This Web page has been archived on the Web.

1999 April Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Main Points

5.2 With the growing use of these arrangements, more taxpayer dollars are being spent and the risks need correspondingly more attention. The risks include arrangements set up poorly among the partners, limiting their chances for success; partners not meeting commitments; insufficient attention to protecting the public interest; insufficient transparency; and inadequate accountability.

5.3 We believe that serving the public interest, effective accountability and greater transparency are basic elements of a framework for these arrangements, and we suggest questions that parliamentarians might wish to raise when assessing them.

Background and other observations

5.5 Effective accountability is more complex in a collaborative arrangement. The federal government is accountable to Parliament for the use of federal funds and authorities, to its partners for keeping its commitments, and, with its partners, to the public for the results the arrangement produces. In our view, this shared accountability means that more parties are accountable and it in no way lessens the federal government's accountability for its own responsibilities in the arrangement.

5.6 Delivering programs and services to the public through collaborative arrangements often requires more transparency than traditional delivery by a government department. Because partnerships are involved, it may be more difficult for citizens to know who is responsible. Consequently, the federal government needs to be as open as possible with information about agreements, decisions and results of the arrangements.

5.7 The Treasury Board Secretariat has informed us that it intends to continue to provide advice and to develop guidance on collaborative arrangements for federal departments and agencies that will address many of the issues identified in this study.

Introduction

5.9 Collaborative arrangements, also called partnering, are increasingly being used in federal program and service delivery as a management tool and to share power and authority with the government's partners in making decisions. In our view, they have the potential to be an innovative, cost-effective and efficient way of delivering programs and services.

5.10 Examples of collaborative arrangements include:

• the Canada Infrastructure Works program;
• Labour Market Development Agreements with the provinces and territories; and
• The National Action Program on Climate Change and related initiatives.

5.12 The Treasury Board has expressed the rationale for the use of a collaborative arrangement as an alternative to the traditional federal structure of departments, agencies and Crown corporations in the following terms:

The government will cooperate and develop partnering arrangements among departments and with other levels of government and other sectors of the economy. These arrangements will help it create new working relationships, exercise influence and leadership in the national interest, avoid costly duplication and overlap in services, and build on the strengths and capacity of other sectors to provide programs and services that are responsive to the client, innovative and affordable. ( Framework for Alternative Program Delivery , 1995)

There are many alternatives to traditional departmental structures for delivering programs, and the government is vigorously pursuing those alternatives... Partnerships are an important form of alternative service delivery. Partnering with other governments, voluntary organizations and the private sector helps the federal government reduce overhead costs and duplication, and bring services closer to citizens. ( Getting Government Right: Governing for Canadians, 1997)

• More taxpayer dollars are being spent this way. Partly because of Program Review, the federal government has been making greater use of collaborative arrangements and has committed itself to doing still more.
• There are risks that deserve attention. These include the risk of poorly defined arrangements, limiting the chances for success; partners not meeting commitments; insufficient attention to protecting the public interest; insufficient transparency; and inadequate accountability.
• Many collaborative arrangements are new and not well understood.

5.16 In our view, there is a need to better understand how to manage the risks associated with collaborative arrangements. There is also a need to know what questions to ask and what issues to consider when assessing these arrangements.

What are collaborative arrangements?

5.18 Common objectives tied to a public policy purpose. The collaborative arrangement reflects an involvement of the federal government as well as other parties in the lives of Canadians, within the legal framework approved by Parliament. In this context, the federal government and its partners pursue common objectives and results that have a public policy purpose.

5.19 Shared governance. The participating organizations share governance related to public policy as well as to the way in which the arrangement itself is governed. The process for making strategic decisions about collective activities is based on agreement by the participating organizations. They agree on the decisions that matter for the collaborative arrangement and that determine its future course of action. They also share the risks involved in those decisions. There is consultation among the organizations, so that decisions are not taken unilaterally. The way decision making is shared and to what extent will vary considerably with the type of arrangement.

5.20 Written agreements on governance and financing. The organizations need to recognize the importance of agreeing on ways to steer the collective effort, as well as the importance of controlling the use of resources. A variety of mechanisms and types of agreements may be used.

