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1992 Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Assistant Auditor General: Len McGimpsey
Responsible Auditor: Alan Gilmore

Main Points

24.2 In general, long-standing problems in federal emergency planning are not being addressed within a reasonable time frame. For example:

• Five years after we raised the issue, the general part (Part I) of the National Earthquake Support Plan (NESP), which provides a framework for further planning, is nearing completion. However, Part II of the NESP - departmental emergency support function plans - is still being worked on.
• The Department of the Environment informed Cabinet in June 1991 that although a few of the recommendations of the 1986 Bhopal Aftermath Report have been implemented - for example, the establishment of the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC) - there has been no follow-up action on most of the other important recommendations.
• A 1986 review of the Chernobyl experience recommended major improvements to the federal government's nuclear emergency response plan. Most of these have not been implemented or are in the early stages of development. Revision of the plan should be a priority.
• Mandates for departmental lead roles in emergency planning still need clarification and interdepartmental co-ordination still needs improvement.

24.4 In our opinion, the delays are the result of several factors, including interdepartmental jurisdictional disputes, allocation of resources to other priorities, the complexity of co-ordinating plans with the provinces, and a lack of a sense of urgency, perhaps due to the absence of a recent major disaster in Canada.

24.5 The information provided to Parliament on the status of emergency preparedness on a government-wide basis is inadequate. The government's budget proposals calling for the ending of the requirement for annual departmental reports could almost eliminate disclosure of this information to Parliament unless an alternative method is used.

Introduction

24.7 The Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act were passed by Parliament in 1988, and the War Measures Act and the Emergency Planning Order were revoked. The Emergency Preparedness Act assigns specific responsibilities to Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC), which was established as a department in 1988 to develop and co-ordinate civil emergency planning. The Act requires an annual report to Parliament on the status of emergency planning. It also requires ministers to identify the civil emergency contingencies that are within or related to their areas of accountability, to develop civil emergency plans and to conduct training and exercises. The Emergency Preparedness Act also introduced the concept of national emergency arrangements that made planning for a war crisis a subset of wider emergency planning activities.

24.8 The Emergencies Act gives the government exceptional powers to deal with public welfare, public order, war and other international emergencies. The use of these powers is reserved for situations that seriously endanger Canadians or threaten the ability of the government to survive. The Act stipulates that such a situation must be beyond the authority of the provinces and one that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law. It also requires consultation with the provinces as to whether a national emergency exists.

24.9 Our 1989 Report presented the results of the follow-up of the 1987 audit on emergency preparedness. It reported that EPC had improved departmental co-ordination in planning. Examples included the Federal Working Group on National Earthquake Preparedness and the development of a draft national earthquake plan. However, the audit noted that goals and deadlines for national emergency planning were not adequately stipulated, and recommended that EPC should provide specific advice to departments about roles and responsibilities, resource allocations, and shortcomings.

The Standing Committee on Public Accounts

24.11 The Public Accounts Committee's report contained recommendations for action by EPC with a response required by 31 March 1991. The recommendations include the following:

• EPC should adopt a formal plan, with milestones for assessing progress, to designate lead agencies for specific national emergencies through the adoption of orders and regulations under the Emergency Preparedness Act.
• EPC should improve guidance to departments by identifying their roles and required levels of response for specific national emergencies.
• EPC should complete a National Earthquake Plan in conjunction with the provincial authorities as soon as possible.
• EPC should work with the departments involved in national emergency arrangements to ensure that goals and deadlines are established for the completion and testing of all emergency plans.
• The government should ensure that the departments responsible for national emergency arrangements provide EPC with achievable dates for the completion of their emergency plans and adhere to the milestones set for the completion and testing of these plans.

In Canada, the municipal, provincial and federal governments share responsibility for emergency planning

24.14 It is important to take this division of responsibility into account because it places limits on the extent of detailed emergency planning that can be done at the federal level. It also requires the co-operation of all levels of government to ensure that emergency plans, policies and procedures are complementary.

Audit Objectives and Scope

24.16 We did not review implementation of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act by the Department of Transport, emergency planning for epidemics, or emergency planning for floods, tornados and forest fires. Nor did we review the role and capability of voluntary agencies such as the Canadian Red Cross. An additional caveat should be made. In certain instances in the report we refer to statements made by departments. These statements represent the views of the departments on the issues we have raised. They are included in the report to provide a context for our findings and an indication of the actions planned by departments.

