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1991 Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Main Points

5.1 Over time, government has established Royal Commissions and other reviews to examine the management practices of the federal public service. The most recent has resulted in a policy for public service reform to improve services to the public, Public Service (PS) 2000. The objectives of this initiative are supported by our Office. The proposed changes are significant both in terms of the departments and agencies involved and the range of problems they address. Their implementation has just begun (paragraphs 5.6 and 5.10).

5.2 The purpose of the study reported in this chapter is to address, early in the reform process, whether we believe that further consideration needs to be given to certain aspects of the reforms as they are being implemented. In particular, we examined the guidance being provided to managers on implementing the desired reforms while still meeting parliamentary control requirements (5.24, 5.25 and 5.29).

5.3 We have drawn on a number of innovative practices, influenced by financial restraints, in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to illustrate our comments. They show initiatives by managers on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to improve the delivery of services at a lower cost to taxpayers. All of these initiatives were started prior to the current reforms - some over 10 years ago - but are considered by managers to be consistent with many of the goals of PS2000. They demonstrate the commitment of public servants to improving programming, getting the job done and meeting the needs of the fishermen, while minimizing the public funds spent by the Department (5.30 to 5.39, 5.43 to 5.48 and 5.57).

5.4 In these cases public servants at Fisheries and Oceans have been innovative in their solutions to improving service, which they implemented with good intentions. However, because of the particular approach fisheries managers have chosen in implementing these solutions and financing them, these initiatives do not, in our opinion, satisfy the requirements for parliamentary control. The government has informed us that there are other cases in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and other departments where managers have successfully reconciled innovation with the parliamentary control framework (5.40 to 5.42, 5.49 to 5.54 and 5.58).

5.5 As shown in our illustrations, certain managers have encountered difficulty in reconciling programming initiatives, taken to improve services and respond to financial restraints, with the parliamentary control framework. Since an appropriate parliamentary control framework is part of the new culture advocated by PS2000, it is important in this period of change that managers understand, through training and guidance, how this framework will be applied in the new environment (5.24 to 5.29 and 5.56).

Introduction

5.6 Over time, government has established Royal Commissions and other reviews to examine the management practices of the public service. The most recent has resulted in a policy for public service reform to improve service to the public, Public Service (PS) 2000. The initiative was launched by the Prime Minister in December 1989 and is the subject of a Government White Paper, issued in December 1990, entitled Public Service 2000 - The Renewal of the Public Service of Canada .

5.7 The White Paper deals with approaches to improving human resource management and reforming management and administrative systems. It includes a significant message to program managers to improve the delivery of services despite constraints. The pressure to improve services with constrained resources has been with government managers for some time and is being addressed through efforts to increase productivity. As part of the PS2000 reform process, public servants are being challenged to further improve or increase services through innovative and creative changes to programming.

5.8 Initiatives to improve services often require new resources. These may be obtained through traditional means such as increased efficiency, reallocation of dollars and staff from other programs or through increased departmental appropriations in cases of particular urgency. Today, part of the challenge for public service managers is to find innovative ways of financing service improvements.

5.9 Government and the public service must discharge their responsibilities within the laws and framework provided by Parliament. The White Paper on Public Service 2000 establishes as a principle of management that any new approaches to improving services are expected to operate within this same framework. At the same time there is a conscious shift from a focus on being "error free" toward "risk-taking and innovation aimed at doing a better job."

5.10 The objectives of the PS2000 reform initiative are supported by our Office. The proposed changes are significant both in terms of the departments and agencies involved and the range of problems they address. Their implementation has just begun.

5.11 The White Paper recognizes that proposed changes will not be easy and will undoubtedly be accompanied by mistakes. To facilitate reform, it argues, a fundamental change in attitudes is required on the part of all public servants and those who deal with them.

Purpose of the Study

5.12 This Office has, on occasion, reported on difficulties related to effective implementation of financial management and control reforms. The purpose of the study is to address, early in the reform process, whether we believe that further consideration needs to be given to certain aspects of the reforms as they are being implemented. In particular, we examined the guidance being provided to managers on implementing the desired reforms while still meeting parliamentary control requirements.

5.13 We examined a number of initiatives that have been taken by managers in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, in an attempt to change programs to improve services without drawing more funds from the Department's budgets. These initiatives originated prior to the publication of the White Paper. As well, we interviewed a number of managers to determine how they believed PS2000 supported these initiatives. We also examined the changing environment for public service managers and the guidance being provided to them as part of PS2000.