5.21 Arrangements excluded from the study. We have excluded the type of collaborative arrangement that involves only federal organizations. An example is the Federal Buildings Initiative, which Natural Resources Canada promotes to other federal departments to encourage comprehensive energy efficiency upgrades and retrofits in federal government facilities. While the issues facing collaborating federal organizations are significant and deserving of attention, they are not the same as those between the federal government and outside parties.

5.22 Other arrangements not examined in this study include:

• contracting for goods and services, and related circumstances where an entity outside the federal government acts as its agent (such contracting may occur within a collaborative arrangement; however, if the relationship is limited to that of a contractor or agent, the opportunities for collaboration are likely limited because the federal government specifies the terms and conditions that must be met);
• for the same reasons, traditional grants and contributions that do not involve collaboration; and
• arm's-length relationships - where organizations exercise independent authority to spend federal funds (for example, the Canada Foundation for Innovation).

Focus of the study

Observations

The Challenge of Collaborative Arrangements

Ensuring effective leadership

5.26 The identification of leadership roles may be a challenge. It should not be assumed that the federal government will always take the lead, particularly when other levels of government are involved or a number of partners are contributing equally. Rather, leadership needs to be based on expertise and level of involvement, and established through action, commitment and working co-operatively with other partners.

5.27 There are different levels and phases of leadership in a collaborative arrangement. Top-level political and bureaucratic leadership is often necessary to initiate an arrangement. These leaders need to demonstrate clear, consistent and visible commitment to the common objectives. Leadership at the level of program management is also essential. In addition, when more than one federal department is involved, a champion or leader in each department may be needed to take issues forward. Finally, to sustain the arrangement, buy-in and commitment are needed from front-line managers and staff.

5.28 In some collaborative arrangements, the federal government does provide leadership. For example, in the National Action Program on Climate Change, the federal government indicated that it is committed to strong leadership to make sure that Canada stays on track to meet agreed targets (see Exhibit 5.1 ). In other cases, the commitment may be implied rather than stated explicitly. For instance, in initiating a program the federal government may assume a leadership role.

Dealing with complex relationships

5.30 Cases such as climate change and the North American Waterfowl Management Plan illustrate the complexity of collaborative arrangements. Both involve other levels of government and the treaty power of the federal government. Partners in collaborative arrangements may be disparate organizations, including various levels of government, First Nations and private corporations. An example is the Canadian Model Forest Program.

Co-ordinating efforts among partners and within the federal government

5.32 We observed the use of secretariats as co-ordinators in a number of arrangements. An arm of a federal department may fulfil this role or, as in the Canada Infrastructure Works program, a joint federal-provincial body. Our 1996 audit of Phase I of that program found that federal-provincial relations were particularly positive in cases where jointly funded secretariats had been established (see Exhibit 5.2 ).

5.33 The background to federal participation generally includes related program activity in one or more departments. The respective roles and responsibilities of those departments are sometimes not clear. The autonomy of a minister and his or her department from other ministers and departments may complicate an arrangement. Thus it is incumbent on those responsible for federal participation to be aware of related authorities and activities in other departments and to ensure a cohesive, consistent approach.

Building trust and confidence

5.35 We observed different approaches to building trust. In the Canada Infrastructure Works program, the division of responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments was based on the comparative expertise of each level of government. This approach contributed to positive relations between them. Implementing the Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation requires confidence in the capacity of the private sector, since private sector voluntary targets are used in place of other policy instruments to attain program objectives.

A Framework for Assessing Collaborative Arrangements

• Serving the public interest. In providing programs and services to Canadians, there are always a number of parties whose interests are at play: the taxpayer, special interest groups, recipients of the programs and services and, in many collaborative arrangements, the private sector. As government and its partners pursue a public policy purpose, they need to balance competing interests and ensure that the public purpose and the need to provide transparent, fair and equitable service are not lost in the desire for greater efficiency.
• Effective accountability arrangements. In a collaborative arrangement, the federal government is accountable to the Canadian Parliament for the use of federal public funds and authorities, to its partners for delivering on its commitments and, with its partners, to the public for the results achieved.
• Greater transparency. Collaborative arrangements involving the federal government need to be as open as possible with information on the agreements, decisions, objectives, targets and achievements.

