement activities within EIC for 1989/90 were in the order of 1,500 person-years and $86 million. In addition, expenditures by other departments and agencies (RCMP, CSIS, DEA, IRB, and HWC) exceeded 870 person-years and $54 million. Customs expenditures are not readily identifiable.

15.17 The challenge of control and enforcement is partially conveyed by the following. In 1988/89, 101.3 million travellers entered Canada. Of these, 37.9 million were American residents, 3.7 million were from other countries, and 59.7 million were Canadian residents. Worldwide, some 80 million persons are estimated to be residing outside their own national boundaries, and there are an estimated 15 million refugees. Many of these seek to migrate for economic or other reasons, and Canada is generally considered to be an attractive destination. Canada has a policy and a tradition of providing safe haven for refugees and displaced persons; it offers relative social and economic stability and easy access to social support systems and employment.

15.18 The combination of procedural fairness requirements of immigration legislation, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and obligations under the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, provide extensive rights for migrants and refugee claimants. Anyone who succeeds in reaching Canadian territory, whether legally or illegally, is afforded the protection of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This involves due process of a claim for protection with several levels of appeal before persons are removed from Canada. This reality has a far-reaching impact on immigration control and enforcement.

Objective and Scope of the Audit

15.20 The EIC audit covered the national headquarters and 14 Canada Immigration Centres (CICs) located in three regions: Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia. Audited areas included the obligations of transportation companies, the entrepreneur program monitoring, investigations, removals, the use of Minister's permits, and automated support systems.

15.21 In our port of entry examination, we visited Customs and Immigration at the head offices, five major airports, nine important land border crossings, and five Customs regional offices. The regions that we visited process more than 50 percent of travellers entering Canada and employ the majority of customs officers assigned to a Primary Inspection Line (the initial checkpoint at ports of entry). The audit focussed on training of customs officers in immigration matters, use of immigration information to identify inadmissible persons, functions performed at the Primary Inspection Line (PIL), and management controls over procedures at the PIL, including performance measurement and feedback.

15.22 At the RCMP, the audit work was carried out at headquarters and in three divisions. In relation to CSIS, we focussed on how the advice resulting from the security screening of potential immigrants was being used by EIC.

15.23 We reviewed Health and Welfare's medical screening operations in Ottawa, with an emphasis on compliance with medical admissibility criteria stipulated in the Immigration Act.

15.24 Enforcement actions taken against refugee claimants whose claims were rejected by the IRB are also covered in this chapter.

Control Activities

The operational effectiveness of some key immigration controls needs to be improved

15.26 Controls should be enforceable, efficient and consistently applied. Enforcement actions should be carried out where appropriate. Our examination of control activities indicated that they do not fully meet these criteria.

The Primary Inspection Line

15.28 At ports of entry, increased workloads and the need to facilitate entry have resulted in the development of an integrated examination system: the Primary Inspection Line. In this system, the initial examination of all travellers to ensure they meet the requirements, in relation mostly to areas of customs, immigration, health and agriculture, is conducted by the officer of one service, usually Customs. This integrated system benefits travellers entering Canada, since the vast majority are admitted after a first examination. Customs officers refer travellers to Immigration for further examination when they are deemed inadmissible, are identified in immigration lookout information, fall within certain specified classes, or require further documentation or examination. Exhibit 15.1 illustrates the distribution of travellers entering Canada by types of ports of entry.

Exhibit not available

15.29 An interdepartmental agreement, signed in 1983, defines the working relationships between Customs and Immigration. This agreement sets out the responsibilities of both entities in delivering the immigration program at ports of entry.

15.30 Customs officers have to rely mainly on their personal judgment to determine within an average of 30 seconds whether a traveller should be admitted or ought to be referred to Immigration for a more detailed examination. In this context, adequate training of officers, proper advance information on persons deemed inadmissible, performance measurement of the PIL, and regular and meaningful feedback on referrals are essential for ensuring proper delivery at the PIL. In the course of our audit, we observed a number of operational deficiencies and weaknesses in management controls at the PIL.

Operational deficiencies at the Primary Inspection Line

15.32 Under the agreement, Immigration is responsible for designing and presenting training courses on immigration matters to customs officers. Customs is responsible for advising Immigration on its training needs and, where requested, for providing course evaluations.

15.33 Training of customs officers on immigration matters is limited and inconsistent. Although assignment to the PIL is an entry level position at Customs, its immigration component is unique and highly specialized. At the PIL, most officers perform the same duties regardless of their employment status and training received. We found that the majority of customs officers assigned to the PIL in the regions visited had received limited training on immigration matters: most PIL officers received one- or two-day training session at the ports; maintenance and skills upgrading was almost non-existent. While Customs intends to provide immigration training to new full-time customs officers centrally, the practice for many years for most PIL officers had been limited to basic training session at the ports.

15.34 These basic training sessions are developed by local staff at Immigration and are inconsistent. We found that they do not follow any minimum standard in terms of course content, supporting documentation, presentation and duration. These sessions are neither evaluated nor validated. Between April 1986 and December 1989, 50 percent of the new full-time customs officers as well as the term and casual employees and students, who represent 56 percent of all new customs officers, were trained locally.

15.35 Customs and Immigration determined that central training is appropriate to prepare new full-time customs officers for their immigration responsibilities. In 1989, Customs expanded the immigration component to a five-day session and made its comprehensive training program mandatory. This training is given at Customs and Excise College in Rigaud, Quebec. It has been evaluated by Customs and is regularly monitored by both organizations. However, existing staff are not entitled to receive it.

