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2003 April Report of the Auditor General of Canada Chapter 3—Canada's Strategy to Combat Money Laundering

2003 April Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Chapter 3—Canada's Strategy to Combat Money Laundering

Main Points



Understanding money laundering

Building a strategy to combat money laundering

Key challenges


About the Study


3.1—National initiative to combat money laundering: Roles of federal departments and agencies and their budgets

3.2—The money-laundering process

3.3—Examples of common indicators of suspicious transactions

3.4—Implementation of key legislation and regulations to combat money laundering, by date

3.5—The business process of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

Main Points

3.1 Over the past 15 years the international community has strengthened its efforts to combat drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. As a key part of this strategy, countries are focussing on the money trail that links criminals to their crimes. They identify, seize, and confiscate criminal proceeds—the profits made from crimes.

3.2 Canada acted quickly to put in place legislation to deal with proceeds of crime and money laundering. However, until recently the legislation lacked two elements of what is now viewed as the international norm for an effective system to combat money laundering:

3.3 Canada launched the National Initiative to Combat Money Laundering in 2000 to close these gaps. Its centrepiece was a new Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act. A total of $139 million was budgeted over the first four years to establish the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and to help the Centre's partners to perform their roles. In 2001 both the Act and the mandate of the Centre were amended to include provisions to detect and deter terrorist financing. The Centre received an additional $34 million over three years for that role.

3.4 Canada's strategy to counter money laundering seeks to strike a balance among its various objectives. They are to strengthen law enforcement, protect personal information, and support international efforts to combat money laundering. The strategy also seeks to keep to a minimum the costs that organizations, such as banks, trust companies, and foreign-currency exchanges, incur to comply with the law to keep records, identify clients, and report unusual or suspicious transactions. With the new law, the balance has shifted to give greater weight to strengthening law enforcement, in Canada and internationally.

3.5 To meet its goals to reduce money laundering and terrorist financing, the federal government will need to deal with a series of challenges. These include the following:

Background and other observations

3.6 Money laundering is a form of financial crime in which the proceeds from criminal activity are made to appear legitimate. The goal of many criminal acts is to make a profit for the individual or group that commits the crime. A strategy to fight money laundering seeks to reduce crime by making it harder for criminals to keep and use their profits.

3.7 Both the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Anti-terrorism Act state that Parliament must review the Acts and how they are administered. To prepare for these parliamentary reviews, the Office of the Auditor General has developed a reporting process with two parts.



3.8 Money laundering is a form of financial crime. It is the process of disguising or concealing the profits or proceeds of crime to make them appear legitimate. "Dirty money" produced through criminal activity is changed into "clean money." The criminal origin of the clean money then becomes difficult to trace.

3.9 Money laundering has been described as a problem involving billions of dollars in Canada and many more billions worldwide. Drug trafficking is believed to be the main source of funds laundered in and through Canada, although other crimes such as fraud and smuggling are also thought to be important.

3.10 The objective of money laundering legislation is to reduce crime by making it harder for criminals to keep and use their profits. Measures are put in place to detect and deter money laundering and to make it easier to investigate and prosecute money laundering offences.

The building blocks

3.11 The building blocks of Canada's strategy against money laundering were put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Keeping pace with the international community

3.12 While the system that Canada put in place was broadly consistent with international standards of the time, those standards were changing. Canada was criticized for lagging behind. In 2000 the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act was replaced by new legislation having the same name, but with a broader scope.

3.13 With these changes, Canada's strategy to combat money laundering was once again consistent with those in place in other countries that are members of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. The government budgeted a total of $139 million over four years to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre and other federal departments and agencies to help meet their additional responsibilities. Exhibit 3.1 sets out the roles of federal departments and agencies, along with their budgets.

3.14 In 2001, the Anti-terrorism Act broadened the scope of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and the mandate of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre to allow it to detect and deter terrorist financing. The Act was renamed the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act.

3.15 The provisions of the Criminal Code that deal with the application of the proceeds of crime were also expanded. From a limited list of serious crimes, they can now be applied to almost all crimes that a person can be charged with. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act was also changed so that a person who is a member of an organized crime group that is laundering money can be denied entry to Canada.

