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2004 June Report of the Auditor General of Canada
Report to the Yukon Legislative Assembly for 2000 to 2003
Introduction
Main Points
Financial Vulnerability
Managing Capital Agreements
Lack of Compliance With Authority
Financial Statement Issues
Follow-up of Previous Issues
Appendix A—Our People
Report of the Auditor General to the Yukon Legislative Assembly for 2000 to 2003
Chapter 1 — Introduction
Our Vision
1.1 The Office of the Auditor General of Canada (the Office) is committed to making a difference for the people of the Yukon by promoting, in all our work for the Legislative Assembly, answerable, honest, and productive government.
Our Mission
1.2 The Office conducts independent audits and examinations that provide objective information, advice, and assurance to the Legislative Assembly. We promote accountability and best practices in government operations.
Our Mandate
1.3 In accordance with Yukon Act, section 30 (1), we audited the accounts and financial transactions of the Government of the Yukon Territory to express an opinion on the Government's financial statements for the years ended 31 March 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.
1.4 Each of the significant matters noted in this report were identified during the course of our audit of the Public Accounts, which have been audited in accordance with Canadian generally accepted auditing standards. Our audits included reviews of certain operating, legislative and financial control systems and financial management practices. These include detailed tests and procedures, as we considered necessary.
1.5 Our audit opinions are included in the Public Accounts. The Auditor's Reports provided an unqualified opinion on the consolidated financial statements of the Government of Yukon for the years ended 31 March 2000, 2001, and 2003. The consolidated financial statements were qualified for the year ended 31 March 2002 as noted in paragraph 6.3 of this Report.
1.6 This Report of the Auditor General to the Yukon Legislative Assembly, also referred to as the Report on Other Matters, is part of our audit of the Government's financial statements. In accordance with the Yukon Act, section 30 (2), the Auditor General is to report on any "other matters" arising from the audit that we feel should be brought to the attention of the Legislative Assembly. Accordingly, this report contains items of concern, our recommendations, and management's response, where appropriate.
1.7 This Report on Other Matters covers the fiscal years ended 31 March 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. This report comments on items that we believe will be of interest to members of the Legislative Assembly. Individually or collectively, they have not generally been significant enough to require a reservation of opinion in our Auditor's Report. However, the report may not include all matters that may be of interest to members.
1.8 During 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, we issued audit opinions on the financial statements of the following government entities. Our opinion on the financial statements of the Yukon Housing Corporation for the year ended 31 March 2000 was qualified (more details are provided in Chapter 6 of this report).
Table 1.1 — Audit opinions issued by the Auditor General's Office on the Financial Statements of Yukon Government entities between 2000 and 2003
|
Corporation |
Year end |
Reported to |
|---|---|---|
|
Yukon Development Corporation |
31 December 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 |
Minister |
|
Yukon Energy Corporation |
31 December 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 |
Chair, Yukon Energy Corporation |
|
Yukon Housing Corporation |
31 March 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 |
Minister |
|
Yukon Liquor Corporation |
31 March 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 |
Minister |
|
Yukon Workers' Compensation Health and Safety Board |
31 December 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 |
Minister |
In addition, we audited the accounts and financial statements of the Yukon College for the years ended 30 June 2000 to 2003. The results were reported to the Minister of Education.
Other audit work carried out on behalf of the Government of Yukon and Yukoners
1.9 In September 2002, we also provided two important reports of interest to Yukoners. First, at the request of both the federal and Yukon cabinets, we carried out a special examination of the Yukon's workers' compensation system. We provided the Yukon Workers' Compensation Health and Safety Board with a report on the results of our work. This report was then provided to the Minister and made public the same day, with the Auditor General addressing a press conference and public hearing in Whitehorse that day.
1.10 Secondly, at the request of the Department of Health and Social Services, we carried out audit work on the health indicators included in the Government of Yukon's publication, Reporting to Yukoners on Comparable Health and Health System Indicators 2002. This publication was to satisfy the Communiqué on Health issued by first ministers in September 2000, in which they agreed to provide clear accountability reporting to Canadians. First ministers directed their ministers of health to provide comprehensive and regular public reporting and to collaborate to develop a comprehensive framework. The report uses comparable indicators, that are jointly agreed-upon, to address health status, health outcomes, and quality of service. This was the first report on the 14 indicators for the Yukon.
Management responses
1.11 Our Office maintains a policy on obtaining comments in response to audit recommendations. The policy suggests that audit observations and recommendations be referred to the management of the audited organizations for comment. The Office obtains from the entity, where appropriate, written responses to recommendations contained in our reports.
1.12 We provided our draft report, where appropriate, to the Deputy Minister of Finance and to Territorial corporations reported on, for comment. Management responses are included with relevant chapters.
Our Thanks
1.13 Management provided explanations, information, and full access to all documents requested during our audit. We would like to express our appreciation to the Deputy Minister of Finance and to the staff of the Government and its Territorial corporations for their co-operation.
For comments or questions on this report, please contact Eric Hellsten at (604) 666-3596, Roger Simpson at (780) 495-3088, or Ron Thompson at (613) 995-3708.
Chapter 2 — Main Points
2.1 This Report is to bring to the attention of the Legislative Assembly any "other matters" arising from our audit of the Public Accounts of the Government of Yukon. Accordingly, this report contains items of concern, our recommendations, and management's response, where appropriate.
2.2 In Chapter 3, Financial Vulnerability, we note that given the changing expectations of Yukoners, the declining and ageing population, and the slumping economy, the Government of Yukon is under increasing pressure to manage its resources well.
2.3 In Chapter 4, Managing Capital Agreements, we found that the Government is not basing advance payments on cash flow statements in order to avoid providing funds in advance of need. It needs to be more precise in entering into such agreements, so that each party is clear on its responsibilities. It must also exercise more discipline in holding others to their part of the arrangements.