15.36 During the audit, we found that Customs had not attempted to analyse maintenance and skills upgrading needs for its existing staff at the PIL. At Immigration, management recognized a need for such training every three years, as stated in the agreement. However, this concern was not felt by Customs to the same extent. We noted that in December 1989, over 60 percent of permanent customs officers in the regions we visited had been on the job for three or more years and had received only local training when they started.

15.37 The deficiencies observed in the training of customs officers and the lack of maintenance courses lead to reduced efficiency and inconsistent application of immigration policies and procedures at ports of entry.

15.38 There is a lack of appropriate immigration lookout information. Immigration deems certain individuals inadmissible or requires that they be further examined before they are admitted into Canada. A readily accessible and accurate data base on these individuals would help customs officers identify them if they sought entry into the country. According to the agreement, Immigration is responsible for developing and maintaining the lookout information system and Customs is responsible for making effective use of it at the PIL.

15.39 Lookout information provides customs officers with names and particulars of persons who are inadmissible to Canada. These are mainly known or suspected terrorists, serious criminals, and previous deportees. This information comes from national or regional headquarters, or local operations, and can be distributed nationally or locally. It is valid for various periods from a few hours up to a month. Immigration distributes a lookout book to airports and to some land border crossings. In addition, all ports of entry receive individual lookout notices.

15.40 We noted deficiencies in the format and use of the existing immigration lookout information. Immigration has not developed a system to provide for the maintenance and effective use of lookout information by Customs at the PIL. In most of the ports visited, we found that Immigration management was not able to provide a set of lookout notices with assurance that they were complete and current.

15.41 At Customs, we observed that efforts to make effective use of the lookout information vary. The lookout book consists of over 3,500 names and is time-consuming to consult. As a result, we noted that it is rarely consulted by customs officers. The lookout notices for the PIL differ in format from region to region and are difficult to consult. Customs management provides a summary of the information contained in the lookout notices to aid the PIL officers at only a few ports of entry visited. In a test conducted during our visits, we observed that the set of lookout notices differed from one PIL booth to another at the same port and few matched the set provided by Immigration. Customs management has not taken steps to ensure that proper lookout information exists at all PIL sites. The lack of complete and readily accessible lookout information increases the risk of Customs admitting inadmissible persons to Canada.

15.42 Recognizing the shortcomings of the existing manual system, both organizations jointly set up an automated system for pilot testing at the Vancouver International Airport. In February 1989, the evaluation of the pilot project was completed; management from both organizations agreed to develop the system for nation-wide use. Near the end of our audit, they were in the process of seeking approval from Treasury Board to implement the system over four years in all major ports of entry.

15.43 In the meantime, no action has been planned by Immigration or Customs to enhance the format, use, and management controls of the existing lookout system.

15.44 We are of the opinion that the lack of an appropriate immigration lookout data base and the ineffective use of existing information reduce the level of protection of the Canadian public.

15.45 Customs officers do not perform all delegated PIL functions. According to its agreement with Customs, Immigration delegates certain functions to customs officers at the PIL. Some of these functions are to admit travellers into Canada, to stamp passports, and to prescribe length of stay when required.

15.46 At major airports, customs officers stamp passports of visitors other than American citizens. This automatically limits their stay in Canada to three months. An Immigration directive effective May 1988 calls for Customs to extend the stay of bona fide visitors from three to six months. This was intended to improve the efficiency of immigration operations by reducing the workload of processing visitor extensions. However, at major airports, Customs still does not extend the stay of travellers to six months.

15.47 At major land border crossings, except for three ports in one area, Immigration retains the function of admitting visitors other than American citizens into Canada. Consequently, customs officers automatically refer these visitors to Immigration for further examination. The automatic referrals account for a significant portion of total referrals from Customs' PIL process. Moreover, operational data showed that 92 percent of all travellers referred at these land border crossings require no further documentation by Immigration to be admitted into Canada. At major airports, automatic referrals account for 60 percent of the total. The number of referrals from Customs has a direct impact on the amount of EIC resources assigned to ports of entry. Immigration is unable to justify the automatic referral process. No action had been taken to alter this long-standing practice or to update the agreement.

15.48 In our view, this situation introduces inconsistent practices at major land border crossings and could lead to inefficient use of resources.

15.49 Customs and EIC should:

• identify training needs and provide appropriate and consistent initial and refresher training to customs officers;
• develop interim measures to improve the use of the lookout book and notices while the automated system is being developed and implemented;
• re-evaluate the functions delegated through their interdepartmental agreement and update it as necessary.

Customs is prepared, in concert with EIC, to examine what measures might be more suitable as an interim lookout program, and could be implemented within existing resource limitations.

Customs will work with EIC to carry out the review and updating process of functions delegated throughout the agreement.

Response from EIC: Training needs are being reviewed within the context of updating the interdepartmental agreement. EIC and Customs have been aware of this issue for well over a year. In the spring of 1990, a new training module was developed by Quebec Region. This module is being reviewed by other regions with a view to establishing a national course to be delivered by the regions. A monitoring plan will be put in place to ensure compliance by both EIC and Customs.

EIC has initiated talks with Customs to find ways to improve the use of the lookout book and perhaps streamline this system, subject to resource considerations. At the same time, EIC will establish at all major ports of entry an automated lookout system which was tested and evaluated in 1988/89.

All functions delegated will be reviewed and updated as part of the exercise to revise the interdepartmental agreement.

Insufficient performance measurement and feedback weaken controls of the Primary Inspection Line

15.51 In 1987/88, Immigration conducted an effectiveness measurement of the PIL. Results were inconclusive. We noted that since late 1989, Immigration and Customs have discussed the need for a system to measure the performance of the immigration function at the PIL. However, many issues remain to be resolved and possible system implementation dates have not yet been discussed.

