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1992 Report of the Auditor General of Canada

Introduction

In the course of these audits, issues arose which were more properly dealt with by both Houses than by either alone . The most notable was that of parliamentary security. We were concerned about the potential problems in having two different security forces operating within the same building. As well, it seemed appropriate to ask an important question: ``Would jointly delivered services be more efficient, economic, or effective than separately delivered services?" In our audit reports to the House of Commons and Senate we indicated that such matters of joint interest would be deferred to this report.

Part One of this Report is an audit. It deals with the audit of the Parliamentary Associations Secretariat and the Parliamentary Exchanges and Protocol Directorate. These directorates, which support travel of delegations of parliamentarians to and from Canada, are funded by both Houses and were not part of our audits of the Senate, House, or Library of Parliament.

Audit Observations: Our observations regarding Associations and Exchanges are:

• Most travel is well documented and there is no evidence that expenses claimed are not for the purposes intended.
• There should be fuller disclosure of delegation activities, including each individual's expenses.
• The House and Senate should discontinue the practice of financing delegation travel through ``grants and contributions". One effect would be that public reports of Parliament's travel costs would no longer be understated.
• The House and Senate should negotiate a written agreement on how the directorates will be managed and funded.

In an Annex , we provide a detailed report with additional observations and recommendations. The Annex is intended for readers with a direct interest or involvement in parliamentary administration.

Our criteria for recommending a joint service were stringent. We indicated to the House and the Senate that we would not recommend further joint services in this report unless three basic criteria were met:

• The legitimate interests and constitutional autonomy of each House were protected.
• Accountability to both Houses was feasible.
• There were clear potential gains in economy, effectiveness or efficiency.
• The conceptual challenge was to separate productivity or efficiency improvements which each House could achieve acting alone, from the potential savings of establishing a joint service. For example, each House could obtain significant productivity savings in cleaning. While these savings might be gained through a combined service, each House could also obtain most of these savings on its own.

To assist the House and Senate to achieve the improvements we believe are necessary and possible, we recommend closer collaboration on an ``as needed" basis through several new organizational linkages:

• Senior Management Working Group to deal with ongoing matters of joint interest.
• Joint Security Committee , with membership including the RCMP to deal with security matters.
• Parliament Buildings Council , an external non-partisan advisory body to advise about various courses of action available to deal with the state of repair of the Buildings and with plans for capital improvements.

Background: Constraints to Joint Parliamentary Services

For the most part, however, each House provides separate services. These services include: security, messengers, cleaning, parliamentary publications, human resources and financial management, picture framing, gyms, barber shops, mini-buses, and perhaps most symbolic of all, the side-by-side Post Offices, one for the Senate and one for the House of Commons.

Each House, reflecting its constitutional position, maintains that it is autonomous in administrative matters. For instance, a majority of the Senators who responded to a survey for our 1991 audit indicated opposition to joint cleaning, messenger, security, and most other services, even if such services were shown to be more economical or efficient.

The budget and number of personnel of the House of Commons is about 5 times that of the Senate; and about 15 times that of the Library of Parliament. The House's elected status sometimes contributes to the general impression that, administratively, it has more ``clout".

Joint administrative services may have a problem of accountability in a bicameral legislature. The problem is that a truly joint service must account to both Houses, a cumbersome requirement. It would be difficult to find a satisfactory formula for joint accountability which would appropriately reflect the political relationships between the Houses.

The House of Commons and Senate make administrative decisions differently. They are organized differently and have different accountability mechanisms. This can inhibit co-operation. In practical terms, these differences reflect the following:

All administrative authority in the House of Commons is concentrated in the Board of Internal Economy. The Chairman of the Board is the elected Speaker of the House. This Board has meetings which are closed, even to Members of Parliament who are not on the Committee. This makes it easier to make quick binding decisions.

On the other hand, in the Senate administrative authority is more open and collegial. Decisions are taken by the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (Committee on Internal Economy), but most of its decisions must be ratified by the full Senate. The meetings of the Committee are open to the public. A practical consequence is that discussions of administrative matters are now more openly reported in the Senate than in the House of Commons.