General Assessment

Room for significant improvement

• Five years after we raised the issue, the general part (Part I) of the National Earthquake Support Plan (NESP), which provides a framework for further planning, is nearing completion. However, Part II of the NESP - departmental emergency support function plans - is still being worked on.
• The Department of the Environment informed Cabinet in June 1991 that although a few of the recommendations of the 1986 Bhopal Aftermath Report have been implemented - for example, the establishment of the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC) - there has been no follow-up action on most of the other important recommendations.
• A 1986 review of the Chernobyl experience recommended major improvements to the federal government's nuclear emergency response plan. Most of these have not been implemented or are in the early stages of development. Revision of the plan should be a priority.
• Mandates for departmental lead roles in emergency planning still need clarification and inter-departmental co-ordination still needs improvement.

24.19 In our opinion, the delays are the result of several factors, including inter-departmental jurisdictional disputes, allocation of resources to other priorities, the complexity of co-ordinating plans with the provinces, and a lack of a sense of urgency, perhaps due to the absence of a recent major disaster in Canada. Our detailed findings and conclusions follow.

Departmental Responsibilities

Departmental lead role mandates need to be clarified

24.21 In March 1991, EPC told the Committee "that the more important consideration is the designation of lead ministers for emergency planning with respect to functional areas relating to the adverse effects of emergencies. This is being addressed in the proposed Civil Emergency Preparedness Management Order now being drafted, which will designate lead ministers for functional planning in twelve areas. Consultations with departments on the latest draft of the order are now in their final stages, and it will be submitted to Cabinet soon."

24.22 The proposed Order focussed on re-establishing the departmental lead roles and responsibilities identified in the 1980 Federal Policy on Emergencies and the 1981 Order-in-Council. The Order-in-Council was revoked in 1987.

24.23 The process to develop the Order was initiated in the fall of 1988. EPC believed it was needed because, with very few exceptions, the planning responsibilities of departments with respect to emergencies were not covered elsewhere. However, the Privy Council Office preferred to use Cabinet administrative authority rather than a statutory instrument to designate lead departments and responsibilities for specific sectors of emergency planning. The Privy Council Office believed that ministerial responsibilities are already defined in applicable laws and statutory instruments. In addition, key departments objected to using the 1981 roles and responsibilities as the basis for the Order.

24.24 As a result of the disagreements, the development of the Order was cancelled in January 1992 in favour of a comprehensive policy review.

Interdepartmental co-ordination still needs to be improved

24.26 In late 1989 the Ministers Advisory Committee began to establish broad priorities for government-wide emergency preparedness. It established a list of government-wide priorities in mid-1991. An EPC survey of departments completed in early 1992 found that somewhat more than half of departmental emergency planning activities related to the MACEP-approved priorities. EPC has also improved its monitoring of departmental progress in emergency planning.

24.27 However, until recently, there has been very little progress in co-ordinated interdepartmental emergency planning for major oil and chemical spills, nuclear accidents and earthquakes. For example, departments have only recently agreed upon a basic management structure to deal with earthquake emergencies, and interdepartmental emergency planning for major oil and chemical spills is in the beginning stages. Departments are beginning to enter into bilateral and multilateral memoranda of understanding that define reciprocal responsibilities for specific situations, or to establish interdepartmental committees to sort out responsibilities.

24.28 EPC assured the PAC that "jurisdictional problems occur only rarely and then in the context of the division of responsibilities between federal, provincial and municipal governments." However, EPC's evaluation of CANATEX - a major exercise to test preparedness for a national emergency involving international events - found a probability that there are overlaps of authority, responsibility and resource requirements across national emergency agencies (NEAs), between NEAs and their parent departments, and between NEAs and the central agencies.

24.29 The report noted that, without identification and resolution of overlaps in responsibilities, the overlaps will create confusion when it is least desirable. For example, there could be competing demands for the same resources during a crisis.

Emergencies Act

Debates about the usefulness of the Emergencies Act

24.31 Some departments have expressed concern that the Emergencies Act may not be used by the government to declare a national emergency because of the requirements in the Act for provincial consultation and parliamentary debate and oversight. Without such a declaration, they believe they will not have the authority to immediately and effectively respond in a crisis. Some departments are considering identifying the additional authorities they would need to act in a national emergency in the absence of a declaration or in the face of an escalating crisis; they believe that the Emergencies Act should be revised. The Department of Justice has indicated that this area warrants further examination.