15.52 Feedback information on referrals is limited. At airports and land border crossings, certain cases, other than those mentioned in paragraph 15.47, are referred from the PIL to Immigration for a secondary examination prior to admitting the travellers into Canada. We found that Immigration maintains some information on the appropriateness and the results of referrals. Customs has not requested feedback on the quality of its referrals, and information provided by Immigration is limited. Except for the number of referrals, there is no department-wide arrangement for regular and meaningful feedback. Where it takes place, it is largely due to local or individual initiatives.

15.53 Customs does not question the accuracy of the only quantitative data on referrals provided by Immigration. We noted that the total number of referrals used by the two organizations for the same land border crossings varied substantially (more than 500,000), even though these figures were from the same source, EIC. Since there was no discussion on, or little use made of, relevant feedback information, neither Immigration nor Customs had identified these discrepancies. As mentioned in paragraph 15.47, the number of referrals was used as a basis for allocating EIC resources at ports of entry.

15.54 Feedback on the results of referrals would help identify areas requiring improvement at Customs and the need for changes to the operating policies and guidelines set out by Immigration. The lack of a performance measurement system on the immigration function at the PIL and the limited exchange of information between both organizations weaken management's control over program delivery.

15.55 EIC, in consultation with Customs, should pursue its development of a performance measurement system and implement means for an appropriate exchange of information to ensure that the operational and administrative responsibilities of both organizations regarding examination of individuals and their admission into Canada are properly discharged.

Response from EIC: EIC has been aware of this issue for some time. In the fall of 1989, we began to develop a performance measurement system to measure PIL effectiveness as it relates to immigration. This is being done in co-operation with Customs and with the assistance of the field offices involved. EIC expects to have part of the system operational by the fall of 1990.

Response from Customs: Customs recognizes the necessity of evaluating our performance of the immigration inspection process. We will assist EIC in the development of an appropriate measurement system and a suitable information exchange process to assist us to properly discharge the immigration duties for which we are responsible.

Security Screening

Some concerns regarding the results of security screening

15.57 The role of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in security screening of immigrants is to provide the Minister of Employment and Immigration with advice on inadmissible immigrant applicants, as defined in the Immigration Act. This ought to include examination of the applicant's past history, including criminal or security-related activities, and a probability assessment of the applicant's continued involvement in such activities, following admission into Canada.

15.58 CSIS security screens most of the prospective immigrants to Canada who have been pre-selected by visa officers, and immigration officers currently do the remainder. CSIS's security screening activities are largely dependent on information obtained through arrangements with foreign agencies around the world. For those applicants who indicate a period of residence in Canada, screening also includes criminal records checks by the RCMP.

15.59 The completeness of the information provided varies with the foreign agency involved and the extent of its co-operation with Canada. The response time for regular inquiries ranges from one to nine months.

15.60 For EIC and DEA, a serious constraint to refusing admission of certain applicants to Canada is the restriction on disclosure of information. Information from foreign agencies is often provided on condition that its nature and its source not be revealed. The release of such information could prejudice future co-operation. Another constraint to security screening is that some countries prohibit information being made available to foreign governments for immigration purposes.

15.61 At the conclusion of its screening activities, CSIS provides, through a detailed report called a brief, advice to EIC on those relatively small number of cases where it has serious security concerns.

15.62 CSIS prepares a "rejection brief" when it recommends refusal of the application because it believes the applicant would constitute a risk to Canada's national security if allowed to enter or to remain in the country. In those cases subject to review by the Security Intelligence Review Committee or the Federal Court of Canada (e.g. cases where the applicant is sponsored by a family member who is a permanent resident of Canada), the brief must also be approved by the Solicitor General before being sent to EIC. If CSIS is unable to gather sufficient or conclusive evidence to support a rejection brief, but still feels that the applicant may constitute a risk to Canada's national security, it submits an "information brief". In either case, the final decision to accept or refuse the application rests with EIC.

15.63 EIC and DEA reject only a small percentage of immigrant applicants who are the subject of CSIS security concerns. Based on information provided by EIC, Exhibit 15.2 illustrates the status and use of the rejection briefs submitted to EIC for the years 1987 to 1989. Exhibit 15.3 provides similar data on information briefs.

Exhibits not available

15.64 With regard to the above cases, the use of the officer's discretion for the denial of an immigrant visa abroad, rather than an outright rejection based on security grounds, is administratively easier. However, it does have serious drawbacks:

(a) EIC is not permitted to record its security concerns regarding these applicants in the information system that is used at ports of entry; and

(b) these applicants are not precluded from coming to Canada as visitors any time they wish.

15.65 The time taken by EIC to reach a decision varies widely. We noted that the majority of completed cases took from one to nine months. However, some took much longer. In one case, EIC arrived at a final decision 23 months after receiving CSIS's advice.

15.66 We noted that EIC has yet to reach a decision regarding 31 percent of the rejection briefs and 45 percent of the information briefs submitted by CSIS over the last three years. Sixteen percent of the cases go back to 1987. The majority of the pending security cases involve persons already living in Canada.

15.67 We also found evidence of poor operational control. We noted that EIC recommended the landing of four applicants and rejected three others before CSIS had completed its work and provided its advice to EIC. Furthermore, EIC had no record in its files of 10 applicants named in briefs (nine in 1989) submitted by CSIS. Finally, we noted that the Immigrant Data System Overseas (IDSO), an EIC recording system representing the results of the work of visa officers abroad, shows 21 rejections of applications apparently based on "failed security" in 1989. EIC headquarters was not aware of 20 of these cases. However, we found that the accuracy of the data in IDSO, with respect to these cases, is doubtful.