Administrative authority in the Senate is dispersed. Neither the Speaker of the Senate, nor the Chairman of the Committee on Internal Economy has as much administrative authority as the Speaker of the House of Commons. The Senate Speaker is appointed by the Government while the House of Commons Speaker is elected by Members. The Speaker of the Senate is not the administrative head of the Senate and currently does not sit on the Committee on Internal Economy.

These differences are significant. Whatever the reason, Senators and Members of the House of Commons do not often work well together on administrative matters. A joint committee to deal with common administrative matters was recommended in the 1985 McGrath Report on the Reform of the House of Commons. It was never constituted. The joint committee on the Library of Parliament last met in 1986. The joint committee on printing has not met in decades. The joint committee on the Restaurant has not met since 1983.

In any successful instance of joint accountability, personal and institutional relationships are critical, since there is no single point of final authority. This is sometimes easier said than done. No matter what the formal accountability framework, relationships and attitudes are decisive. In achieving change, the attitudes of parliamentarians and staff can make a real difference.

Part One

Audit of the Parliamentary Associations Secretariat and Parliamentary Exchanges and Protocol Directorate

The directorates' annual budget for 1991-92 was slightly less than $5 million. Of this about $1.5 million was for travel by Senators and Members of the House of Commons, and accompanying staff and spouses. We decided to examine these expenditures in some detail. About $800,000 was for conferences and delegations hosted by Canada. The rest was paid for administrative operations, including contracts, dues to international associations, and staff salaries.

We identified four key features of the directorates that distinguish them from other organizations on Parliament Hill:

1. Operating budgets are shared approximately 70:30 between the House of Commons and Senate.
2. The grants and contributions budgets are also shared 70:30. Much of the grants and contributions are used to pay for Parliamentarians' travel.
3. Although a joint service, all employees - whether from the Senate or the House - report to directors who are employees of the House of Commons.
4. The directorates are accountable to the two Speakers who directly authorize many expenditures. This is different from the Library of Parliament, where the Speakers have responsibility, but do not directly authorize expenditures.

Audit Objectives

1. To determine whether the Speakers have the legal authority to act as they do on behalf of the directorates, and if authority is properly delegated.
2. To determine whether there is an appropriate accountability framework for the directorates and for individual travellers, and whether the use of grants and contributions is legal and appropriate.
3. To determine if the foreign travel supported by the Parliamentary Associations Secretariat and the Parliamentary Exchanges and Protocol Directorate is managed with due regard for economy and efficiency; and if moneys are spent for the purposes intended.

Observations and Recommendations

• The authority of the Speakers: The House of Commons has clearly established the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons. The Senate Speaker's authority in respect of the directorates is implicitly delegated by the Senate.
• Money spent for purposes intended: We examined a sample of travel files and found that generally, expenses were well documented. We found no evidence that expenses claimed were not for the purposes intended.
• Accountability Framework: The budgeting process appears to generate disagreements and perhaps misunderstandings about several administrative and budget matters concerning the directorates. This indicates a less than harmonious relationship between the Senate and the House of Commons with respect to the administration of the directorates. Clearer arrangements might help avoid some of these problems.