Focus of the study

3.16 Both the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Anti-terrorism Act state that Parliament must review the Acts and how they are administered by a specific date:

3.17 In preparation for these parliamentary reviews, the Office has developed a reporting process involving two steps (see About the Study at the end of the chapter):



Understanding money laundering

What is money laundering?

3.18 The term "money laundering" is believed to have first been used in the United States in the 1920s to describe one method criminals used to make their profits or proceeds of crime appear legitimate. They turned to retail businesses that operated on a cash basis. The goal was to mix criminal proceeds with legal income and report the total as legitimate business earnings. It was termed money laundering because laundries were popular choices for changing dirty money into clean money.

3.19 There are a number of definitions of money laundering. Some focus on how the criminal puts the proceeds of crime into the financial system, for example, deposits directly into banks or through a business. Broader definitions equate money laundering with almost any use of criminal profits. The common thread in these definitions is the criminal's goal: to disguise the proceeds of crime to make them appear legal.

3.20 Canadian law does not define money laundering; rather the Criminal Code defines the offence of laundering the proceeds of crime; the Code and other federal acts define the criminal activities that produce the proceeds of crime.

3.21 Money laundering does not include all illegal activity. Disguising the proceeds of tax or duty evasion, for example, is not a money-laundering offence. In those cases, the government has argued that specific rules and procedures in other legislation are adequate to deal with the proceeds from offences. The Income Tax Act, for example, provides its own penalties for tax evasion and procedures for recovering unpaid tax.

3.22 Money laundering is a specific type of crime. The actual transactions used to launder the profits of crime are both legal and commonplace; making bank deposits, wiring funds, and exchanging currency are examples. What makes these acts illegal is that the source of funds is from criminal activity and the reason behind the acts is to disguise their criminal origins.

3.23 For a person to be convicted of money laundering, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the funds or property were the proceeds of crime, that the accused had knowledge or belief of that fact, and that the accused intended to disguise them.

3.24 Much of the proceeds of crime are not laundered in the sense that the term is usually used. Rather, they are spent by the criminal or held in cash or bank accounts inside or outside Canada to be spent at a later date, with no attempt made to disguise their origins. A purchase of motor vehicles for personal use, for example, is thought to be one of the most common uses of the proceeds of crime.

Is there a relationship between money laundering and terrorist financing?

3.25 Money laundering involves the processing of the profits of crimes that were committed in the past so as to disguise their illegal origin. The financing of terrorism, however, involves the processing of funds—whether obtained legally or illegally—to be used in future crimes.

3.26 Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Canada has taken a number of steps to combat terrorist financing. They are aimed at assisting the police to detect and deter the financing of terrorist activities and to investigate and prosecute offences that are related to terrorist financing.

3.27 Terrorist groups differ from large criminal organizations in several important ways.

3.28 As a result, it is difficult to follow terrorist money trails. For the three-year period ending 2003-04, the government has allocated a total of $34 million to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre to detect and deter terrorist financing. Regulations have been developed for reporting transactions that appear to be related to terrorist financing.

What is known about the extent and impact of money laundering?

3.29 Since money laundering and the criminal activities that it attempts to conceal are hidden, it is difficult to determine how widespread money laundering is. As we noted in the Auditor General's 2002 Report, Chapter 4, The Criminal Justice System: Significant Challenges, estimates of the extent and effects of organized crime are based on limited information, often repeated from one report on money laundering to another.

3.30 A number of studies have reached the conclusion that there are no reliable estimates of either the extent or impact of money laundering in Canada or internationally. For example, in its most recent strategy to combat money laundering the United States Treasury states, "We still do not know the full magnitude of the money-laundering problem. The various efforts to attempt to answer this question over the years have not been satisfactory." As a result, estimates that are frequently used in Canada and internationally should be viewed with a degree of scepticism.

3.31 Nevertheless, there is a consensus that the Canadian government should pay attention to money laundering and terrorist financing. Drug trafficking—considered to be the source of much of the money laundered through Canada—is believed to be a business earning multi-billion-dollar amounts per year. Economic crimes such as fraud are also thought to be widespread in Canada.