24.32 The Department of National Defence, which now includes EPC, has the primary responsibility for determining whether the legislation warrants amendment. EPC believes that these concerns are unwarranted and that departments may needlessly reduce efforts to prepare for major emergencies because of their concerns. EPC believes that if departments' concerns are valid, the concerns could easily be addressed by preparing draft special legislation as part of departmental emergency preparedness efforts.

CANATEX and Related Issues

24.34 CANATEX was generally regarded by departments as a useful exercise. Many departments observed that the exercise had improved understanding and heightened the awareness of departmental senior management concerning the need for senior-level involvement.

24.35 However, departments and EPC agree that the usefulness of the exercise was reduced because:

• key departments did not fully participate in the exercise as a result of their Gulf Crisis responsibilities; and
• regional and functional capabilities of departments were not tested.

24.37 The EPC review of the CANATEX exercise was reviewed by departments, including the Privy Council Office (PCO). The PCO indicated in March 1991 that it was inappropriate to ask ministers to consider recommendations resulting from CANATEX in the absence of any assessment as to whether the exercise's findings had been validated by the issues that arose during the Gulf Crisis. It recommended that the results of CANATEX be reconsidered in light of the Gulf War experiences, and noted that it was of paramount importance that this analysis be rigorous and all-encompassing. We found that such an assessment had not been conducted. We reviewed departmental reports on lessons learned from the Gulf Crisis as they relate to general emergency preparedness. With the exception of DND, most departments indicated that their capability was not tested to any significant degree.

Results of CANATEX indicate the need for major improvements

• an absence of an up-to-date and complete government emergency book informing departments of what steps to take in the event of an emergency;
• a lack of departmental emergency books informing staff of their responsibilities and the steps to take in the event of an emergency;
• a lack of secure telecommunications;
• inadequacies in civil industrial preparedness; and
• a lack of stated government policy on whether to continue to support public protection measures initiated in the 1950s in response to a threat of nuclear attack, including the warning system, the public shelter program, and radiation monitoring, which are generally in poor condition.

Communication management needs to be improved

Concerns about government crisis management machinery exist

24.41 There is a debate within the government as to whether the central crisis management machinery of government is adequate. The current overall federal structure for crisis management is based on the concept of flexible response, with ad hoc committees of ministers and deputy ministers and mirror committees of lower officials to be created as required.

24.42 The Privy Council Office believes that this approach works well and that the inadequacies identified in the exercise reflect the design of, and the constraints on, the CANATEX exercise.

Response to CANATEX

24.44 The Department of Industry, Science and Technology has formed an interdepartmental committee to address the problems of industrial preparedness, although it indicates that its formation was in response to events arising from the Gulf Crisis.

24.45 In response to the issue of maintaining a warning system, the Department of Communications states that the government intends to rely on available telecommunication facilities to inform the public of emergency situations, rather than set up its own system.

24.46 The Government Emergency Book is a prerequisite to resolving many of the other key concerns. It has been under development for about two years and EPC says that it will be completed in December 1992. However, there are significant debates among departments as to what the book should address.

Medical Stockpiles

24.48 A 1986 departmental internal audit found that the equipment was in generally sound condition and that the stockpile was still required. A study published by EPC in 1988 found that the stockpile was still required and that it should be expanded. However, a subsequent 1989 departmental internal audit found significant concerns among federal, provincial and non-governmental agencies about the contents, locations and maintenance of the stockpiles in 1,150 nationwide sites. The 1989 audit also recommended that the Department study the effectiveness of having stockpiles at the sites. The 1988 and 1989 assessments differ significantly on the usefulness of the stockpiles. Although the differences have not been resolved, the Medical Services Branch of the Department, in response to the 1988 study, and in conjunction with the provinces, has begun a preventive maintenance and refurbishing program, which the Branch believes will also lead to the rationalization of the sites.

Information to Parliament

The disclosure of information on the status of emergency preparedness is not adequate

24.50 At the PAC's request, our Office reviewed information on the status of emergency preparedness provided to the Committee and Parliament. We found that the information identified what each department is doing, but it did not indicate how these actions fit into an overall departmental or government-wide plan to reach a capability to respond to major emergencies. Nor does it provide information on the major issues that still need to be resolved; for example, the problems with the Federal Nuclear Response Plan described below.