• Recommendation: To improve communications and the accountability framework for the directorates, the House of Commons and the Senate should develop a memorandum of understanding to guide the operation of the two directorates. The memorandum of understanding should set out:
• the method of supervising the directorates so that they are accountable to both Houses;
• the process for developing and approving budgets;
• the relative contributions of the Houses, both financial and non-financial;
• the form and content of reports from returning delegations that are tabled in each House;
• the method of appointing staff, particularly directors; and
• the reporting relationships for directors.
• The reports of returning delegations, as currently produced, do not provide full accountability for trips by individual travellers.
• For individual parliamentarians, public reports of returning delegations are a timely and effective way to account for travel on behalf of Associations and Exchanges. The Standing Orders of the House of Commons require that a report be tabled in the House 20 sitting days after the return of the delegation to Canada. By convention, reports are also tabled in the Senate.
• We expected to find that activities and expenditures would be reported in sufficient detail to provide accountability to both Chambers and to the public. However, the reports of returning delegations included no cost information nor the official schedule of activities. Some omitted mention of up to 10 days of the trip, after allowing for travel time.
• Recommendation: The reports of returning delegations currently tabled in the House of Commons and Senate, while useful, should be improved. The House of Commons and the Senate should require that all reports of delegations be tabled, on a timely basis, and include sufficient information on the activities and travel dates, and total costs for each individual on the trip. The members of the delegation and all those accompanying it should be identified.
• D Use of Grants and Contributions: An important difference in the financing of the Associations and Exchanges Directorates, compared with other administrative activities of the House of Commons and the Senate, is the use of transfer payments. Grants and contributions constitute about 60 percent of the total budget of the directorates.

An appropriate use of the grants would be to pay dues to an association's international parent body, such as the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association's contribution to the North Atlantic Assembly.

The Associations also make use of the fact that grant funds do not lapse at the end of a fiscal year . This means the funds can be retained from one year to the next by the association receiving the grant. We agree that it would be inconvenient for some Associations if they could not carry over funds. However, administrative convenience is not sufficient justification for continuing with this anomalous arrangement. Of course, Parliament could decide to state clearly how its definition and understanding of transfer payments differs from the Treasury Board definitions applied to government departments.

Another consequence of using transfer payments is that the cost of parliamentary travel is understated. This travel is not reported as transportation and communication expenses by the Senate or the House of Commons, and is also not included in the travel expenses of parliamentarians reported in the Public Accounts.

Recommendation: To increase the usefulness of the information contained in the Public Accounts concerning these directorates, the Senate and the House of Commons should:

• limit the use of transfer payments to recipients who are more clearly at arm's length from Parliament, such as the international parent body of some associations;
• budget and pay for the Parliamentary Associations Secretariat and the Parliamentary Exchanges and Protocol Directorate travel directly, while maintaining whatever ratio of House of Commons and Senate delegates the Chambers agree on; and
• report this travel in the Public Accounts as a transportation and communications expenditure, as well as separately for each parliamentarian.

Part Two

Security

Context and Background

Our observations build on our recently completed audits of the House of Commons (November 1991) and Senate administrations (March 1991).

These two audits made similar observations about security arrangements. In the Senate audit report we noted: ``...current arrangements with other security agencies do not ensure a co-ordinated and appropriate response to emergency situations..." In the House of Commons audit report we noted: ``Security inside the parliamentary buildings...has not been standardized and co-ordinated to ensure that daily, routine operations also function properly in emergency situations. This puts in question the merit of having two separate security forces."

Based on these observations, we recommended at that time that the House and Senate study the implications of a joint security service. We deferred a definitive conclusion about whether to recommend creating a joint security force to this report.

Since our 1991 audits, the House, and especially the Senate, have made many improvements. The Senate has appointed a new Chief of Security, reorganized its Protective Service and instituted regular staff training. Most notably, the Senate has approved contingency plans to co-ordinate its activities with the House of Commons and RCMP, and is conducting training exercises to refine and practise its response procedures. Since the House of Commons audit, the House has implemented a new management and organizational structure and started co-ordinated modification of its security and emergency procedures.

A key feature of the security environment is that roles and responsibilities are divided between four security/police services:

• House of Commons Security Service;
• Senate Protective Service;
• RCMP; and
• Ottawa Police.

These arrangements should provide:

• harmonized access control of people, freight and mail/courier to the Parliament Buildings; and
• co-ordinated responses to security incidents both on the grounds and in the Buildings.