3.32 The goal of a large number of criminal acts is to make a profit for a criminal individual or group. Money laundering enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without putting the criminal source of funds in danger of being discovered. Once laundered, the proceeds of crime can be used to finance further criminal activity, creating a cycle of crime.

3.33 The economic costs of money laundering can take many forms. For example, honest businesses cannot compete fairly with those that derive part of their income from money laundering. When money is laundered through financial institutions, the reputation, and even the integrity, of each of the institutions could be ruined.

How is money laundered?

3.34 Most of the criminal activities that require money laundering generate cash. Money laundering is usually described as a three-stage process involving placing the proceeds of crime into the financial system, creating layers of financial transactions to disguise their origins, and then moving the laundered funds back into the legitimate economy (Exhibit 3.2).

3.35 The simplest forms of laundering take place close to where the original crime was committed. For example, money laundering may involve purchasing and then cashing in casino chips. In this way, the criminal profits are changed into what appears to be legal gambling profits. More complex examples can involve the purchase and sale of stocks, commodities, or property.

3.36 These techniques are best suited to relatively small and/or occasional sums. When the criminal activity is continuous, cash-based retail businesses such as car washes and laundries, video-game arcades, video rentals, and bars and restaurants have been used. Proceeds of crime are mixed with legal funds and the total reported as legitimate business earnings. Any additional tax that may be due is treated as a cost of doing business.

3.37 When the amounts of cash to be laundered become larger, and as domestic law enforcement becomes better at identifying money laundering, the laundering process is more likely to have an international component. In addition, the three stages of money laundering tend to become more distinct.

3.38 Bulk cash has been carried or shipped out of the country, or transferred through formal or informal financial systems. Alternatively, funds have been moved through companies that engage in international trade in goods and services and thus have credible explanations for moving funds abroad.

3.39 An offshore corporation or trust may then receive the funds and place them within the international financial system. At that point, the owner of the funds may be protected by bank secrecy, corporate secrecy, and possibly solicitor-client privilege, which also provides secrecy.

3.40 There are a number of techniques that criminals have used to access these funds from home: from a debit or credit card issued by an offshore bank, through domestic accounts of a foreign bank, as profit from real estate sales or securities trading, as salary or business income from a foreign company, or as a business loan.

How is money laundering detected?

3.41 A successful money launderer tries to mimic legal transactions. As a result, it is often very difficult to differentiate illegal from legal transactions until law enforcement officers target a particular criminal act that has been committed and then unravel the money trail.

3.42 Law enforcement officers receive information from a wide range of sources when conducting criminal investigations. Traditionally, the focus has been on the original crimes, and money laundering has become visible only in the course of subsequent investigation. Analysis of RCMP investigations conducted before the new Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act was introduced, for example, indicates that most proceeds-of-crime cases originated in other law enforcement units, notably drug enforcement.

3.43 Being able to identify a client or "know your customer" is a basic part of a system to fight money laundering. At the local level, front-line employees—who deal with customers on a day-to-day basis—are believed to be in the best position to identify what might be an unusual or suspicious transaction or pattern of transactions. These employees have become the first line of defence in the federal government's efforts to combat money laundering. They are in a position to detect the criminal or another person injecting the proceeds of crime into the financial system.

3.44 Anti-money laundering systems attempt to establish money trails by focussing first on unusual financial transactions. From the perspective of a financial institution, a transaction may appear unusual based on

3.45 The transaction or series of transactions moves from the unusual to the suspicious when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the transactions are linked to a criminal offence. This is a more difficult test, and the larger financial institutions use specially trained security staff to help make the determination.

3.46 The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada has published indicators to assist in identifying suspicious transactions (Exhibit 3.3). These indicators were compiled in consultation with reporting entities, law enforcement agencies, and organizations that specialize in international financial intelligence. The indicators are based on characteristics that have been linked to money laundering or terrorist activities in the past, and they will evolve over time.


Building a strategy to combat money laundering

Canada's growing international experience

3.47 International efforts to fight money laundering have been under way for more than 15 years. They were part of the war on drugs, expanded to include the proceeds of most other serious crimes, and most recently have been included in anti-terrorism efforts.