Preparedness for Major Disasters

Earthquakes

Background

24.53 The GSC also indicates that there is a "subduction zone" under Vancouver Island. A subduction zone is an area where a plate of the earth's crust is moving under another segment of the crust. According to the GSC, this motion is not continuous but periodic in certain circumstances. That is, plates may be temporarily locked together by friction until enough stress builds up to cause a sudden rupture.

24.54 The GSC indicates that the oceanic crust in the subduction zone under Vancouver island is similar to that in six other locations in the Pacific. At five of these locations there have been mega-earthquakes in recorded history. The latest occurred off the west coast of Mexico in 1985 and caused severe damage. Another characteristic common to these subduction zones is the lack of minor earthquakes along the interface between the plates. The GSC reports that the seismic network on the west coast has not detected any seismic activity on the interface underlying Vancouver Island. Other evidence also suggests that the plates are stuck.

24.55 The subduction zone extends from northern California to northern Vancouver Island. A recent study off the coast of Washington state estimates that there is a 2 to 10 percent risk of a catastrophic earthquake in the subduction zone in the next 50 years.

24.56 The GSC would like to accelerate studies for the Vancouver Island area to determine if there is evidence to indicate that such large events could occur in the area. It would do this by improving the monitoring network to determine where and how rapidly strain is accumulating in the earth's crust. However, the GSC states it has limited funds for these and related projects. Based on available information, the GSC is planning to upgrade the seismic zoning maps to include the effects of the catastrophic earthquake in the 1995 revision.

Losses due to earthquakes

24.58 The study estimates that fatalities may be in the low hundreds, serious injuries in the several hundreds and economic losses in the several billions of dollars. Actual losses would, of course, vary depending on the strength of the earthquake and when and where it occurred. In addition, since such studies are subject to methodological and resource constraints, the results should be viewed as giving only a general idea of the magnitude of losses.

24.59 The study also suggests that further detailed economic and vulnerability analyses of such critical structures as schools, hospitals, bridges and water, sewage and electrical systems are needed for governmental and corporate decision making. The question of who will conduct and fund these studies has been a long-standing issue among the several levels of government. The federal government, at one point, considered doing a rough set of estimates, but recognized that the responsibility belonged to the provinces. To date, preparedness planning has occurred largely without these estimates.

National Earthquake Support Plan

The National Earthquake Support Plan is a framework for more detailed planning; it is not an operational plan

24.61 The NESP is intended to be a national plan for providing assistance to British Columbia. However, it is not an operational plan. The National Earthquake Support Plan does not state what the response capabilities of the federal government and other governments are, or what level of assistance the federal government is supposed to give.

24.62 At the time of writing, the NESP had been discussed with government officials of British Columbia and Alberta. Other provinces have been informed of the plan but their participation has not been incorporated into it. We are concerned about this approach, since the Geological Survey of Canada indicates that there is also a significant earthquake hazard in Eastern Canada. The GSC has pinpointed the Ottawa and St. Lawrence valleys, New Brunswick and the south of Newfoundland as areas with significant earthquake hazards.

Urban Search and Rescue and Recovery Planning

24.64 The NESP is not intended to address the issue of recovery after an earthquake. A plan for recovery needs to be developed.

Roles of the Departments of National Defence, Transport and Communications

24.66 A 1992 DND study concluded that the Department has adequate resources to fulfil its current responsibilities, to expand its operations in case of a major earthquake and to accept the role of managing logistics operations. The conclusion is based on the assumption that the majority of Canadian Forces units would be in their normal peacetime locations, available for rapid tasking, and that departments and agencies involved in the NESP would be prepared to operate for an extended period, perhaps as long as 30 days, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

24.67 DND is developing a complete logistics plan, and it estimates that a final draft will be sent to senior management for approval by December 1992. DND has also developed its own immediate earthquake response plan for British Columbia to co-ordinate actions of Canadian Forces in that province. That plan was approved in May 1991. DND would respond to requests for other support as part of its responsibilities for the provision of assistance to the civil authorities.

24.68 Pursuant to NESP, the federal government may be requested to provide all types of civilian transportation; however, it is uncertain whether the requested transportation can be provided. The NESP gives the Department of Transport overall responsibility for the provision of arrangements for civil transportation resources. Given its limited transportation resources and limited legislative authority, Transport states that it could fulfil this only role if the government invoked Part III of the Emergencies Act or by special order-in-council, which would allow it to allocate civilian transport. Transport states that it has already drafted the appropriate legislation that would lead to such an order-in-council.