A single parliamentary force would eliminate the need for operational co-ordination between the House, and Senate, and would simplify the task of co-ordination with the RCMP. However, we have concluded, in light of our examination and the changes already underway in the House and Senate, that the necessary co-ordination can also be achieved by revising and improving existing arrangements. This has the advantage of retaining the existing accountability arrangements provided for in the Parliament of Canada Act, rather than facing the inherent difficulty of a single force being accountable to both Chambers.

There are at least three organizational options which would provide better co-ordination than presently exists.

Option 1. Consolidate security of both the buildings and grounds under one security agency.

The single force could either be a new agency, or the RCMP. In either case, it would have to be accountable to both Houses. We conclude that while this option is theoretically feasible, accountability would be difficult to achieve, significant operational problems would remain, and the improvements needed could be achieved in other ways:

• Co-ordination with the RCMP would remain a key requirement. Operating procedures would still have to be co-ordinated, and a unified command and control structure developed.
• If the RCMP took full responsibility for the buildings, there might be some potential benefits with respect to the effectiveness of security, especially if parliamentarians want a higher level of protection. On the other hand, costs might be higher reflecting the more extensive training and higher salaries of RCMP officers, as compared with members of the House and Senate security forces.
• If the RCMP were in charge, this would potentially raise a fundamental constitutional issue, because the legislature would then be entirely dependent on the Government for security protection.

This option would leave responsibility for the grounds and emergency back-up to the RCMP. In our 1991 audits we recommended that the Senate and House assess this option. To respect the constitutional autonomy of each House, the most acceptable way to do this would be to create a new agency reporting jointly to the House and Senate.

Alternatively, one House, presumably the House of Commons, could provide security to all of Parliament. This is how the Restaurant and cafeterias work. We ruled out this model for security because of the real and symbolic importance of security to the constitutional separation of the House and Senate. Allowing one side to provide the service to the other might signify the authority of one Chamber over the other - a concept that few parliamentarians would find acceptable.

We have concluded that Option 2, consolidating security only in the Buildings under one security force is feasible but is not absolutely essential for realizing the necessary improvements. Nevertheless, the benefits of amalgamation should be noted:

• Integrating the day-to-day activities of the House and Senate security services would give security staff experience in working with the other House's staff in routine situations. Experience in other legislatures suggests that security staff respond better in emergency situations when they operate under the same arrangements that are in place in routine situations.
• The annual savings from merging the two existing security services are in the range of $400,000 to $600,000. The total annual security budget is $14 million.
• Other operational advantages are noted in Appendix A of the Annex .

• A joint service might lack sufficient accountability. It would be under less direct control than in the current arrangement, where each service is directly and solely responsible to its House. Such joint services have problems of decision making and accountability, as we have seen in our audits of the Library of Parliament and the Parliamentary Associations and Exchanges directorates.
• A merger of the two services would entail significant direct and indirect costs and disruption during the reorganization.

Most of the security effectiveness gains of a joint force can potentially be achieved by this option. This option maintains the existing organizational arrangements among the House Security Service, Senate Protective Service and the RCMP. Our analysis indicates that co-operation on a number of specific actions - discussed in more detail below - can provide an effective security regime. Particularly important is a unified command structure over the three forces in the event of emergency.

Several factors have led us to this conclusion:

• First, security and senior administration officials in the House and Senate are adamant that the necessary improvements can be made.
• Second, some improvements have already been made.
• Third, none of the actions we recommend would preclude establishing a joint force later. Indeed, the specific actions we recommend would be required if a joint force were created.

1. A clear single structure for emergency response would diminish the potential for confusion and disagreement in an emergency.

Recommendation: The House, Senate and RCMP should work together to harmonize and communicate their security policies for command and control, and develop emergency procedures to reflect these policies.

2. Compatible and interrelated emergency procedures are required.

Recommendation: The House, Senate and RCMP should together:

• clarify and co-ordinate procedures for dealing with incidents near, or crossing jurisdictional boundaries;
• develop agreements to provide for sharing of security personnel, when needed; and
• refine and co-ordinate their respective emergency contingency plans, including initial response by the Hill Detachment of the RCMP.