The Changing Environment for Public Service Managers

The challenge to improve services
5.14 The White Paper on Public Service 2000 and our Office argue that one of the obstacles to improving services is the government's complex set of personnel, administrative and financial rules and reporting requirements. The challenge faced by managers, under the government's new management philosophy, is how to improve service delivery with less emphasis on administration and control in a period of resource restraint. The thrust of the policy is to place more discretionary authority in the hands of individual public servants, who are to be held accountable for their actions. They are to be empowered and encouraged to be innovative to get the job done in the most efficient and effective way.

5.15 The reform is not intended to weaken parliamentary control; at the same time, it proposes to eliminate all but essential controls, as a means of providing more resources for the delivery of services. This includes reducing rules and decentralizing authority, while emphasizing the delivery of services, and the creation of a results-oriented culture. At the same time, management is expected to operate under existing parliamentary laws and control and accountability structures. Under this approach, managers are expected to have a common understanding of what is to be done, what requirements apply, and how they will be held accountable.

The dilemma for program managers
5.16 Information has been provided to managers on the philosophy of the cultural change involved. Changes to legislation and central agency policies are now taking place. Yet program managers must make immediate programming decisions based on the information available to them. In this environment of change, do they understand the effect these changes have on the way the principles of parliamentary control are to be applied? As they are making program decisions, do they know which controls will continue to apply and which will no longer apply? Or which controls Parliament expects to be applied?

The Parliamentary Control Framework

5.17 Under our system of government, the will of Parliament is supreme, as expressed through the laws it enacts, its appropriation of funds, and the limits it imposes on the funds it approves for government programs. The machinery of financial control to support the will of Parliament is the responsibility of government. Parliament sets the purposes of, and limits to, expenditures and government provides further guidance to public servants on the mechanisms to be used to meet these requirements.

5.18 A fundamental right of Parliament is to control the generation of revenue and its expenditure through the use of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Parliament has exclusive control over the right to levy taxes and the authority to spend revenues. This means that all expenditures must be approved by Parliament; all revenues must be deposited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund; and an accurate and complete accounting for expenditures, revenues and what was achieved must be made to Parliament, and must be audited.

5.19 It is the responsibility of managers to implement and uphold both the letter and the spirit of the laws established by Parliament and related regulations. The laws themselves tend to be complex legal documents that set out the objectives for programs, often in general - not operational - terms. Government and its central agencies provide further guidance in the form of rules and guidelines and training on how to implement parliamentary direction and how to account to Parliament for expenditures against budgets, for revenues and for achievements.

Implementing administrative and management reform
5.20 Past efforts at administrative and management reform illustrate the challenge faced by government managers in taking reform recommendations and putting them into practice in government operations. Experience has shown how difficult it has been to meet the reform objectives. Among the factors that have been identified as contributing to these difficulties are the partial implementation of reform recommendations and a lack of understanding on the part of senior officials of the requirements of effective management and control of public funds.

Progress in financial management
5.21 Government has been building on the lessons of the past. A 1987 study of financial management and control by this Office found some major improvement in control practices and procedures in departments (1987: 4.26). A follow-up audit in 1989 found further initiatives to improve financial management and control with several important measures still to be undertaken (1989: 25.56).

Effective Change

Adapting to cultural change
5.22 Social scientists who have studied how organizations manage change successfully point out that two important facets have to be taken into account. The first is that all members of the organization have to be committed to and understand the common goal that is to be achieved. The second is that they have to be provided with the means to accomplish the common goal.

5.23 For successful adaptation to the "new culture" in the public service, individual public servants need a clear sense of the extent to which both goals and the means for achieving them have changed. A poor fit between what is expected of managers and the means available to them for achieving it can result in undesirable solutions to problems ranging from unproductive approaches to developing initiatives that cannot be accommodated within existing control structures.

Need for consistent message on the requirements for parliamentary control in the new environment
5.24 Some of the documentation related to PS2000 presently being provided to public service managers on changing an organization's culture and motivating staff gives a conflicting message. There are instances where they are advised that adaptive and innovative organizations do not allow rules and procedures to stand in the way of results. Such general discretion on the part of public servants cannot always be reconciled with traditional requirements for parliamentary control. Suggestions in this documentation that public servants "dismantle constraints" or "work around constraints" or "bypass" or "escape" the system ought not to be applied in a way that undermines parliamentary control.