24.69 In the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake, communications are vital. Existing communication networks would probably be destroyed in a catastrophic earthquake, and immediate communications would be limited largely to amateur radio operators. Partial restoration of the telecommunications network is expected to take a minimum of 48 to 72 hours. One alternative being considered by the Department of Communications, as an interim measure, is the use of the MSAT satellite after it comes on line in 1994. Communications believes that this would reduce, to some degree, the major disruption in service that would undoubtedly occur.

24.70 A recent report issued by EPC indicates that, with the exception of DND and the Canadian Coast Guard, most federal Pacific region departmental units have inadequate communications for a catastrophic event. In order to address the problem, the Department of Communications will be conducting a communications study to determine telecommunications needs.

CANATEX 2

Nuclear Emergencies

Background

24.73 In 1989, the Treasury Board approved major additional funding for AECB to remedy problems in the regulation of Canada's nuclear industry. These problems are described below. The AECB recently informed us that, although it has largely completed hiring the authorized personnel, it would take several years to implement important improvements in regulatory enforcement and inspection programs. In 1992, the AECB informed Treasury Board that, on the basis of further review, its 1989 assessment was still valid; consequently, Treasury Board authorized a requested further increase in staff. According to the AECB, it expects that by the end of fiscal year 1993-94, satisfactory progress will have been made to correct the most serious shortcomings that still exist in the regulatory process.

24.74 With respect to the possibility of nuclear accidents at generating stations, AECB informed Treasury Board that, although it still concludes that nuclear power plants are acceptably safe, this does not mean they are risk-free. In support of its 1989 request for resources, the AECB stated, and a subsequent review commissioned by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources confirmed, that:

• the years of successful accident-free operation that are the hallmark of the Canadian nuclear program are not, by themselves, proof of adequate safety. CANDU plants cannot be said to be either more or less safe than other types of nuclear plants.
• it is now recognized that, through the combination of a series of comparatively common failures that, on their own, are of little consequence, accidents can develop in myriad ways.
• AECB's review of safety has been too simplistic. Spot checks of a fairly small number of key areas were thought to be sufficient. These spot checks uncovered enough safety problems to demonstrate that a more thorough review is essential, since the risk posed by nuclear power plants may be higher than once believed.
• each year there are a variety of significant events with safety implications at Canadian nuclear power plants. There is a significant backlog of required maintenance, operating documentation is out-of-date, inspections are incomplete and deficiencies in operating plants may require design modifications.

Radiotherapeutic or Industrial Devices

24.76 In 1989, the AECB informed Treasury Board that there were 3,300 licensed radioisotope users in Canada holding nearly 5,000 licences. It also reported that the number of inspections with unacceptable findings was steadily increasing. For example, the percentage of hospital inspections reporting licence violations rose from 7 to 40 percent between 1984 and 1988. In 1987, 33 percent of inspections of all radioisotope users revealed unacceptable conditions. Other AECB information indicates that there is virtually no prosecution of serious offenders.

24.77 In 1988 there were over 600,000 individual shipments of radioactive material in Canada, ranging from small quantities in standard industrial packages to very large and highly radioactive quantities in massive steel and lead containers. During that year, there were 42 reported incidents in which packages were lost, stolen, damaged or improperly shipped. AECB indicates that the safety of shipments is assured if the package is designed and used correctly. Practically no inspections have been made to ensure that the packages are used correctly. On the few occasions when inspections have been made, the rate of violations discovered indicates that there may be many shipments that do not meet prescribed safety standards.

Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan

The Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan needs to be significantly improved

24.79 The current Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (FNERP) states that it covers emergencies that may arise off-site from nuclear generating stations in Canada and other countries, or from nuclear weapons testing, nuclear-powered devices, non-military nuclear-powered vessels and radioactive emissions that affect the public. Responsibility for dealing with nuclear emergencies is subject to the same provincial-federal jurisdictional roles as other emergencies. The Department of National Health and Welfare's role is based on an exchange of letters among the Prime Minister, the President of the Privy Council, the Minister for Emergency Planning, and the Minister for Health and Welfare during the period 1982 to 1984.

24.80 The impetus for federal action was the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. The first version of FNERP was issued by NHW in 1984.