Recommendation: The House, Senate and RCMP should ensure security staff have extensive knowledge of each other's security operations, through detailed briefings and tours.

4. Joint simulation exercises and training are an essential element for improving parliamentary security.

Recommendation: The House, Senate and RCMP should together:

• establish an ongoing series of exercises simulating different emergency incidents in the Parliament Buildings and grounds;
• conduct a training needs assessment of House, Senate and Hill Detachment staff. Courses of common interest should be developed and conducted jointly;
• develop comprehensive training on joint operating procedures for House and Senate security staff, and the RCMP; and
• extend relevant training courses to participants of the other two organizations.

Recommendation: The House and Senate should develop:

• hiring standards for security staff that are substantially the same; and
• an ongoing program of staff exchanges.

Recommendation: The House, Senate and RCMP should together ensure the co-ordination of their operation centres, and, for the longer term, examine the feasibility of collocation.

7. Improved emergency communication between the security services is needed.

Recommendation: The House and Senate, in consultation with the RCMP, should ensure that future upgrades and purchases of communication equipment are, where appropriate, integrated.

8. Co-ordinated information and threat assessments would provide the security services with a more complete picture of the environment in which they operate.

Recommendation: The House, Senate, RCMP and appropriate agencies should together:

• identify relevant security intelligence, and establish mechanisms to have it provided to the House and Senate on a regular basis; and
• agree on a program to regularly conduct threat assessments on Parliament.

Recommendation: The House and Senate should establish a joint security committee.

Membership would consist of senior officials - the Sergeant-at-Arms, the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, the Parliamentary Librarian, the RCMP ``A" Division Commanding Officer, an observer from the Ottawa Police and, as necessary, from other municipal police forces. It should be co-chaired by the Clerks of the Senate and House and report, as needed, and as requested, to the Board and Committee on Internal Economy. Its primary role would be to:

• ensure good communication and co-ordination between staffs;
• vet policy and budget issues affecting the security of both Houses; and
• monitor the implementation of the security recommendations of this report.

Overall Conclusion and Recommendation

Recommendation: To ensure that these changes are made, an outside body should review the effectiveness and efficiency of the resulting arrangements within three to five years.

Upkeep of a Heritage Asset: the Parliament Buildings

There has been a long-standing concern over the condition of the Buildings. In the past 16 years, several reports have recommended clarification and rationalization of roles and responsibilities for the Parliament Buildings and urged specific programs of major capital improvements. Few of the recommendations have been implemented.

The 1985 Special Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons, the McGrath Report, proposed that the precincts of Parliament be placed under the authority of a new officer - the Intendant, who would be responsible to both Houses. This recommendation was not implemented.

In 1984, Public Works commissioned a firm of consulting architects to report on the condition of the Centre Block. The 1985 report identified serious problems. These problems related to fire and health safety, electrical systems, and mechanical systems, as well as basic structural elements such as repointing and repairing exterior masonry. Many of these repairs are still outstanding.

We had several major questions concerning the Parliament Buildings:

• Are the roles and responsibilities for improving and maintaining the parliamentary precinct clearly defined? Should they be changed?
• Do the current arrangements and practices promote the management and preservation of these important national heritage assets with due regard for long- term economy and efficiency? Are operating repairs, maintenance, and capital improvements carried out in a timely manner and the costs reported to Parliament?
• Does an approved long-term plan exist?

• proposed renovations to the 1910 Wing of the East Block;
• asbestos removal and renovations in the Wellington Building; and
• development of a 10-year plan for the parliamentary precinct.

No one organization has clear responsibility for the parliamentary precinct. Financial responsibility for the upkeep and renovations of the Buildings is, in practice, shared. Even the distinction between the roles of Parliament and Public Works, which are generally accepted, are blurring, as Parliament undertakes more capital projects.