3.48 The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) provided a framework for the international response to the problem of money laundering. Among other things, the Convention required countries to bring in legislation against the laundering of the proceeds of crime. Additional obligations were included in the 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

3.49 The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering was established following the G-7 Summit in July 1989, and Canada has been a member of the Task Force since it began. By setting and promoting international standards for anti-money-laundering systems, and identifying and listing non-cooperative countries, the Task Force seeks to limit the access of terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and other organized criminals to the international financial system.

3.50 The Task Force originally drew up 40 recommendations in 1990 to combat the misuse of the financial system by persons laundering drug money. The recommendations provide a framework to fight money laundering. They include changes to the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and international co-operation. For example, each country is expected to do the following:

3.51 The recommendations made by the Task Force were originally used only for the proceeds of crime involving drug trafficking. However, it was decided in 1996 to extend the recommendations to proceeds of all serious crimes. This decision was based on the experience that had been gained from investigating money laundering up to that point, and also on the fact that changes were being made in the way that money was being laundered. Money laundering techniques, for example, were becoming more sophisticated. The recommendations have now been endorsed by more than 130 countries and are widely accepted as the standards for preventing money launderers from using the financial system.

3.52 In 2002 the Task Force identified a number of areas for possible changes in its framework and invited comments from countries, international organizations, the financial sector, and other interested parties. Potential changes include modifying the way that customers are identified; changing the reporting process for suspicious transactions; identifying the actual owners of assets held by companies, trusts, and foundations; and applying the recommendations to professionals such as lawyers, accountants and financial analysts who might provide advice or other assistance in laundering criminal funds.

3.53 In April 2001 the executive boards of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank agreed to improve the efforts made by both institutions in the global fight against money laundering. The institutions are working with the Task Force and their member countries to incorporate the standards to combat money laundering into their surveillance and operational activities. They will also increase technical assistance, research, and education efforts in this area.

3.54 In the wake of 11 September 2001, at a special meeting on the financing of terrorism in October 2001, the Task Force expanded its mission beyond money laundering to include terrorist financing. The Task Force has issued new international standards to combat terrorist financing and called on all countries to adopt and implement them. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have also agreed to extend their involvement beyond anti-money-laundering to efforts aimed at preventing terrorist financing.

3.55 In June 2002 the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada was admitted as a member of the Egmont Group of financial intelligence units (FIUs). The Egmont Group was formed in 1995 to provide a forum for financial intelligence units to improve support to their respective national anti-money laundering programs. This support includes expanding and exchanging financial intelligence in a larger, more routine way, improving the expertise and capabilities of the personnel of these organizations, and fostering better communication among financial intelligence units by applying new technologies.

Canada's new strategy against money laundering

3.56 When the Financial Action Task Force evaluated Canada in 1997, it recommended that Canada implement a mandatory reporting scheme for suspicious transactions and cross-border currency movement. It also recommended that a central financial intelligence unit be established to collect, analyze, and share this information.

3.57 Canada's National Initiative to Combat Money Laundering was developed to address the shortcomings identified by the Task Force. Exhibit 3.4 sets out the current system of legislation and regulations.

3.58 The centrepiece is a new Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act which received royal assent on 29 June 2000. The legislation

3.59 Exhibit 3.5 shows how these pieces fit together. A variety of financial transactions may be associated with money laundering or terrorist financing, including deposits, money transfers, currency exchanges, and real estate purchases.

3.60 Financial institutions, currency exchange dealers, casinos, and others who act as financial intermediaries are required to report the following:

3.61 Anyone who fails to report these transactions is committing an offence punishable by a fine of up to $2 million and/or imprisonment for up to ten years. It is also an offence for a person to disclose to the criminals or money launderers or anyone else that a report has been made if the intent of the person is to prejudice the criminal investigation or prosecution.

3.62 The proceeds-of-crime legislation also requires that any person who imports or exports large amounts, $10,000 or more in cash or other liquid assets such as travellers' cheques or blank money orders across the Canadian border must report to Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. It will then forward the report to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre. Currency can be seized if it is not declared, but will be returned after the person pays a fine, unless Canada Customs and Revenue Agency has reasonable grounds to suspect that it represents the proceeds of crime.