Concerns about the Federal Nuclear Emergency Response Plan

24.82 The Plan does not contain standard operating procedures that identify tasks, when they should be performed, and which specific staff positions should perform them. Also, NHW has not received departmental supporting plans for FNERP.

24.83 The provinces have primary responsibility for health and safety. The FNERP is not clearly linked to the provincial nuclear emergency plans. It should, to the extent possible, indicate what support and resources provinces would need in the event of a nuclear accident and where such resources might be obtained. Clear linkages are essential to ensure co-ordination in the event of an accident.

24.84 The Plan has not been tested in integrated interdepartmental, provincial and municipal exercises. However, it was partially tested during the Chernobyl accident, the 1988 Cosmos satellite re-entry incident and an exercise that focussed on air monitoring. National Health and Welfare states that the FNERP will be tested as part of its participation in an international exercise in the spring of 1993.

24.85 The Plan also does not provide guidance on the specific levels of radiation at which action should be initiated to protect against radiation exposure from contaminated air, water, soil and food.

24.86 Federal and provincial authorities need to agree upon standards for such matters as preventing damage to the thyroid through the distribution of stable iodine, deciding when to evacuate and shelter residents for the short or long term, and protection levels for food and water. The 1986 review by National Health and Welfare found that the entire area of radiation measurements and reference levels is in a state of "transition and confusion". It recommended that the Bureau of Radiation and Medical Devices take steps to establish realistic levels of radiation to protect the public. In December 1991 the Federal-Provincial Sub-committee on Radiation Surveillance agreed to standardize public protection levels for food and water. NHW states that consideration of draft standards for food and water has been indefinitely postponed while the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health considers the future of its federal-provincial committee structures. However, it has indicated that alternative mechanisms will be explored to obtain the required consultation.

24.87 In addition, the FNERP does not contain guidelines for dealing with the late stages of a nuclear emergency. Guidance needs to be developed, in consultation with the provinces, on responding to such problems as disposing of radioactive materials, cleaning up contamination of the food chain, water supplies and property, and re-entry to affected areas.

24.88 Together, Canada and the United States have about a dozen nuclear generating stations along the border. Responsibility for co-ordination with authorities in the United States needs to be clarified. A federal working group met on 27 May 1992 for the first time with its U.S. counterparts to establish co-ordinated communications.

24.89 Radioactive devices are used nationwide in medical facilities, universities and industry. Accidents involving such devices are the responsibility of licensees, AECB and the provinces. However, emergency planning for major accidents involving these devices must take into account that we would not know where an accident could occur and that, in general, there would not be any waiting period before action had to be taken. The FNERP does not cover accidents involving radioactive devices. Preparedness for such situations requires planning based on the capabilities of the provinces. In our opinion, a review should be undertaken by the federal government in consultation with the provinces to determine if FNERP should be expanded to include such accidents.

Accidents Involving Oil and Chemicals

24.91 The government's Green Plan recognizes that the possibility of chemical accidents is an inherent part of industrial society. In recent years, there have been a number of serious accidents worldwide, resulting in significant loss of life, property damage and damage to the environment. At home, Canadians have witnessed recent fires involving toxic chemicals at St. Basile-le-Grand, Quebec and tires at Hagersville, Ontario. The Department of the Environment estimated that it cost over $90 million to deal with these accidents. It also estimates that there are about 15,000 spills annually in Canada. In 1986, the last year for which data were analyzed, over 17,000 Canadians (1 in 1,500) were evacuated due to releases of chemicals, during several accidents. Most of these spills fall under provincial or municipal jurisdiction and polluters have the primary responsibility to respond. However, at least 30 percent or about 4,500 spills involve direct or indirect federal government responsibilities.

Bhopal

24.93 The Department led an industry and government steering committee to examine the potential for Bhopal-type accidents in Canada. The March 1986 report, ``Bhopal Aftermath Review", contained 21 recommendations. The recommendations were endorsed by the Department of the Environment's Consultative Committee in its report entitled "From Cradle to Grave: A Management Approach to Chemicals". The Department informed Cabinet in 1991 that a few of the recommendations, including the establishment of the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada, have been implemented, but no follow-up actions have been taken on most of the other important recommendations. The 1991-92 departmental initiatives described below address some of the more important recommendations directed to the federal government.

Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada

24.95 The Council is viewed by the federal government and others as an alternative to a strictly government-driven regulatory approach. It is supported by participation of officials and funds from the federal and provincial governments and industry; it receives an annual contribution of about $330,000 from the federal government.

24.96 Council members include federal and provincial agencies and various industry associations, for example the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association. However, representation from environmental or other public interest groups and certain industries, such as mining, smelter and pulp and paper, is low.

24.97 MIACC states that its objective is "to be a national focus and leader for co-operative action to reduce the frequency and severity of major industrial accidents involving hazardous substances". It defines a major industrial accident as an unplanned event that could occur during manufacturing, transportation, storage, use, handling or disposal of dangerous substances, and that may result in a release in such quantities so as to present a serious hazard to health, life, the environment or property beyond the limits of an installation or a transportation right-of-way.

24.98 The Council has undertaken a wide range of activities. To date, it has focussed on developing standards, guidelines, processes and co-ordination activities, for example, co-ordinating information systems containing data for handling dangerous substances and emergency medical information. Through the Canadian Standards Association, it has published a national standard on "Emergency Planning for Industry", and it is developing other standards and guidelines in such areas as buffer zones and emergency response training. It relies on its members to require or monitor compliance with its standards or guidelines.

24.99 A 1990 review of MIACC, conducted for the sponsoring federal government departments, concluded that, although it had set up a comprehensive action plan and provided an innovative forum, there were concerns about whether it would be effective in achieving its goals. A current major concern is whether industry is sufficiently committed to the process. Another assessment is planned for 1994.

Department of the Environment

24.101 Given its broad responsibilities for environmental emergencies, the Conservation and Protection Service of the Department recognized that it needed a program to deal with a wide range of environmental crises. Based on its experience with events such as the St. Basile chemical release and the Hagersville tire fire, it developed a "Crisis Management Planning Manual" and program. The Manual was approved in June 1991 by the Conservation and Protection Service management and is a good example of sound crisis management planning. If followed, it should enable the Department to readily move from day-to-day emergency operations to a departmental crisis management status.

24.102 The Department of the Environment recognizes that it does not yet have a complete inventory of hazardous installations and has not conducted reviews of accident prevention activities at potentially hazardous installations. The Green Plan highlights the need for the inventory, and the Department plans to work with industry and the provinces to create it. The Department initiated work on the inventory in May 1992, and it expects to have it completed by mid-1993.

24.103 Since reporting to the Department by industry is voluntary, it does not always receive immediate reports of significant spills of hazardous materials, especially those on industrial sites. It obtains its information primarily from regional and provincial networks. It is now considering the need for regulations to significantly improve spill reporting and is working with the provinces and Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada to strengthen existing arrangements.

24.104 The Department also recognizes that it does not have comprehensive information on chemical accidents. Its existing database is not adequate to provide the necessary information. Without comprehensive data on chemical accidents and spills, it will be difficult to measure the effectiveness of MIACC projects, the Department's hazardous-spill prevention/response program and other related federal programs.

24.105 The Canadian Chemical Producers' Association (CCPA) told us that, by 1993, it plans to establish a publicly available information system requiring member companies to report chemical emissions or spills into the air, land or water that are an environmental or health concern. According to the CCPA, the system will also require reporting of hazardous and non-hazardous waste disposal, by total tonnage. The CCPA plans to make these data part of the recently initiated Department of the Environment National Pollutant Release Inventory.

24.106 The Department acknowledges that it has limited information on "lessons learned" from industrial chemical spills or "near misses" that have occurred in Canada. The Bhopal Aftermath report indicated that obtaining this information is difficult since most of the best information is distributed only within the company having the accident, because of proprietary and liability concerns. The Department states that attempts through the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada at improving industry-government co-operation and breaking down barriers within industry have so far proven generally unsuccessful. The Council working group has decided to review major accidents only on an ad hoc basis with publicly available information.

24.107 Within the Conservation and Protection Service, the Preparedness Division of the Environmental Emergencies Branch is responsible for emergency planning, policies and standards for both marine and non-marine oil and chemical accidents. To help identify program building blocks, the Division conducted a survey in 1992 to identify the needs of its clients. The survey findings included the following:

• There is a need for clear policies, including the resolution of continuing federal-provincial jurisdictional questions.
• The Department of the Environment's national procedures for such areas as notification and incident reports need to be reviewed and updated.
• Specific emergency response standards need to be established, for example on clean-up.
• There is a need to establish realistic public expectations about responses and environmental damage; otherwise public and political expectations may adversely affect response activities.
• Many interdepartmental, intergovernmental, and government-industry agreements, protocols, and plans exist, but most of these are out-of-date or forgotten; updating these agreements could be a major task.
• While the Department of the Environment has many response plans, the existing exercise program for these plans is inadequate.