15.68 An outright rejection on security grounds or the refusal to issue an immigrant visa to an applicant does not mean that the applicant will not gain admittance to Canada through other means. We have documented cases of applicants who have made their way to Canada and claimed refugee status after being denied an immigrant visa (based on the visa officer's discretion) as a result of the security screening process. Their status in Canada has yet to be finalized. CSIS normally becomes aware of these cases only at the time the refugee makes an application for permanent resident status, sometimes a few years after his/her arrival in Canada. This is a serious concern because these persons are allowed to remain in Canada for extended periods without security screening.

15.69 The main reason that CSIS's briefs do not automatically result in the rejection of applicants by EIC is that, in many instances, the information is supplied in confidence by foreign agencies to CSIS. Consequently, the information could not or would not be disclosed in open court proceedings. This means that EIC is not able, in such cases, to satisfy an impartial tribunal that the individual represents a danger to society. In addition, EIC has stated that humanitarian or compassionate grounds are the overriding factors that make it accept some applicants rather than refuse the individuals on security grounds.

15.70 We noted, however, that Parliament has recognized the potential problems regarding the requirement for non-disclosure of CSIS's information. It has provided a special legislative means in the Immigration Act for denying admission or allowing removal from Canada of persons who are considered a security risk by CSIS or are suspected of being involved in organized criminal activity, yet have never actually been convicted of a serious offence.

15.71 In such instances, the Immigration Act provides for the issuance of a security certificate that will ultimately deny admission to, or allow the removal of, an individual from Canada. Security certificates require the approval of a Federal Court judge in the case of a non-resident, or of the Governor in Council in the case of a permanent resident. The certificate may be issued following a joint report by the Minister of Employment and Immigration and the Solicitor General when they are of the opinion, based on security or criminal intelligence reports, that a person should not be allowed to enter or to be in Canada. We have observed that few ministerial joint reports have been issued over the last four years, and only two security certificates were issued. However, one of the certificates cannot be enforced because the Federal Court of Appeal has ruled that the process followed constituted an unjustifiable violation of the subject's rights under the Charter. The government has applied for leave to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.

15.72 In almost all cases, CSIS's security screening addresses concerns related purely to national security. Criminal records, which consist of public data concerning convictions for punishable offenses, are not part of CSIS assessments.

15.73 Even though CSIS forwards criminal record information obtained from foreign agencies and the RCMP to visa officers, criminality risk assessments are not as comprehensive as they need to be. According to CSIS, foreign agencies generally provide it with criminal records but not criminal intelligence information, on the grounds that CSIS is not a police agency. This is particularly significant when assessing whether an applicant might engage in acts of violence that would endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada.

15.74 CSIS and EIC are currently in the process of confirming that the responsibility for criminality assessments lies with EIC. This would allow EIC and DEA to deal directly with the RCMP and foreign agencies respectively. This issue is now under study by an interdepartmental committee set up to increase the quality and efficiency of the overseas screening process. Under this committee, new security screening profiles are now being tested at selected posts, and agreement-in-principle to significant changes in security screening responsibilities has been reached.

15.75 Given the number of serious concerns raised in this audit, we believe there is a need to evaluate whether one of the major objectives of the Immigration Act, which is to prevent the admission of people who may be harmful to the well-being of Canadian residents or the national security of Canada, is being achieved.

15.76 EIC should, in collaboration with CSIS and DEA, evaluate the effectiveness of the immigration security screening activities.

Response from EIC: Since the summer of 1989, External Affairs, CSIS, RCMP and EIC have been working on a new Immigration Screening Project. The new screening system, developed in 1989, will focus resources on applicants who are the most likely to present a problem. The system was tested in four posts in early 1990 and the data is now being assessed.

EIC now evaluates with CSIS the results of immigration security screening activities for cases identified by CSIS in screening briefs. A general evaluation of these activities will be done within the Interdepartmental Committee, which includes CSIS, Solicitor General and RCMP/External Affairs as needed.

Response from CSIS: EIC, CSIS, External Affairs, and the RCMP launched a major study of the immigration security screening program in June 1989, with a view to streamlining the processing of applications from prospective immigrants.

As noted in paragraph 15.74 above, the study has now progressed to the final stage of testing at selected posts, with a view to subsequent worldwide introduction. Assessment of the applicability of this new approach will include the effectiveness of certain immigration security screening activities, including demands placed on resources both overseas and domestically. The results of the selected post study are expected within the current fiscal year.

15.77 EIC should ensure that all relevant criminality information is gathered and assessed before permanent resident status is recommended.

Response from EIC: Until 16 July 1990, Canada Immigration Centres (CICs) submitted immigration applications (IMM 8s) to the CSIS for security screening and co-ordination of Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) checks with the RCMP. As of 16 July 1990, CICs began to deal directly with the RCMP for in-Canada criminal checks. EIC does not routinely submit applicants for fingerprinting. CPIC checks are based on names and cover only convictions and charges in Canada. CSIS still co-ordinates overseas security and criminal trace checks. In co-operation with CSIS and the RCMP, EIC and External Affairs have pilot projects underway overseas using criminal and security profiles to allow visa officers to play a greater role in criminal and security screening including direct liaison with local police authorities where possible.

Medical Screening

Inconsistent application of medical admissibility criteria

15.79 We have concerns with the overall level of compliance with the legislated medical admissibility criteria. The Immigration Act stipulates that, to be medically admissible, visitors and immigrants must not pose a danger to public health or safety, and their admission must not create excessive demands on Canadian health and social services. Current procedures do not provide assurance that these criteria are met.