Serving the Public Interest

5.39 Is serving the public interest being given appropriate emphasis? A collaborative arrangement may enhance flexibility, cost effectiveness and citizen participation in program and service delivery. The federal government is constantly seeking more efficient ways to deliver programs and services, such as arrangements with the private sector and through "single windows" - the use of common facilities with provincial governments. However, meeting this objective of greater efficiency should not compromise the objective of achieving the intended results. In addition, given the complexity of collaborative arrangements, care has to be taken in enhancing accountability.

5.40 The suggested elements of a workable collaborative arrangement - enhancing accountability, improving efficiency and achieving results - tend to pull in different directions. The emphasis in setting up an arrangement should not be solely on greater efficiency or on meeting accountability requirements. Through agreement with its partners, the federal government needs to keep these factors in balance, and transparently so, while giving priority to achieving the results of the arrangement (see Exhibit 5.4 ).

5.41 Are public service values being maintained? Balancing the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability is not enough. In addition, the public interest needs to be kept in view by assuring that services and benefits are delivered in a fair, impartial and equitable manner, in accordance with traditional public service values.

Effective Accountability Arrangements

5.43 From our previous audits and studies of accountability arrangements, we have identified a set of key elements needed for strong accountability:

• clear and agreed expectations;
• clear roles and responsibilities;
• balanced expectations and capacities;
• credible reporting; and
• reasonable review, program evaluation and audit.

Clear and agreed expectations

5.45 A focus on the common outcomes being sought - particularly those seen as important to Canadians - rather than on specific outputs can be a powerful means of establishing and maintaining the collaboration. The efforts and steps taken to get the partners to agree on common objectives and results can be used to create understanding among the partners, sort out roles and responsibilities, encourage co-ordination, allow for flexibility in the specific contributions of different partners and build trust.

5.46 Are the common objectives agreed to? The agreement should clearly describe the common objectives and purpose of the arrangement. Any statement of values, objectives, purpose or vision will serve as the basis for subsequent agreement on more specific results and performance measures. Without agreement on reasonably clear common objectives, the arrangement is unlikely to succeed.

5.47 The parties may have different reasons for pursuing the common objectives. For example, in the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, duck hunters and bird watchers find common purpose in restoring waterfowl populations, albeit for very different reasons.

5.48 Similarly, a private sector company pursuing a profit motive may find that its goal is compatible with the public interest, as expressed in the objectives sought through a collaborative arrangement. For example, the Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation encourages energy efficiency improvements that meet both public and private sector objectives.

5.49 Initially, the parties may be able to agree only on a general statement of their common objectives, which may allow discussion on an arrangement to move forward. However, as they implement the arrangement and get to know each other, they need to reach agreement on more specific details concerning each partner's role and the results to be accomplished. An example in which partners first reached agreement on general principles is the National Child Benefit, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report ( paragraph 6.42 ).

5.50 Are the expected results clear? In addition to agreeing on the common objectives, it is important that the partners agree on the results to be accomplished. The partners need to be as specific as possible about these results in the initial agreement and, if necessary, ensure that they are fully specified in subsequent discussions or agreements.

5.51 To implement a collaborative arrangement, the responsible parties need to know what to do and what results are expected. A strategic framework is often required, elaborating on or clarifying these expectations and guiding activities. For more complex multi-year arrangements, a planning function is needed.

5.52 The partners also need to agree on the performance measures that will be used to assess what has been accomplished. This will reduce the chance of major disagreement in the future on whether the arrangement has been successful. Performance measures can range from quite specific quantitative indicators to more general qualitative statements of what would have to occur for the arrangement to be judged a success. For example, the North American Waterfowl Management Plan clearly stated and communicated the expected results to all partners, and the related performance measures were agreed upon and then used in periodic reviews of results (see Exhibit 5.5 ).

5.53 In addition, the partners need to agree on what data are required, key definitions, and how the data will be collected to ensure their integrity.

5.54 Are the operating principles and procedures to be followed clear and agreed to? Each partner may be bound by legislative or administrative requirements related to certain aspects of the arrangement. For example, the federal government may want to make sure that specific decisions are made about the delivery of services in both official languages, access to information and adherence to appropriate public service values such as impartiality, fairness and equity. The partners need to decide in advance on the extent to which any such requirements are to be met.

5.55 Have human resource management issues been addressed? Managing people well is crucial to success. Various issues may arise when employees of participating organizations work together in a collaborative arrangement. There may be a need to have their assignments allow for career development, for example. Assignments also need to be structured to avoid a conflict of duties. Where a proposed collaboration arrangement has human resource implications, these should be addressed early and openly with all potentially affected employees and their representatives.