5.25 Public servants are being motivated to be innovative, results-oriented, and willing to take risks. They also must know what continuing obligations have to be met, and how these are to be met. The information provided by government and the central agencies needs to provide guidance on how parliamentary control can be reconciled with implementing innovation in programming. Managers need to know who to contact for information and how to obtain approval and resolutions for what may appear to be an exception.

The dilemma for managers: reconciling innovation with parliamentary control
5.26 Other audits in this year's report have identified difficulties managers have experienced in implementing innovative programming. For example, in the Department of Agriculture managers have developed new and innovative farm safety-net programs based on federal-provincial agreements (10.29). However, existing safety-net programs based on similar agreements have presented problems for the Department in fully implementing important parliamentary financial controls (10.4 to 10.7).

5.27 To respond to both financial constraints and demands to improve services, managers at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans have been making programming changes. These initiatives all originated prior to the publication of the White Paper. Some began over 10 years ago; others were implemented this past year. These managers saw the PS2000 philosophy as supportive of the changes they had made in programming and financing to improve services.

5.28 The government has informed us that there are other cases in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and other departments where managers have successfully reconciled innovation with the parliamentary control framework. The illustrations that follow, however, show the difficulties managers encountered in meeting the parliamentary control requirements they must satisfy with respect to:

  • ensuring that programming changes meet the requirements of the Fisheries legislation and related regulations;
  • ensuring that new ways of financing, such as barter, meet the requirements of the Financial Administration Act; and
  • ensuring that Parliament is fully informed of how the Department's responsibilities are carried out and financed.
5.29 In some instances, central agencies have not developed mechanisms to meet these requirements; for example, on how to account for barter or other activities carried on outside of government. Guidance on how innovative practices can be reconciled with the requirement for parliamentary control and accountability would help to ensure that fundamental principles were not overlooked. It could be provided as one of the steps being taken to change the public service culture and would support further necessary steps to proper implementation. It could also help managers to responsibly manage risks.

Illustrations from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans

5.30 Like many other government departments, Fisheries and Oceans is feeling the pressure of resource constraints. While the demand for improvements in programs and services has continued to grow, budgets have been reduced.

5.31 The Department has a long tradition of working closely with fishermen and the fishing industry. Its decentralized structure permits close contact with its clientele and an understanding of its needs. Eighty-six percent of its staff is located outside headquarters in its six regions.

5.32 Two innovative methods of program delivery that we reviewed are the new quota monitoring and test fishing initiatives. Quota monitoring is designed to support the enforcement of individual quotas. Test fishing is done to collect information on the quantities and maturity of fish to determine times for opening and closing the various fisheries. The Department undertook these initiatives for the benefit of the fishermen.

1. Quota Monitoring

Problem: how to improve management of the competitive fishery
5.33 Fish have traditionally been harvested on a competitive basis in Canada. Under this management approach, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans sets an overall quota, or a total allowable catch for a given species and lets all licensed fishermen compete for a share. The Department controls the opening of the fishery and closes it when it believes the limit of the allowable catch is reached. In this way it attempts to conserve fish stocks through limiting the length of time the fishery is open. In some fisheries, the race to catch the fish in the time allowed resulted in a lower value received for the product and led to increased and excessive catching capacity. As well, the race for the fish encouraged fishing in unsafe weather conditions. As a result, for those fisheries, seasons became shorter. For example, in the Pacific sablefish fishery in 1981, 2,900 tons were taken in a season lasting 245 days, while in 1989, 5,200 tons were taken in a season of 14 days.

One solution: change to individual quotas
5.34 One solution being increasingly turned to by fisheries managers to improve fisheries management is to set individual quotas for each licence holder. Managing in this way involves dividing the total allowable catch among all licensed fishermen, so that they each know their share before fishing begins. With this system, fishermen do not have the same incentive to overinvest in harvesting capacity or to catch as much as they can during a short fishing season. In addition, processors can more efficiently handle the catch. They can harvest their own quotas at their own pace, resulting in greater efficiency, safety and improved prices over a longer season.

The Department has the authority to initiate changes in fisheries management
5.35 The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is charged with the responsibility of managing the fisheries under the Fisheries Act and the Fisheries Development Act. The Minister has the power, subject to the regulatory process and other legislative requirements, to implement a regime of individual quotas in those fisheries where it is deemed appropriate.