3.63 The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre acts as a filter. Its primary function is to receive and analyze the reports required by the legislation. Through that analysis, it determines whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that specific information about certain transactions would be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of an offence involving money laundering or terrorist financing. If the Centre's analysis determines that the information is relevant, it is passed on to the appropriate authorities.

3.64 The Centre is also responsible for protecting the information it receives through its various sources from disclosure to anyone who is not authorized to have that information. It must also ensure that financial institutions and others comply with the requirements in the Act to report transactions, keep records, and identify clients.


Key challenges

3.65 Canada was one of the last industrialized countries to introduce a system of mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions and to establish a financial intelligence unit to receive, analyze, and pass on the information. In developing its new strategy, therefore, Canada was able to draw on both its own experience and that of other countries.

3.66 Like other countries, Canada needed to strike a balance among the objectives of enforcing the law, protecting personal information, keeping to a minimum the cost of complying with the requirements, and supporting international efforts to combat money laundering. The model that has been adopted is similar to the one in place in most other countries; differences between countries tend to reflect their particular circumstances and constitutional frameworks.

Respecting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the privacy rights of Canadians

3.67 The Centre receives personal financial information about people who are engaged in legitimate financial transactions. This raises the issue of protecting a person's reasonable expectation of privacy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

3.68 To protect the privacy of Canadians who are completing legitimate financial transactions, several safeguards and limitations were built into the Centre's mandate. These include

3.69 Under the law, the Centre is also obliged to protect the personal information it stores from disclosure to an unauthorized party. To ensure that the information is protected, the Centre has put practices in place to manage information securely. This includes making sure that its facilities and equipment are secure physically and that its employees follow the security restrictions on information.

3.70 The legislation provides the Centre with authority to disclose personal financial information where there is a "reasonable suspicion." Section 8 of the Charter, the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, has been interpreted by the courts to mean that a judge must authorize a request before personal financial information can be collected and given to law enforcement agencies. The judge's decision would be based on whether there were "reasonable and probable grounds" to believe that the financial transactions were being used for money laundering or terrorist financing.

3.71 In addition to protecting personal information from unauthorized disclosure, the Centre has other challenges. It must develop an operational definition of what constitutes "reasonable grounds to suspect" to guide decision-making about what information must be disclosed and why the information would be relevant to a money-laundering investigation or prosecution. Also, the Centre must develop appropriate procedures to balance the risk of not disclosing information that could prove beneficial to investigations against the risk of making disclosures that result in unnecessary or unjustified investigations.

Developing high-quality financial intelligence for law enforcement

3.72 Law enforcement agencies use a variety of investigative techniques and intelligence sources to gather evidence against money launderers. The information that the Centre will pass on to law enforcement agencies is for two main uses:

3.73 Once information on financial transactions is collected, it must be analyzed. How effective the analysis is will be measured in the long term by the effect it has on criminal investigations and the number of money-laundering prosecutions that law enforcement agencies are able to make. The information that the Centre provides to law enforcement agencies needs to be both useful and timely. To meet this challenge, the Centre has made three types of investments:

3.74 The Centre expects to receive almost 3,000,000 financial transaction reports per year. This information is analyzed to determine whether there are links and patterns among individual transaction reports that appear to be suspicious, reports about currency that is moved across borders, or other relevant data to which the agency has access.

3.75 The challenge for the Centre, therefore, is to develop and enhance the ability to analyze the information in order to identify transactions that indicate money laundering or terrorist financing. The information that it discloses should also add value to the investigation of criminal offences.

Responding to the particular challenges posed by terrorist financing

3.76 We noted earlier that terrorist groups differ from large criminal organizations in several important ways: the reasons for their financing activities, the sources of their funds, the size and nature of the financial transactions they complete, and the way that they move funds outside the traditional financial system. As a result, it is difficult to follow the trails made when terrorists move money around.

3.77 The Department of Finance has developed regulations that govern how suspicious transactions related to terrorist financing should be reported. As part of the anti-terrorism initiative, the Centre was provided with additional resources to build its ability to detect and deter terrorist financing.

3.78 The Centre has begun the process of acquiring the specific tools and indicators needed to uncover the activities that show potential terrorist financing. The Centre is also building a team of analysts who will focus on terrorist financing. As with money laundering, the challenge is to develop the ability to analyze information and to disclose it in a way that will improve the investigation of offences related to terrorist financing.