5.56 In federal-provincial arrangements, employees of one level of government may report to those of another. Clarity of these relationships will be required. As well, federal employees continue to be subject to federal legislation and policies and to maintaining their rights and benefits in areas such as collective bargaining, grievance and redress, employment equity and official languages.

5.57 As part of the Treasury Board Secretariat's efforts to eliminate policy and legislative barriers, the federal government recently adopted a more flexible approach to human resource management in collaborative arrangements. This has been done through legislative changes that allow deputy ministers of departments to delegate the full range of human resource management authorities to non-federal managers.

5.58 Has provision been made for adequate financial control? Collaborative arrangements generally use federal public funds, public servants and other resources. The federal government is responsible for the stewardship of these resources. The other partners may also contribute significant resources, in some cases more than the federal government. Consequently, it is in the interest of all the partners to agree on sound procedures and practices for financial management and control, dealing with such things as different accounting methods and year-end carry-over provisions.

5.59 In addition, agreements need to identify and minimize the risk of the federal government being held liable for amounts exceeding parliamentary appropriations. This can be done by explicitly documenting the mechanisms and conditions under which any losses would be shared or guaranteed, and by capping maximum federal exposure at levels of approved authorities.

5.60 In striking an agreement that provides for adequate financial management systems and processes, the federal government needs to work with the other partners toward an appropriate standard of financial management, tailored to the nature and complexity of the arrangement.

5.61 Phase I of the Canada Infrastructure Works program is an example of the arrangements that the federal government can make in agreement with its partners. In our audit of the program, we examined the basis on which federal officials had approved projects; we found that there was a need to improve financial control. In the program as a whole, insufficient provision had been made for compliance audits. However, federal program officials reached an agreement with the Quebec government department involved in the arrangement to set in place a system of compliance audits. In our judgment, this contributed to meeting the federal government's requirement for assurance of compliance with essential conditions of the program. Systems and process audits and reviews were also undertaken in the four Western provinces.

Clear roles and responsibilities

5.63 The involvement of federal and other government partners may be based on legislation, which may limit their actions and activities. The legal, human resource and financial authorities need to be clearly identified, including the sharing or transfer of human, physical, financial or technological resources. Collaborative arrangements may also involve the delegation of authorities and the transfer of resources from the federal government to other (usually governmental) partners or to individuals or bodies representing the collectivity. In such cases, the nature of the transfer needs to be clearly specified and publicly disclosed.

5.64 Labour Market Development Agreements illustrate the accountability relationships in collaborative arrangements involving the federal government with other levels of government (see Exhibit 5.7 ).

5.65 Other collaborative arrangements use contribution agreements as a financing mechanism. While these agreements may include management and co-ordination provisions, their purpose is to ensure that payment of federal funds is conditional on performance and on compliance with the program. There is a need to also provide federal departments in collaborative arrangements with guidance on how to use contribution agreements to manage the sharing of power and authority in decision making. For example, in our 1996 audit of Phase I of the Canada Infrastructure Works program, which is a contributions program, we found that federal-provincial agreements contained management and co-ordination provisions but did not clearly identify roles and responsibilities for providing monitoring and performance information. Consequently, the federal government did not have adequate information for accountability and program implementation.

5.66 Have adequate decision-making processes been established? The extent to which decision rules need to be formally specified in the agreement will depend on the nature of the arrangement. For diverse organizations, a wide range of rules may be required, encompassing membership, participation, the make-up of decision-making bodies and the conduct of business. Where the parties are closely aligned, the decision process may rely on a more informal but still clear understanding. In the case of the federal government, the roles and responsibilities of ministers, or senior public officials acting for ministers, need to be clearly delineated.

5.67 As noted in paragraph 5.33 , effective co-ordination is needed in order to clarify roles and responsibilities when multiple departments are involved. The solution may lie in designating a lead department, the involvement of a central agency or establishing a specific management structure.

5.68 Through the management structure, decision rules are implemented, the necessary steering and working committees are established, and the involvement of ministers, senior public servants and those appointed as officers of the arrangement is specified. The management structure of the arrangement should fit with the management structures of the participating organizations and include the mechanisms needed to co-ordinate efforts and resolve problems.