15.80 The identification of danger to health and public safety is dependent upon the appropriateness and proper application of medical examination procedures and tests. According to the Medical Officer's Handbook, the highest category of risk is assigned to those individuals suffering from diseases believed to be readily communicable in Canada and with serious consequences on transmission. It was pointed out to us that medical examination procedures, however, do not require routine screening for hepatitis-B and AIDS (HIV infection) although evidence of these diseases normally renders individuals inadmissible to Canada. This is in contrast with the practice for tuberculosis where routine screening is the norm. This raises the question: Is the Canadian public consistently being offered the level of protection that is contemplated under the Act?

15.81 The Handbook contains no quantitative guidelines for the assessment of what is excessive demand on Canadian health and social services. It states that "it is not possible at present to establish quantitative guidelines based on statistical analysis of Canadian health and social care experience in order to differentiate the ... categories of the (excess demand) profile." The Handbook states that the main determinant in assessing excess demand is "general professional experience." The determination reached by this approach is, inevitably, very subjective.

15.82 HWC, in conjunction with EIC, should ensure compliance with the medical admissibility criteria stipulated in the Immigration Act; if this is not considered possible or realistic, it should recommend that the legislation be amended.

Response from HWC: HWC medical officers as a matter of policy ensure that the medical inadmissibility criteria stipulated in the Immigration Act are complied with in all medical assessments.

Medical Guidelines have been established and are reviewed by Immigration Review Board Consultants on a periodic basis.

EIC in co-operation with HWC have tasked a special Medical Inadmissibility Review Committee to review all medical conditions and related issues to ensure that the current Medical Guidelines for Inadmissibility are appropriate, just, and compatible with current medical opinion.

Response from EIC: As a result of discussions with respect to this issue between EIC and HWC in 1989, a comprehensive review of the legislation, policies and procedures pertaining to the determination of medical inadmissibility was launched in the spring of 1990. The review is taking into consideration the concerns expressed by the Hawkes Committee and in the Boyer Report ("Equality for All") as well as the results of consultations with a variety of interested parties, including provincial governments, whose responsibility it is to provide health and social services, and non-governmental organizations representing a variety of people with an interest in this issue.

Obligations of Transportation Companies

Transportation companies contest fines

15.84 The Immigration Act imposes on transportation companies the responsibility of ensuring that passengers have the required documents in their possession before they are brought to the port of entry into Canada. Where companies fail to meet this responsibility, the Act and Regulations provide for the imposition of fines and for the payment of detention and removal costs, within certain limits.

15.85 We examined the application of these policies to determine whether they were being applied strictly and consistently. We also assessed the extent to which their application was being monitored.

15.86 Imposition of fines. Before 1989, EIC was experiencing difficulties in collecting fines imposed on transportation companies. Some carriers consistently refused to pay the fines, and management control over the situation was weak.

15.87 In 1989, Immigration revised the fines structure and started litigation proceedings against carriers in order to collect monies owing to the Crown for penalties imposed after 1 July 1989.

15.88 The carriers object strongly to the payment of fines related to cases involving refugee claimants who are later found by the Immigration and Refugee Board to be real refugees. They contend that they should not be penalized for helping persons whom the Immigration Act was designed to help. This is an important consideration in view of the approval rate for refugee claimants, which exceeds 80 percent.

15.89 Detention and removal costs are also contested. Since January 1984, with some early exceptions, foreign air carrier members of the Association of Airline Representatives in Canada (AARC) have collectively ceased payment of detention costs assessed against them. Because of long processing delays and the volume of those being detained, the carriers felt, at that time, that the unlimited detention liability was unfair to their industry and that a 72-hour limitation would be more equitable. Consequently, the new immigration legislation limited the liability of transportation companies to the first 72 hours.

15.90 The files reviewed indicate that, as of April 1990, the unpaid amount exceeds $7.5 million. The collection of detention and removal costs is subject to a six-year limitation period in most provinces. Those amounts assessed in early 1984 have passed the deadline for collection.

15.91 EIC has only recently considered litigation against carriers in order to recover these monies owed the Crown. While 15 cases were turned over to the Department of Justice for legal action, proceedings are now suspended pending the outcome of settlement discussions between Immigration and the transportation companies.

15.92 EIC should take timely action regarding detention and removal costs owing to the Crown.

Response from EIC: EIC has developed and implemented, with Justice, a process for negotiating settlement of the detention costs incurred by carriers prior to 31 December 1988. A more aggressive policy will be followed with respect to the collection of detention costs incurred since 1 January 1989, on the basis of the new legislation. Procedures are being developed to refer non-payment cases for prosecution. An automated system for processing violation reports will be implemented to ensure that we can commence prosecution within the statutory limitation period for these offenses.

Entrepreneurs

Inconsistent application of terms and conditions of admission for entrepreneurs; controls not enforceable

15.94 Between January 1986 and December 1988, 6,938 entrepreneurs and 18,740 dependants were landed under the entrepreneurs component of the Business Immigration Program.

15.95 When selected as entrepreneurs, immigrants make a commitment to establish, purchase, or make a substantial investment in a business venture in Canada within a period of two years after the date of landing. This business venture should have the potential to contribute significantly to the Canadian economy by creating or maintaining employment for one or more Canadian citizens or permanent residents. The entrepreneurs must also participate actively in the management of that venture. EIC needs to establish controls to ensure that entrepreneurs comply with the requirements of the program.