Promoting awareness and compliance

3.79 The Centre has two additional mandates. The first is to increase the public's awareness and knowledge about money laundering and terrorist financing. The second is to ensure that a broad range of financial intermediaries comply with the legislation and its regulations.

3.80 The Centre has identified more than 100,000 financial and other entities that could be subject to the new reporting requirements. These range from large banks to single practitioners such as a self-employed accountant or lawyer. Only a small proportion falls within the financial sector that is regulated by the federal or provincial governments.

3.81 Based on the experience of United States officials, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency expects to receive about 40,000 cross-border reports each year. It has incorporated the new requirements into the existing procedures.

3.82 One of the challenges for the Centre and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency is to ensure that financial entities and the traveling public are aware of their obligations. The second is to develop an efficient and effective program to ensure that they comply.

Establishing and maintaining effective working relationships

3.83 As noted earlier, the ultimate objective of the federal government's strategy to combat money laundering and terrorist financing is to reduce crime. To succeed, co-operation, co-ordination, and information sharing are needed at several levels:

3.84 As the lead agency, the Department of Finance faces the challenge of ensuring that effective working relationships among these partners and stakeholders are developed and maintained. This will allow each to do its part in meeting the strategy objectives. A timely flow of information and intelligence is particularly important.

Measuring the effectiveness of federal efforts

3.85 There are a number of challenges associated with measuring how effective a strategy to combat money laundering is.

3.86 For more than a decade, members of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering have been conducting self-assessments and peer reviews of their systems set up to combat money laundering. These assessments have focussed on the need to comply with the 40 recommendations made by the Task Force in 1990 to combat money laundering.

3.87 The assessments have indicated that the member countries have followed most of the 40 recommendations. In other words, compliance has been high.

3.88 The assessments have also found, however, that only a small number of member countries have set up systems that let them know how financial transaction reports are used by law enforcement agencies. In addition, the assessments showed that members did not know whether the information from the reports resulted in money launderers being charged and convicted, or in the proceeds of crime being confiscated. The Task Force concluded that "it was not possible for the examiners to come to any firm conclusions on the issue of effectiveness."

3.89 When the Canadian government approved funding for the National Initiative to Combat Money Laundering, it directed that the Initiative be evaluated in the third year of its operation. The evaluation would assess whether the program design and the funding provided were appropriate. The government also directed that the Initiative be formally evaluated in the fifth year to assess whether it had met its objectives. In addition, the formal evaluation will address privacy issues, whether the Initiative is cost-effective, and whether alternative approaches might produce better results.

3.90 Although the National Initiative was launched in 2000, it did not become fully operational until the supporting regulations came into force. Reporting about suspicious transactions was not mandatory until November 2001; other types of reporting began in 2002. The challenge for the Department of Finance and its partners is to ensure that a meaningful evaluation is completed before Parliament reviews the legislation.



3.91 At the end of 2004 we will report on how the federal government's strategy to combat money laundering has been implemented. In particular, we expect that the federal government will have responded efficiently and effectively to the challenges identified in this report:

3.92 Canada's strategy to combat money laundering seeks to strike a balance among the objectives of

3.93 With the new legislation, the balance between these objectives has shifted to give greater weight to the needs of law enforcement and to the support of international efforts.

3.94 Both the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Anti-terrorism Act state that Parliament will review the Acts and their administration beginning in late 2004. Members of Parliament will therefore have an opportunity to determine whether the right balance is being struck.


About the Study


Both the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Anti-terrorism Act state that Parliament must review the Acts and how they are administered:

In preparation for these parliamentary reviews, the Office has developed a reporting process that has two steps.

Scope and approach

As part of the first step, we interviewed officials from Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Solicitor General, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We also consulted international bodies involved in combatting money laundering, and we reviewed related laws and regulations, domestic and foreign reports on money laundering, and initiatives to fight money laundering.

Audit team

Assistant Auditor General: John Wiersema
Principal: Richard Smith

Richard Domingue
Rose Pelletier
Patti-Lou Fowlow
Sebastien April

For information, please contact Communications at (613) 995-3708 or
1-888-761-5953 (toll free).