5.69 We observed a variety of management structures, including boards of directors and management committees supported by subcommittees and sometimes a secretariat. In some cases, the parties adopt a constitution or charter - for example, in the Canadian Model Forest Program (see Exhibit 5.8 ). In other cases, terms of reference specify the roles of committees and related decision-making structures. In our audits of climate change and Phase I of the Canada Infrastructure Works program, we found that the management structures did not adequately specify federal responsibilities.

Balanced expectations and capacities

5.71 The National Child Benefit provides an example of the need for such a balance, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this Report ( paragraph 6.59 ). If the smaller partners in the National Child Benefit lack the capacity to obtain accurate and relevant data on program outcomes, and to verify the data, then the federal government or larger provinces could work with the partners, if asked, to help them build capacity.

Credible reporting

5.73 Is provision made for adequate reporting? In a collaborative arrangement, the partners report to each other and to their respective governing bodies, both individually and collectively; they also report to those affected by the arrangement. In an agreement, a statement of the reporting required is essential for effective accountability to the governing bodies, as well as for management and co-ordination purposes. The agreement should normally refer to such reporting vehicles as business plans, corporate reports, or reports to Parliament and to provincial and territorial legislatures.

5.74 We observed many forms of reporting in collaborative arrangements, including annual reports issued by organizations outside the federal government. In some cases, these reports provide performance information. Where collaborative arrangements have been established to move program and service delivery closer to those directly affected, reporting to the public and to the community fulfils an accountability obligation. We suggest that the reporting regime ought to serve accountability to the community affected, to the applicable minister(s) and, through the minister(s), to Parliament. It is also important that the federal government work with its partners to ensure that the information needed for good reporting is provided on a timely basis, so that decision makers can make effective use of it.

5.75 Is information for Parliament sufficient? We noted in a number of cases that reporting by collaborative arrangements is not addressed or referenced in the established performance reporting systems of government, particularly those for reporting to Parliament. For example, private sector partners may make an annual report public and provide it to the minister who answers in Parliament for the federal department involved. This practice is followed for the annual report of the Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation (see Exhibit 5.9 ). To ensure that all such reports are brought to the attention of Parliament, we believe that they need to be clearly referenced in the responsible department's Estimates documents. These documents are the Reports on Plans and Priorities and departmental Performance Reports, and there are established procedures allowing parliamentary committees to examine them.

5.76 Is the reporting credible? In Chapter 5 of our April 1997 Report, we suggested a number of desirable features for performance reports on what has been accomplished:

• Clear context and strategies. The report should clearly describe the mission and mandate of the organization, the objectives of its programs and services, the major strategies and resources being used to achieve these objectives and the related external context.
• Meaningful performance expectations. The report should contain clear and concrete key performance expectations with a focus on outcome-results.
• Results reported against expectations. Key results should be reported in relation to expectations and be attributable to the activities undertaken.
• Demonstrated capacity to learn and adapt. The report should provide a measure of the ability of the program to learn from past performance and to adapt to external changes.
• Fair and reliable performance information. Performance information should be fair, valid, reliable and understandable.

5.78 External audit assurance can enhance the credibility of reports on results by examining the consistency, reliability and fairness of the partners' performance information.

Reasonable review, program evaluation and audit

5.80 As we noted in our May 1996 Report Chapter 3 on program evaluation, evaluation studies have the potential to:

• provide information to support decisions about resource allocation;
• help Canadians determine the value obtained with their tax dollars; and
• help public servants and their collaborative partners manage for results and take responsibility for them.

5.82 Is sufficient monitoring under way? Monitoring is increasingly recognized as an integral part of sound management. Program managers gather and analyze information that will allow them to gauge progress toward objectives and adjust program planning and implementation. In a collaborative arrangement, a realistic and effective monitoring strategy is required that takes into account:

• the nature of the arrangement, such as the historical relationship between the partners, the level of innovation involved and the complexity of the arrangement;
• the level of political or financial risk associated with the program and the arrangement;
• the specific accountability requirements for each partner;
• the capacity of the partners to monitor performance;
• the type and level of delegation to each partner (for example, if program delivery has been delegated to a partner, monitoring also can be delegated. The federal government could work with its partners to ensure that the monitoring takes place and results are reviewed); and
• the monitoring already undertaken by the partners (as much as possible, monitoring systems and information should be shared to avoid duplication and promote efficiencies).