15.96 While the nature of the commitment made by individuals when they are selected abroad calls for terms and conditions to be imposed on landing, an immigration officer has the discretionary authority not to impose any. Where they are imposed, we would have expected the officer to specify a time and place for the entrepreneur to furnish evidence of compliance.

15.97 During the first nine months of 1989, 2,345 entrepreneurs became permanent residents. Our audit revealed that only 60 percent of these entrepreneurs were landed with terms and conditions. Furthermore, less than half of the 60 percent were required to report to a CIC to provide evidence of compliance with conditions imposed. Given these statistics, we believe that control was not exercised.

15.98 Until the fall of 1989, there were no cases of entrepreneurs referred to inquiry for breach of conditions.

15.99 Moreover, there are no terms and conditions attached to the landing of entrepreneurs' dependants. This could limit the effect of enforcement measures against an entrepreneur who does not comply with the terms and conditions. Should a removal be warranted, the dependants could remain in Canada and sponsor the entrepreneur as a family-class immigrant. The application of the policy related to humanitarian and compassionate considerations would also prevent removal in such cases. Consequently, control is impossible unless the program is redesigned to make dependants subject to the same treatment as the entrepreneur concerned.

15.100 During the audit, EIC began to develop a new monitoring system for entrepreneurs, and some cases are now being referred to inquiry. However, this does not address the issue of constraints to removal.

15.101 EIC should clearly state control objectives for the entrepreneurs category, establish corresponding efficient and effective control mechanisms, and apply these mechanisms consistently.

Response from EIC: We agree. For the coming months EIC plans to implement the following procedures:

- impose terms and conditions on all entrepreneurs to ensure a consistent application;

- in all cases indicate where and when entrepreneurs must report to establish that they have complied with the terms and conditions of their landing.

The application of existing control mechanisms against entrepreneurs has resulted in one deportation order being issued. An additional inquiry is underway, and 15 further inquiries are being considered.

Enforcement Activities

Integrity of immigration control affected by exceptions

15.103 Before the 1989 amendments to the Act, the enforcement programs were in a state of near collapse. The refugee status determination backlogs made it advantageous for persons charged or arrested under the provisions of the Act to make refugee claims. Ninety percent of all immigration inquiries were related to refugee claims. Most claimants, including those whose identity could not be verified, were released into the general population while awaiting a determination of their case, and virtually all of them were certain to remain in Canada for three or more years, whatever the merits of their claim. The fact that these persons could not be removed until their case had been dealt with by the refugee status determination process meant that enforcement action could not be carried out.

15.104 The enforcement function also suffered from the gradual reductions in resources devoted to the Immigration Program. In addition, Immigration priorities were the processing of refugee claims, in-Canada landings, and sponsorship applications.

15.105 The 1989 legislation offered the possibility of real improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement activities. It was widely expected that inadmissible persons who had no legitimate claim to refugee status would quickly be removed. This assumption was the basis for the design and implementation of a new strategy in relation to investigations, detentions, and removals.

15.106 This strategy anticipated that the volume of refugee-related enforcement activities would be greatly reduced. For visitors and immigrants, the planning was for more investigations, including the arrest and reporting to immigration inquiry of criminal residents and non-residents, more detention of persons awaiting removal, and more numerous and expeditious removals. The result would be better protection of Canadian society.

15.107 While significant reforms have been achieved, the above expectations did not materialize. Improvements in the management of the enforcement process are negated for the most part by an inability to carry out enforcement actions or by the cancellation of their effect. The immigration environment precludes timely, effective action; the refugee determination process still monopolizes enforcement resources while pro forma activities, i.e. activities done for the sake of form, reduce efficiency.

Investigations

The rebuilding of the investigation function is under way

15.109 As per an interdepartmental agreement, EIC refers cases involving apparent offenses under the Immigration Act to the RCMP for investigation and possible prosecution. The RCMP places its highest priority on investigations relating to organized smugglers of immigrants and illegal immigration consultants. However, a large part of its investigation time on immigration matters is still spent responding to requests from EIC and the public. These requests have on occasion developed into major operations.

15.110 In 1988, EIC recognized that there were serious shortcomings in its area of investigations. The lack of personnel made co-operation among enforcement units within EIC ineffective, and relationships with other enforcement groups in and outside Canada had deteriorated. There was a general inability to carry out enforcement actions. There was no effective guidance from national headquarters; information systems were inadequate, unreliable, and in some cases, misleading. Backlogs in investigations of criminal actions by immigrants or visitors exceeded 10,000 cases in the largest region. Morale of immigration investigators was poor, and often no response was made to tips from the public.

15.111 During 1989, the investigation function in EIC underwent massive change. New enforcement units were established. This heightened the profile of the function and improved the morale of enforcement staff. Resources allocated to investigations became less vulnerable to arbitrary reassignment to other sectors, and greater support was ensured for the rebuilding of investigation expertise. The authorization of over 100 person-years for investigator positions provided indication to staff that their work was considered important. The new resources were expected to enable investigations to take a more pro-active approach to enforcement and to neglected areas such as criminality, self-reported infractions, and relationships with other organizations involved in immigration enforcement.

15.112 A number of other management actions were taken, both at national headquarters and in the regions to rebuild the investigation function. At headquarters, groups dedicated to enforcement policy and operations were established to provide leadership and functional direction to the investigation function. An investigator's guide was produced. A national investigations working group was formed to identify problems and recommend solutions. New equipment for investigators was procured, and a review of problems with information support systems for investigators was launched. Headquarters is in the process of developing its monitoring capability over investigations. The control over the caseload is being improved through the implementation of a computerized case management system in the large regions.