Public Works clearly has the lead role. This role, as landlord and custodian of the Parliament Buildings, is specified in the law. However, there is another fundamental constitutional principle- that the two Houses are each responsible for their internal affairs. The challenge is to balance the Minister's legislative authority with parliamentary privilege. The British Parliament faced a similar challenge until this year. Their Parliament Buildings were the responsibility of a Minister. With the passage in 1992 of the Parliamentary Corporate Bodies Act, the House of Lords and House of Commons now own the buildings and are responsible for their maintenance and improvement. An Office of Parliamentary Works has been established to care for the buildings.

To the extent that the Canadian Parliament's heritage buildings are ``special purpose", adopting the British model would be consistent with the existing Public Works policy of, where appropriate, assigning responsibility for the administration of special purpose buildings to the occupants.

Recommendation: Parliament should track the British model for owning and maintaining its Parliament Buildings and, if it appears successful and feasible, should consider adopting a similar model for capital improvements and planning for our Parliament Buildings.

Better reporting to Parliament and the public is the first step in this direction. At present, reports are deficient in the following respects:

• Costs are not fully reported. Public Works does not, for instance, publish separately all its operational and capital expenditures on Parliament Hill. According to Public Works, this information is easily available.
• Expenditures, in relation to needed work, are not published. There is no long-term plan or measure of progress against a plan. While this is not common practice for capital projects, we believe the Parliament Buildings would benefit from such a report.

This would:

• assist interested parties and the public to obtain comprehensive information about expenditures on buildings and grounds in the parliamentary precinct; and
• improve the quality of financial reporting on the costs of Parliament by consolidating and identifying Public Works' costs related to the Parliament Buildings.

Such a plan is important, because until it is approved, the government will not implement its 1988 decision to spend up to $200 million over 10 years for urgently needed repairs and development of the Parliament Buildings. The $200 million represents only a proportion of the basic structural and electrical work which has been identified.

Most of the necessary major repairs and renovations identified in the 1970s and 80s have not yet been undertaken. One example is the 1910 Wing of the East Block. Still awaiting renovation, most of this wing has been unoccupied by parliamentarians for the last five years. In the meantime, only some of the most urgent health and safety related work such as asbestos abatement, has been undertaken.

The delays and the limited number of projects undertaken without an approved plan also reflect government policies on fiscal restraint. A further explanation, we were told, is the reluctance of the government to be seen as unduly favouring Hill projects over others required elsewhere. As we have observed, delays are also caused by:

• the lack of clear accountability for the buildings;
• the presence of many stakeholders with different needs and perspectives;
• the absence of consolidated and analyzed information on the state of the precinct; and
• the lack of a clearly defined timetable for making decisions on capital projects on Parliament Hill.

Public Works has also taken action and has established a special unit dedicated solely to serving Parliament. The initial reaction of the House and Senate to this organizational innovation appears to be favorable.

Overall Conclusion and Recommendation

Parliament and the government should have outside advice on the short- and long-term needs of the parliamentary precinct for renovation, conservation, and accommodation.

An independent voluntary non-partisan advisory group, a Parliament Buildings Council, could be established. It should report periodically and advise Parliament and the government on:

• the quality of the Buildings' maintenance and state of repair, particularly in light of their heritage characteristics and national importance;
• the appropriateness of plans to deal with the repairs, major capital improvements, and future parliamentary accommodation; and
• the appropriateness of current organizational, funding, and accountability arrangements.

Recommendation: A small non-partisan advisory body, a Parliament Buildings Council, should be established.

Potential Efficiency and Economy Gains

The Special Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons, chaired by James McGrath, in its 1985 report, commented: ``There appears to be little co-ordination and consultation among the three administrations that make up the parliamentary establishment (the Senate, the House of Commons, and the Library of Parliament)." The report observed there might be overlaps in office automation, research administration, and other areas and recommended that a survey be undertaken with a view to ``eliminating duplication and ensuring that members receive efficient and effective services." It recommended that the Board of Internal Economy of the House undertake the survey. The recommendation was not implemented.