Canadian Coast Guard

24.110 The Canadian Coast Guard estimates that there are 3,500 spills annually in Canadian waters from all sources of oil and other hazardous substances. Two oil spills in rapid succession served to focus attention on the government's ability to deal with oil spills. On 23 December 1988, a tugboat collided with the tanker barge it was towing off Grays Harbour, Washington. Approximately 800 tonnes of "bunker C" heavy oil escaped. Early in January 1989, oil began washing ashore on Vancouver Island.

24.111 The tanker Exxon Valdez went aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska on 24 March 1989, spilling 40,000 tonnes of crude oil. Both events resulted in public concern about the ability of the government to respond to and manage such situations.

24.112 In spring of 1989, the federal government responded by initiating an internal review of the existing statutory and international regimes, and policies and systems to facilitate safe movement of tankers. The review also covered contingency planning and policies and capability for responding to spills from ships.

Public Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability

• The capability to respond effectively to a marine spill of any significant magnitude does not presently exist anywhere in Canada.
• Each year, based on current levels of tanker traffic, Canada can expect over 100 small spills (less than a tonne), about 10 moderate spills (about 100 tonnes), and at least one major spill (100 to 10,000 tonnes). A catastrophic spill (greater than 10,000 tonnes), for which we are totally unprepared, can be expected once every 15 years.
• About 70 percent of oil entering the marine environment is from routine incidents of negligence or intentional operational discharges.
• A major research and development effort is urgently needed to develop more effective spill clean-up equipment and technology, because what is now available is essentially primitive and largely ineffectual.
• Over 340 chemical spills occur in marine waters every year. The environmental and health hazards they pose are largely unknown and, in very rare circumstances where clean-up is possible, it costs on average 10 times as much, and takes 5 times as long, as oil spills.
• Canada is a signatory to an international agreement requiring inspection of 25 percent of all foreign vessels entering its ports. (Current data from the Coast Guard indicate that 16 percent of foreign vessels were inspected in 1991, compared to 11 percent in 1989.)
• The Coast Guard's investigative and prosecution efforts are seriously inadequate and do little to deter polluters.
• The chances of polluters being caught are small, and of being caught and prosecuted even smaller.
• Although contingency plans exist, they are, for the most part, poorly designed, unco-ordinated and untested.

24.115 In October 1991, the Treasury Board approved an increase of $100 million over a six-year period for the Coast Guard, the Department of the Environment, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to implement a strategy that responded to key recommendations of the Panel. Of the $100 million, $3.9 million was allocated for policy development, $36 million for prevention, and $60 million for preparedness activities. About $63.5 million, $23.8 million and $12.7 million were given to Coast Guard, Environment and Fisheries and Oceans, respectively. Most of the initiatives are in the beginning stages or have not yet been started.

24.116 Cabinet directed that a detailed response to the Panel's recommendations be prepared by the end of 1991. As of mid-August 1992, the response had not yet been sent to Cabinet.

Department of the Environment's response: Environment Canada recognized that to effectively deliver on its interdepartmental emergencies responsibilities, it needed to carefully co-ordinate its internal sector emergencies programs to provide a single departmental focus. Hence, effective April 1990, the responsibility for the co-ordination of departmental emergency and crisis preparedness was given to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Conservation and Protection. Since this action was taken, we are pleased to note we are now better co-ordinated internally and are discharging our interdepartmental responsibilities in a timely manner and that disputes are minimal.

Environment Canada agrees with the need for the framework, as prepared by EPC, for a National Earthquake Support Plan. In addition to participating in the development of the NESP, Environment Canada has developed a Departmental Earthquake Support Plan for British Columbia, which primarily focusses on providing B.C. with support for an earthquake incident. This document is expected to be promulgated within the coming weeks.

The creation of MIACC is a significant development in co-operative efforts among stakeholders and signals a new way of working together, which is resulting in practical, effective and cost-efficient products. The partnership approach, from the perspective of Environment Canada, is the best means of preventing accidents and building preparedness in an area of fragmented jurisdiction.