15.113 EIC has established priorities for investigation activities. In descending order, they are: investigating cases of criminality involving visitors and permanent residents; searching for refugee claimants who fail to show up for their inquiry or removal; following up on tips received from the public; dealing with self-reported cases; and investigating overstays, illegal workers and other illegal migrants.

15.114 These initiatives testify to serious efforts by management to improve the quality and results of investigations. However, significant improvements still need to be made.

More efficient investigations needed

15.116 Direct access to the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) is needed. We noted from departmental files that extensive delays are experienced in obtaining information through CPIC. If EIC had its own CPIC terminals, the investigator's ability to obtain information and to monitor cases involving allegations of serious criminality would be greatly enhanced. Under the present system, getting information through CPIC can take four months or more. EIC has never applied to get direct access to CPIC. We have been advised by the RCMP that direct access could be obtained, and EIC is currently preparing an application.

15.117 The efficiency and operational effectiveness of immigration controls depend largely on the ability of officials to make positive identifications of individuals. The multiplicity of originating countries and the sophistication of modern technology make it difficult to recognize false documentation when it is used.

15.118 Investigations and enforcement actions such as removals are also affected by difficulties in securing positive identification of individuals.

15.119 The above difficulties reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of immigration controls and enforcement. Fingerprinting all visa applicants and refugee claimants would reduce the cost of the program and would be a major step in helping EIC achieve its control and enforcement objectives. It would also improve control over citizenship applicants as reported in chapter 28 (see paragraphs 28.74 and 28.75).

15.120 EIC should consider the necessity of fingerprinting all visa applicants and refugees claimants.

Response from EIC: EIC will carefully consider this recommendation taking into account possible delays and costs. Fingerprinting of refugee claimants in the backlog has been underway since the spring of 1990 without undue use of resources.

Removals

The majority of orders for removal of refugee claimants has not been carried out

15.122 To ensure due process, the Act has established judicial procedures for removals. Denial of admission to or removal from Canada can be ordered only by an independent adjudicator after a quasi-judicial hearing of the Minister's representative and the person concerned. Most removal orders may be appealed to the Federal Court.

15.123 We found that rejected refugee claimants are less likely to be removed than non-claimants. In a sample of 217 refugee claimants who were subject to an enforceable removal order in the Quebec Region, we found that 64 percent had not been removed. Exhibit 15.4 illustrates the proportion of those removed and the reasons for delaying removals or cancelling their effect in the other cases. During the same period, only 20 percent of the 313 enforceable removal orders issued to persons who were not refugee claimants were not carried out.

Exhibit not available

15.124 Our sample indicated that 24 percent of removal orders affecting refugee claimants in 1989 were temporarily suspended for claimants from countries experiencing conditions of war or civil strife (i.e. through moratoria). Such suspensions and other delays have, in the past, provided strong assurance of non-removal to some groups on the basis of nationality.

15.125 In another sample of 103 cases appealed to the Federal Court and denied, we found that 24 individuals, less than 25 percent, had been removed.

15.126 The cancellation of enforcement actions in so many cases has a negative impact on the morale of EIC staff. Those interviewed have consistently stated that while they personally try to maintain a level of professionalism in carrying out their functions, this situation does affect their enthusiasm for their work.

15.127 Although the resources dedicated to enforcement are substantial and growing, we question the economy, efficiency, and operational effectiveness of a process where the carrying out of enforcement actions (removals) is the exception rather than the rule.

15.128 EIC should review its enforcement strategy in order to improve the cost-effectiveness of the enforcement process.

Response from EIC: EIC regularly reviews and updates its enforcement strategy. A major review resulted, in 1988/89, in Treasury Board allocating additional resources for the function. A senior management steering committee reviews on a quarterly basis the use of enforcement resources.

Minister's Permits

The use of Minister's permits creates inefficiencies

15.130 The power to issue a Minister's permit is delegated by the Minister to managers of Canada Immigration Centres (CICs) and to immigration program managers abroad. To improve the speed of service, this authority was further delegated to EIC supervisors as of 1 April 1990.

15.131 From January to November 1989, according to EIC statistics, 33,400 Minister's permits were issued or renewed. Permits are issued to, among others, persons who have not obtained visas, persons who have committed offenses in other countries which, if committed in Canada, would be punishable under an Act of Parliament, visitors who appear at Immigration Centres after their visas have expired, persons who are ill and come to Canada for treatment, and persons who have lost their status, through overstaying or otherwise, and applied for landing in Canada.

15.132 Control activities and investigations identify many cases involving infractions by visitors where removal from Canada is not warranted. To allow these persons to remain in Canada and to comply with the legislation, their cases must be reported in writing to a senior immigration officer. These individuals are not directed to immigration inquiry by the senior immigration officer. However, they have violated the Immigration Act and a Minister's permit must be issued for them to remain in Canada. The process of legitimizing the status of these individuals involves perfunctory or pro forma activities.

15.133 One example of such pro forma activities is the following:

A temporary foreign worker comes one day late to a Canada Immigration Centre to obtain an extension to his employment authorization. The immigration officer is faced with an observed infraction to the Immigration Act, which must be the subject of a written report under section 27 of the Act. The officer will recommend to a senior immigration officer that this infraction not be referred to inquiry, as the circumstances would not warrant removal of the person from Canada. Having received concurrence and the required approval of a supervisor, the officer will legalize the status of the individual through the issuance of a second document, a Minister's permit. Finally, a third document, a new employment authorization, will be issued.

15.135 Initially, a Minister's permit was seen as being administratively the most efficient method of permitting the entry of prohibited immigrants and visitors when this seemed desirable. The Act specifically precludes the use of Minister's permits to cancel a removal order. However, a procedure nicknamed the Buffalo Shuffle is sometimes used to circumvent this restriction. While in strictly legal terms this procedure is considered valid, Minister's permits were not intended to cancel the effect of a removal order, certainly not through the inefficient process outlined below.