In 1990, the House Special Committee on the Review of the Parliament of Canada Act (the Danis Committee) commented that there was a ``significant degree of overlap" between the two Houses. It said there may be efficiencies that could be achieved, ``if there were a more co-ordinated approach to administrative services than has taken place in the past." No specific actions were taken in response to this recommendation.

Our Approach

We assessed the potential savings that could be achieved by combining each currently separate service in terms of the following:

• fewer management positions;
• fewer clerical and administrative positions;
• fewer operational positions;
• lower training costs;
• more economical purchasing arrangements;
• reduced duplication;
• increased use of equipment; and
• possible economies of scale with new equipment.

Because the preliminary analysis indicated that cleaning and maintenance; furniture repair and auxiliary services; printing, and transportation offered fewer benefits as joint services, they were examined less thoroughly. We did conduct interviews with management about these services to determine if their delivery could be improved by having closer ties with the other House. We also examined training, development, collective bargaining and occupational health and safety because increased collaboration appeared to be valuable.

Observation: We could not find compelling arguments to recommend, at this time, amalgamation of entire services. The savings from amalgamation, over and above potential efficiencies which each House is now separately pursuing, are not large in relation to the organizational costs and disruption of amalgamation. (A fuller description of these findings is contained in the Annex.) More collaboration would yield many of the benefits of amalgamation, but with few of the associated costs.

More collaboration would yield benefits. We found a number of small-scale opportunities to reduce costs and/or improve efficiency and effectiveness. We noted opportunities such as:

• consolidating, or each House specializing in, certain parts of services;
• joint purchasing ventures;
• shifting staff between House and Senate services, on an as-needed basis; and
• collaborating in training and development, occupational health and safety, environment and collective bargaining.

Three Examples where Collaboration could Yield Benefits

Similarly, if downtown deliveries (and messages) were co-ordinated and centralized, this could result in savings of about $30,000 annually. Of course, establishing the system of co-ordination would, itself, have a cost.

The Centre Block Post Offices have long been a symbol of overlap. Two apparently identical Post Offices sit side by side. One might think only one is necessary. Our analysis indicates that if all current services are maintained, including the philatelic service, then a combined service might reduce costs by about $30,000 annually. As well, some small savings in space are also likely if the two Post Offices are amalgamated. Alternatively, savings could be achieved if each side specialized in certain services and provided them to both Houses.

In sum, the two Houses could save over $100,000 annually in operational labour costs by more collaboration. In addition to these savings, although it is hard to calculate the benefits, there are situations where the staff from one House could be assigned, on a temporary ``as needed and as available basis", to provide assistance to the other.

We estimate that administrative savings from entirely amalgamating these services, over and above the savings from more collaboration and from efficiency improvements each House is now pursuing, are about $50,000 to $100,000 annually. This is about one to two percent of the total budget for these services.

Example #2 - Publications: The instances when informal co-operation has occurred are relatively rare. Such co-operation did take place during round-the-clock Senate debates on the GST in the fall of 1990, when the House helped produce the Senate Hansard.

The Senate service, because it is smaller, is also less able to handle exceptional circumstances. For example, it is difficult to handle very long sittings in the Chamber, many simultaneous committee meetings, or situations where the proportion of French is much higher than usual.

Example #3 - Training and Development. The 1991 audits of the House of Commons and the Senate noted deficiencies in the area of training and development and suggested co-operation between the Houses might be part of the solution. Some initiatives are underway which address our concerns. As well, more can be done.

• More sharing of information on training needs would assist the Houses and the Library of Parliament to identify areas where training needs can be met without unnecessary duplication of effort. These are likely to include areas such as computer training, and communication skills which are not influenced by whether the employee works for the House, Senate or Library of Parliament.
• More joint initiatives in staff career development through rotation and transfer could provide greater developmental opportunities for employees. Indeed, recently there has been a significant increase in the number of secondments and developmental assignments between the organizations.

Circumstances will change. Therefore, the potential for joint services needs to be assessed on a periodic basis. For example, amalgamation may prove attractive if efficiency initiatives underway do not achieve expected savings.