5.84 Are procedures in place to follow if things go wrong? It is important that agreements include specific procedures, such as dispute resolution mechanisms, that each party can follow should things go wrong. These procedures may include reference to independent bodies to assess cases of disagreement, and ultimately should provide ways to terminate the arrangement if necessary. Provisions for termination also need to ensure that public funds and assets, including the sale of any public assets, are safeguarded.

5.85 Has provision been made for audit? The parties need to agree on appropriate provisions for external audit of the arrangement. A requirement for financial audit is often recognized in collaborative arrangements, but given that there are public purposes involved, value-for-money audits and independent assessment of performance information may be needed. The question of who should do the audits also needs to be determined. In the case of federal-provincial arrangements, this Office recognizes the value of working jointly with provincial audit offices in audits of program delivery.

Greater Transparency

• The involvement of several different partners may make it difficult for citizens to know who is responsible for doing what, unless extra care is taken to communicate such information.
• Where citizens now have to deal with service providers outside government, access to redress mechanisms may not be evident. Citizens may not have the same recourse to the minister and members of Parliament in these cases.
• The provisions of the Access to Information Act that apply to the federal government may not extend to partnering organizations, limiting the information made available unless the arrangement specifically addresses the issue. The partners may need to reconcile access to information and privacy laws of different jurisdictions.

5.88 Is sufficient information being disclosed to Parliament and the public? Information about a collaborative arrangement ought to be made available to Parliament, the public, and the respective legislative and governance bodies, with the exception of sensitive and personal information.

5.89 In addition to the agreements themselves and the reports they produce, the information made public should include:

• major decisions and activities that affect specific groups;
• related documents such as non- commercially confidential board or management committee papers; and
• statements of policies and practices, encompassing conflict of interest rules, limits on confidentiality and complaint and redress mechanisms.

5.91 Part of the commitment to greater transparency is consultation with the public. It is important to ensure that the goals sought and the results obtained in a collaborative arrangement are the right ones for Canadians. To this end, the partners need to seek out the views of target groups, stakeholders and the general public.

5.92 Successful collaborative arrangements also depend on transparent relations among partners. A wide range of information on such aspects as goals, reporting relationships, resources and the results being achieved needs to be made available among the partners, to build and maintain trust and to enable the necessary co-ordination to take place.

Conclusion

5.94 In recognition of the need to manage these risks, this study examined a number of issues related to effective participation in collaborative arrangements. In serving the public interest, the federal government must ensure that its public purpose is not lost in the desire for greater efficiency. Effective accountability means that the government remains accountable to Parliament for the use of public funds and authorities but also shares with its partners accountability to the public for results. Transparency calls for the federal government to be as open as possible about the arrangements it enters into with partners.

5.95 The study identified a number of desirable attributes of agreements in a collaborative arrangement. The partners need to be very clear about the results expected for the common objectives, about roles and responsibilities, and about provisions for reporting, evaluation and audit. Operating procedures also need to be set out, including those for human resource management and financial control.

5.96 It is important that these attributes of agreements be complemented by good implementation practices. In addition to setting out provisions in an agreement for reporting, the federal government and its partners need to ensure that performance reports credibly describe the results accomplished and attribute them to the resources used and the actions taken.

5.97 This chapter points to the need for federal departments to effectively manage their involvement in collaborative arrangements. The Treasury Board Secretariat and departments have an important role in providing advice and guidance on these management issues. In addition, there is a need for all of those involved in collaborative arrangements to learn from the experience. For our part, we plan to report on an audit of federal government involvement in collaborative arrangements and new arm's length relationships.

5.98 The desirable attributes of agreements and the good implementation practices our study identified led to a series of questions that we suggest as a framework parliamentarians may wish to use to assess collaborative arrangements. As further experience is gained with collaborative arrangements, we expect to be able to refine this framework.

About the Study

Objectives

Scope

• Modernizing Accountability Practices in the Public Sector, 1998 - a joint paper by Treasury Board Secretariat and Office of the Auditor General of Canada.
  (http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/account/OAGTBS_E.html)
• Assessing Alternative Service Delivery Arrangements, June 1998 - an Office of the Auditor General of Canada discussion paper provided to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts.
  (http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsf/html/dispr_e.html)

Study Team

Allison Fader
Frances Smith

For information, please contact John Mayne.