The requirement to finance increased monitoring cost
5.36 One of the implications of introducing individual quotas, however, is that monitoring and enforcement requirements increase. Instead of one overall quota, many individual quotas must be monitored. Since fishermen can reach the limits of their quotas at different times, greater costs are incurred in gathering information on the fish caught. If the Department itself were to conduct the additional monitoring activity, it would need additional resources or a reallocation of existing resources. Fisheries managers solved the problem by having the fishermen, as the direct beneficiaries, pay the costs of the increased monitoring requirements.

5.37 It was decided to encourage the establishment of private monitoring arrangements. The monitoring function is one which the Department could delegate to a third party with the appropriate arrangements in place. Private monitoring companies would weigh every catch before it went to the processor and provide data on the catches to the Department as specified. The monitoring activity was to be self-funded and self-administered; as well, participation was to be self-enforced by the fishermen. The Department intended to remain at arm's length to the arrangement by having the monitoring service provided directly to the fishermen by the private sector. In this way, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans believed that neither the restrictions on its ability to raise and spend funds nor the requirements of the regulatory process to control changes in licence fees would apply.

5.38 The Department implemented the program by establishing, through agreements, the obligations of private companies for monitoring. The Department withholds licences from fishermen until advance payments for monitoring are made. Thus the fishermen, if they want to obtain their licences, must fund the monitoring activity (see Case 1 and Case 2 ).

Individual quotas are seen as beneficial
5.39 The Department believes the move to individual quotas has the support of most of the fishermen involved. In implementing this system, Fisheries and Oceans has met a number of its objectives. One of these is to involve the fishermen in managing the resource, which in turn improves the credibility and acceptance of fisheries management decisions. The Department believes that significant program benefits have been realized in the cases of the Pacific Sablefish and affected Gulf of St. Lawrence fisheries. However, the manner in which this initiative has been implemented raises a number of concerns.

Lack of fit with the parliamentary control framework
5.40 The financing of these individual quota monitoring arrangements is not "at arms length" - that is, exclusively provided by the private sector - as planned. In these cases, the Department has ensured the payment of the fees by making proof of advance payment a condition of obtaining a licence. It is also often instrumental in setting the fees that fishermen will pay the private company. Fisheries and Oceans managers believed this additional support was required to ensure the program's initial success and monitoring companies' longer term survival.

5.41 Since this service was being provided by the private sector, the Department did not consider it necessary to clarify the regulations related to generating or spending revenue. However, its exclusive right to grant fishing licences was used to ensure that funds were paid to a third party as a prerequisite to fishermen obtaining their licences. As a result, it was not clear whether these funds should have been deposited in the Consolidated Revenue Fund as an additional licence fee. Under the current arrangement, the revenues are not completely outside of government, nor are they subject to parliamentary controls for collection, spending and accounting. While departmental managers believed that the arrangements were appropriate, changes were being planned to address the above concerns.

Full costs are not reported to Parliament
5.42 The nature of the arrangement and the full costs have not been reported to Parliament. Part III of the Department's 1991-92 Estimates identifies monitoring of individual quotas and collection of data as key components of the enforcement of regulations. The establishment of individual quotas for sablefish and its cost is mentioned in the supplementary information. The implementation of individual quotas is also mentioned as an achievement of Atlantic fisheries management. However, there is no disclosure of the estimated costs of monitoring the quotas in the case of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, expected to be paid in 1991 by fishermen as a condition of obtaining a licence.

2. Test Fishing

Problem: how to gather essential data using fewer resources
5.43 Data on all aspects of the fisheries resource are essential to fisheries management. The Department needs information on abundance, migration and spawning patterns for fisheries management purposes such as determining how many fish can be harvested. The fishermen also have an interest in knowing where fish are, and their quantity, size and maturity.

One solution: contract test fishing out to fishermen
5.44 Testing the fish stocks requires specialized equipment and vessels, as well as skippers and crew who are competent in the waters and in the fishery. These resources are needed at specific times of the year, often for short periods. To meet these requirements without increasing the number of government vessels and crews, the Department has chartered experienced fishermen and their boats.

5.45 These individual charters can be expensive, particularly in cases where fishermen under contract are not able to participate in the commercial fishery. For example, individual charters to carry out testing in the herring roe fishery on the west coast can range in value from $174,000 to $230,000 per charter (1990).

5.46 With traditional financing approaches apparently closed to them, the Department's managers developed an alternative approach to financing test fishing by granting special fishing access to participating fishermen. Part or all of the costs of conducting the test fishing are paid by allowing the participating fishermen special access to the fishery, when others are not allowed to fish. In addition, guarantees often provide assurance that the estimated costs to the fishermen of test fishing charters will be fully covered, with the Department receiving any surplus (see Case 3 and Case 4 ).