Recommendation: To deal both with ongoing and emerging joint administrative issues, we recommend that the Board and Committee of Internal Economy establish a Senior Management Working Group. Co-chaired by the Clerks of the House and Senate, its general purpose would be to:

• vet proposals for collaboration and joint services and, where appropriate, refer them to the Board and the Committee;
• commission studies into potential and existing joint endeavours;
• ensure ongoing communication between respective managers on both sides; and
• monitor implementation of this report.

• arrangements for sharing and assistance of staff and equipment;
• co-operative purchasing arrangements, including truck leasing and maintenance;
• combined internal mail services;
• rationalized postal services;
• co-ordinating Senate and House buses;
• co-ordination of collective bargaining positions;
• co-ordination and co-operation on training initiatives;
• budgets of the Parliamentary Associations and Exchanges directorates; and
• common building and accommodation issues.

Parliament-wide costs and benefits should be a determining factor in the Working Group's recommendations to the Board and Committee of Internal Economy. In considering whether services should be jointly delivered, the challenge will be to make decisions which consider Parliament-wide costs, rather than those of only a single directorate or a single House. Nothing will be gained if one House reduces its costs, while the other increases its costs by a similar or a greater amount. Considering Parliament-wide costs will require serious attention to the incentives given managers. The objective should be to recognize and reward managers who consider Parliament-wide costs and benefits.

The activities of the Senior Management Working Group should be reported to both Houses. We believe that a useful means to ensure that joint possibilities are systematically considered, on an ongoing basis, would be to have the House and Senate table a periodic report on the activities of the Senior Management Working Group. Such a report would help give parliamentarians, many of whom have an interest in joint services, assurance that joint possibilities are being systematically considered. The Working Group might report initially to the Board and Committee which might add relevant commentary or decision. The report should identify:

• areas where joint possibilities have been considered;
• the conclusions of these studies, and the resulting decisions taken by the Board and Committee of Internal Economy; and
• areas that the Working Group plans to consider in the future.

Existing Joint Arrangements: Some Examples

The jointly delivered services we looked at are:

• Human Resource Management Activities -
  • Language Testing;
  • Language Training;
  • Health Services;
• OASIS - Installation of a Video and EDP Network; and
• Document Distribution.

• partial cost recovery;
• ``free" services on an ``as available" basis;
• agreements for each to provide different components of the service; and
• services provided to all parliamentarians by one organization, with input from the others on level and quality of service.

For each of these cost recovery models, the key level of service consideration is that access must be equitable. If one House receives poorer service, it will not wish to participate in an arrangement where its service requirements receive a consistently lower priority than the other House.

The joint distribution of documents is a good example. There is a high level of satisfaction with the service. Why does this service work well? The answer appears to be related to three factors:

1. The arrangement between the Houses is long standing and informal.
2. The quality of service and level of satisfaction with the service is high, and hence there is no pressure to change the arrangement.
3. Although the service is under the control and is funded by the House, it is not conspicuously identified as a House of Commons service.

What Now? What Later?

These recommendations are intended to complement the recommendations in our 1991 audits. We note that many of these recommendations have already been acted upon. We hope that those which recommended fuller reporting on parliamentarians' expenses will also be implemented. If the recommendations on disclosure and fuller reporting are not acted upon before the next election, we urge that they be given a high priority in the next Parliament.

The security issue, especially, will require constant attention. In undertaking the follow-up on security which we recommend be done three to five years from now, it will be necessary to ensure that parliamentarians are consulted about the appropriate balance between public access to Parliament and an appropriate level of security. While those responsible for security may prefer the highest possible level of security to minimize security risks, parliamentarians may wish to limit increases in the level of security in order to foster public access.

• In sum, although much less than we expected, the savings derived from more co-operation are worth pursuing. The House of Commons and Senate should seek more co-operative and efficient administrative relations. Parliamentarians, parliamentary managers, and the thousands of employees on Parliament Hill all have a role to play, if the challenge is to be met. These are issues of leadership and values.