15.136 For example, before effecting the removal of a person whose refugee claim was not recognized by the IRB, a post-claim review is done by EIC. If the review decision allows an application for landing in Canada, the removal order must first be carried out through the Buffalo Shuffle, which generally follows the steps described below.

• National headquarters advises the appropriate inland CIC of the decision.
• The individual is requested to come to the CIC, where the decision and procedures are explained.
• The shuffle is initiated at the convenience of the individual.
• The inland CIC sends a letter to the CIC at a border crossing to advise it that the entry of this individual is authorized.
• A letter is sent to the American immigration authorities advising them that the person will be readmitted into Canada through the issuance of a Minister's permit.
• An appointment is requested from the closest Canadian visa office in the United States with instructions to issue a Minister's permit.
• The individual reports to the visa office on the agreed appointment date, picks up the Minister's permit, and returns to Canada.
• The individual makes an appointment with an immigration officer at an inland CIC to begin the procedures to become a permanent resident.

15.138 This procedure is further complicated by the fact that American authorities demand, on occasion, the use of a Canadian escort in cases where the subject is considered by them to be dangerous, even though the escorting officer has no legal authority while in the United States.

15.139 A program evaluation in 1987 of inland control and enforcement identified pro forma activities as a factor impeding the efficiency and effectiveness of inland enforcement activities. The evaluation recommended amendment of the Act to remove the sections dealing with infractions that are not being enforced. To date, the situation remains unchanged.

15.140 Since 1980, more than 80 percent of the Minister's permits issued and renewed were for persons seeking entry to Canada as members of a class designated as "other inadmissible persons" under section 19 (2) d) of the Act. This latter category does not include persons inadmissible for medical, security, or criminal reasons, but those inadmissible because they are not well documented. Either they do not have a visa, a passport, or an employment or student authorization, or they are applying for landing in Canada.

15.141 In our 1982 report we recommended that national headquarters establish systems for monitoring and analysing data on the issue and renewal of Minister's permits. EIC concurred with the recommendation and established a coding system to provide more detailed information on Minister's permit holders. In our 1985 follow-up to the 1982 audit, EIC indicated that it would monitor the delivery of Minister's permits.

15.142 While EIC has improved its information base, it still does not use it to monitor the situation.

15.143 EIC should:

• consider more efficient means of legitimizing, where appropriate, the status of individuals involved in infractions to the Act; and
• take steps to monitor and analyse the use of Minister's permits.

EIC will continue to monitor all permits issued under certain categories (principally related to security) as we have done for the past two years. EIC will analyse the data received through the monitoring of Minister's permits which was put in place in the Spring of 1990. In consultation with the Regions, we will study the apparent practice of routinely issuing permits for minor violations where there are no humanitarian or compassionate grounds not to direct an inquiry.

Field Operations Support System

Access to the Field Operations Support System and quality of data need to be improved

15.145 Our work in the areas of employment authorizations, Minister's permits, and security screening indicated that FOSS data were incomplete, unreliable, and sometimes misleading, and consequently did not meet the operational requirements for control and enforcement.

15.146 Our examination established that these deficiencies are the result of improper information entry procedures, terminal sharing among employees, and inability to access the FOSS information because of network difficulties. Our review of files and interviews with departmental officials demonstrated that management is aware of the problems and has considered the impacts, but has as yet been only partially successful in resolving them.

15.147 Some CICs visited had established logbooks at the request of management to record systems downtime and availability. But CIC staff told us that because of frequent problems and because national headquarters was slow in resolving technical difficulties, the logbooks had fallen into disuse and were eventually abandoned.

15.148 At the time of the audit, EIC was attempting to improve and upgrade its communications network facilities. In view of the increased transaction volumes expected from other users, this is particularly important and would help to improve and facilitate immigration control and enforcement.

15.149 Our examination also revealed that there was substantial discontent with the implementation of a management information module, which often produced erroneous results about CIC processing volumes. Regional offices were concerned because these volumes are intended for use in the allocation of resources. This has led to much lost time and energy in the regions.

15.150 FOSS as a record-keeper of issued documents is considered good and essential by its users in delivering the Immigration Program. It is, however, ineffective when aggregate information is needed by centres or regions on cases processed and has very little or no built-in controls for follow-up of terms and conditions of stay.

15.151 Almost all Immigration staff interviewed by us indicated that the unreliability of access to FOSS and its contents affect the quality of their work. In part because of these shortcomings, some CICs have implemented local systems on micro-computer networks to provide them with management and operational information. We examined information from one such system in the Quebec region and, because of its closeness to the users, we found the data to be highly accurate, reliable, and useful for generating management information. Some of this information duplicates FOSS data, which is possibly why staff have not kept the FOSS system up to date.

15.152 EIC should upgrade the Field Operations Support System to meet the operational needs of its centres.

Response from EIC: The FOSS is a system that is continually evolving. In recent years, service to the public has been improved by implementing and expanding FOSS, with the inclusion of full document entry and more equipment.

The communications network has been upgraded considerably since the audit observations were made. Approval to install a new communications network, CEINET, is expected soon and pilot projects combining voice and data systems are well underway.

EIC has created a Technology Working Group to provide a forum for regional and local office staff to advise national headquarters of changes in operational needs. A training data base and on-line help screens have recently been made available to all staff in an effort to improve system use and data entry. All these activities have alleviated previous difficulties in accessing the FOSS systems.