5.47 As appropriations become more limited, this approach to financing fish management requirements has increasing appeal. For example, the value of test fishing charters for salmon has increased from $0.5 million in 1980-81 to $1.4 million in 1989-90 (constant dollars) in the Pacific region.

Test fishing arrangements are viewed as beneficial
5.48 The advantages of proceeding with test fishing under the chartering option are persuasive to Department of Fisheries and Oceans managers. The Department can meet the information needs of its clients and managers. It also provides the Department with a means of using experienced fishermen with the needed equipment. This has the added advantage that the Department does not make unrealistic demands on its own vessels and crews, thereby remaining operationally flexible. By financing the charters with fish, the Department does not draw on its operation and maintenance funds.

5.49 The Department argues that significant program benefits have been realized. For example, in 1988, Pacific herring on the Canadian coast sold for approximately $2,630 Canadian a ton compared to approximately $1,216 Canadian a ton for the same type of fish in Alaska. However, the way this initiative has been implemented and financed raises a number of control and accountability concerns.

Lack of fit with the parliamentary control framework: lack of clarity in the authority
5.50 We raised questions in 1983 about the appropriateness of using the fisheries resource to pay for chartering vessels. The Department obtained conflicting legal opinions. It is not clear that Parliament has provided the Department of Fisheries and Oceans with the right to pay for services either in fish or by allowing fishermen special access to fish. This situation was never clarified. Nor did it provide guidance for its managers on the circumstances in which the approach could be used and still satisfy the legislation. As a result, managers interpreted their options in different ways. Managers and staff in the Pacific believed that the problems raised in the past had been addressed through procedural changes, and continued the practice. Other regions, for the most part, were still not convinced that the practice was allowable. Recognizing that there are differing views on this matter, Fisheries and Oceans has indicated that it is taking steps to clarify the way it conducts test fishing to alleviate any concerns.

The problem with barter
5.51 In providing fish or special fishing rights to some fishermen in return for their services, the Department, in our opinion, has essentially used a form of barter. The quantity of fish allowed to each fisherman in return for specified testing is set out in a contract. These contracts with the fishermen are the means the Department uses to formalize the practice.

5.52 Barter is not covered by the traditional parliamentary control practices and procedures of the Government of Canada. This means that the test fishing activity takes place largely outside the existing framework of parliamentary control and accountability. The contracts with test fishermen determine the quantity of fish that may be caught and set the conditions of the barter arrangement by providing a basis for determining its value. Value expressed in terms of access to amounts of fish is outside of the existing framework for controlling and accounting for departmental transactions. It requires special practices for control and accounting.

Inappropriate use has been made of a non-tax revenue account
5.53 Where there have been surpluses under the contracts, the funds have been deposited in a Department of Fisheries and Oceans non-tax revenue account. Regional officials have, without proper authorization as required by the Financial Administration Act, paid for contract deficits out of this account. In this way, the region has been able to make each test fishery pay for itself without using appropriated funds. In 1990, the Department made payments from the non-tax revenue account totalling $319,242. In developing these mechanisms to accommodate the barter arrangement, the Department is operating the non-tax revenue account like a revolving fund without having the authority to do so. The Department recognizes that the use of this account was improper and has discontinued its use.

5.54 The value of the test fishing is reported in Part III of the Department's 1991-92 Estimates but has not been reported systematically in the past. This type of reporting does not meet the requirements of parliamentary control and accountability. Parliament has not approved the expenditure as part of the budget, or received a full report of revenues and expenditures compared with budgets, or of results achieved.

Summing Up

5.55 As part of the government's new management philosophy, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on changing the organizational culture. Much has been written and said about the importance of changing the pattern of shared beliefs, assumptions and behaviour that members of government organizations acquire over time. The same emphasis has not been placed on providing public servants with guidance on how to cope with the requirements of parliamentary control in this new environment.

5.56 The challenge for public service managers is to improve service within the framework approved by Parliament. With the pressures to deliver programs with fewer resources, the incentive to finance new initiatives other than by appropriations is strong. As part of the PS2000 White Paper, reform of the financial resource management system is proposed. A number of amendments to the Financial Administration Act have already been put in place. The challenge is how to use new financing initiatives to improve service, while ensuring that essential control and accountability requirements are met.

5.57 Our examples illustrate initiatives by Department of Fisheries and Oceans managers on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to improve the delivery of services at a lower cost to taxpayers. They show the commitment of public servants to improving programming, getting the job done and meeting the needs of the fishermen, while minimizing the public funds spent by the Department. Public servants at Fisheries and Oceans have been innovative in their solutions to improving service, which they implemented with good intentions. They feel current reform initiatives of Public Service 2000 support their initiative and the risks they have taken.

5.58 However, because of the particular approach that fisheries managers have chosen in implementing these solutions and financing them, they do not in our opinion satisfy the requirements for parliamentary control. Despite their successful aspects, these cases in our opinion are examples of departures from current practice.

5.59 DFO managers remain highly committed to improving services to the fishermen and the industry, as well as meeting their parliamentary obligations. They are in the process of reviewing the cases that have been described, to ensure that there is no doubt that all requirements are met. A number of different programming approaches are being examined in consultation with the client groups.

5.60 Some potential solutions to reconciling the financing of the initiatives in our illustrations with the parliamentary control structure may lie in such financing instruments as vote netting or revolving funds provided for in the recent amendments to the Financial Administration Act. Guidance needs to be provided to managers on how, and in what circumstances, these may be used. Managers also need to know how approvals can be obtained for such instruments and how to report their use to Parliament.

Response on behalf of government: Innovation and responsible risk-taking constitute the core themes of the Government's commitment to the renewal of the Public Service through Public Service 2000. In the Public Service 2000 White Paper, the government left no doubt that ". . . there must be greater freedom to innovate and make the best possible use of scarce resources (and) if there is not, the Public Service... will not be capable of serving Canada and Canadians effectively." The White Paper went on to say that this would require "... fundamental changes in attitudes by Public Servants, by Ministers, by Parliamentarians and ultimately by the public." In short, the achievement of the goals of Public Service 2000 will require a lot of effort by many. The support of the Office of the Auditor General expressed in this chapter is a welcome contribution to that effort. The Government looks forward to working with the Office in bringing about the fundamental changes in attitude that will be required.

In order to encourage entrepreneurial innovation and responsible risk-taking, Public Service 2000 recognizes the need to streamline administrative, financial, and personnel practices, and to remove ineffective or redundant controls "... to ensure that the only rules are good and necessary rules." Basic principles of Parliamentary accountability will, as a result, be emphasized as Public Service 2000 is pushed forward. The examples cited in this chapter were initiated before the Public Service 2000 initiative. As Public Service 2000 proceeds, essential rules will be highlighted so that managers can more ably avoid pitfalls in reconciling innovative initiatives with the Parliamentary accountability framework. In the words of the White Paper, "As Public Service 2000 simplifies the Public Service's administration ... the importance of effective accountability based on shared values is going to become correspondingly greater."

The Government is convinced that the Parliamentary accountability framework affords substantial scope for innovation and responsible risk-taking. Recognizing, however, that the ultimate authority and accountability requirements governing the Public Service rest with Parliament, the Government also suggested in the White Paper that Parliamentarians could themselves consider changes to further the aims of Public Service 2000. In this vein, a significant contribution could come from examining the Parliamentary accountability framework to ensure that it is consistent with the changing management environment in the Public Service and that it properly reflects the needs of Parliamentarians in relation to the changes taking place. For example, substantial improvements in reporting through the Estimates have been made in the last decade. These improvements potentially offer a basis for building increased flexibility into the Parliamentary accountability framework. Much of the current framework was conceived at a time when Parliament depended on a large body of legislation and regulations to ensure that its intent would be respected. With the improvements to the reporting regime, however, Parliamentarians are much more aware of both planned expenditures and results achieved. Ample opportunity exists, for Parliamentarians and others, to delve into program areas both within individual departments and across the government to ensure that the purposes for which funds are appropriated are achieved. This, combined with Regulatory Reform and Access to Information legislation, has resulted in a Public Service that is more open and visible that at any previous time.

The Treasury Board Secretariat and the Office of the Comptroller General would welcome the opportunity to collaborate with the Office of the Auditor General in identifying opportunities to strengthen or refine the Parliamentary accountability framework. This would involve breaking new ground by challenging those structures and processes which are redundant or which inhibit cost effective delivery of services to the public. Accountability to Parliament will be strengthened, not reduced, by measures aimed at making the framework more responsive to the needs both of Parliamentarians and of federal departments and agencies, in the interest ultimately of the people of Canada.