2.4 In Chapter 5, Lack of Compliance with Authority, we express our concern that violations of authority continue to occur and that the Government should have systems and processes in place to ensure that these situations do not arise. We found examples of departments exceeding their spending authority, of trust funds not being adequately monitored, and of payments being made prior to the approval of Management Board.
2.5 In Chapter 6, Financial Statement Issues, we bring attention to qualified Auditor's Reports that we have issued on the Public Accounts and the financial statements of the Yukon Housing Corporation, and what has been done to correct problems identified in those reports. We also recommend improvements in the Government's accounting for environmental liabilities and tangible capital assets.
2.6 Finally, in Chapter 7, Follow-up of Previous Issues, we bring to the attention of the Legislative Assembly, up-dated comments on previous audit observations and recommendations. The most significant of these matters deals with land inventory valuation and enhancing accountability. As the chapter notes, some of these issues have not yet been resolved, even though several years have passed since we first identified and reported them. We draw particular attention to the problems encountered under the capital funding agreement with the City of Dawson for its recreation centre and sewage treatment projects.
Chapter 3 — Financial Vulnerability
3.1 Yukoners in general and Members of the Legislative Assembly in particular are interested in the financial health of the Yukon Government. As the economy of the Yukon has slowed over the past few years, this has impacted the finances of the Government of Yukon and heightened the interest in the Government's financial position.
3.2 The Government provides a number of reports on its financial position. Departmental and corporate plans, budgets, and annual reports provide the greatest level of detail. The Government has endeavoured to make the budget understandable to all Yukoners by publishing the operations and maintenance estimates, the capital estimates, the capital highlights, and the operations and maintenance highlights.
3.3 The Public Accounts of the Yukon Government are designed to present financial statements that fully and appropriately disclose the financial position and operations of the Government. The Government's consolidated financial statements contained in the Public Accounts summarize financial reporting for all of its entities. The Financial Administration Act requires the Public Accounts to be tabled in the Legislative Assembly by 31 October of each year for the fiscal year that ends on March 31. In this Chapter, the information comes from the consolidated statements, unless we state differently.
3.4 One way that Members of the Legislative Assembly can assess the Government's financial health is by looking at its annual surplus or annual deficit at the end of the fiscal year.
3.5 While the annual surplus and deficit inform members about what has occurred during the year, another important figure is the accumulated surplus or accumulated deficit. These amounts tell the members what the Government's financial situation has been during its recorded history, not just for the past year. The accumulated surplus for the Government as at 31 March 2003 means that the net amount of its annual surpluses and deficits is an overall positive balance of $166.2 million.
3.6 One area that has not been a concern for the Yukon is the area of debt, which has been a problem for several other jurisdictions. The Yukon's total long-term debt as at 31 March 2003 was just over $31 million, or 10% of its total recorded assets of $299.1 million.
3.7 A complication arises when one considers consolidated and non-consolidated results. Non-consolidated financial results only include the accounts of the Government, meaning the government departments. Consolidated financial results also include the accounts of other entities, which have been gathered through different accounting methods. In the case of the Yukon Government, the consolidated results include the accounts of six non-departmental entities. Therefore, the consolidated results more clearly reflect the entire scope of the government's influence.
Risk
3.8 Management practice has evolved in recent years to examine financial affairs from the perspective of risk. Risk analysis for governments is complex due to the wide and varied scope of matters they are responsible for and includes the following two questions, among others:
- What is the risk of unforeseen costs being incurred?
- What is the risk of revenues not being collected?
Every good planning and budgeting system has included these two questions without necessarily identifying them as risks.
3.9 Two large areas of risk for the Yukon Government under these headings are:
- Escalating health care costs. As with all jurisdictions in Canada, health care costs are increasing rapidly and are difficult to forecast. Technological advances in medical treatments result in better outcomes for patients, but are often much more expensive than historical treatments. Northern jurisdictions are also affected by a disproportionate share of medical evacuations as specialists and their equipment are available only in large southern cities.
- Federal formula financing. As with the other territories and many provinces, a large share of the Yukon Government's revenues is provided under an agreement with the federal government. Changes in population and territorial revenues and expenses can result in unpredictable swings in federal funding, which may have the undesirable result of less money flowing to the Yukon than anticipated.
3.10 As of 31 March 2002, the Government had an accumulated surplus of $168,142,000. This amount is significant and is one of the few accumulated surpluses held by a Canadian jurisdiction. However, it represents only a portion of the Government's spending in one year. In addition, the Government forecasted large annual deficits over the following two years. If these deficits were to be realized, the accumulated surplus would be reduced significantly.
3.11 At the end of 2003, operational expenditures exceeded main estimates by $3 million, but more significantly, capital expenditures were $11,000,000 less than the budget. This resulted in the deficit being smaller than anticipated. Of larger impact was a significant revision to the methodology used to calculate population statistics under the formula financing grant at the end of September that led to $23.7 million more in grant revenue. This significantly improved the financial results for the year and alleviated short-term cash pressures on the Government. In combination with other differences in actual formula financing from estimates, the forecast annual deficit of $35.97 million in the main estimates for the year ending 31 March 2003 became a $554,000 annual surplus.
Table 3.1 — Forecast and Actual Annual Deficits and Actual Accumulated Surpluses for the Years Ended 31 March 2002 and 2003 ($ thousands)
|
2002 |
2003 |
|
|---|---|---|
|
Forecast annual deficit |
(21,596) |
(35,970) |
|
Actual surplus (deficit) |
(15,961) |
554 |
|
Change in accounting policy |
|
(2,482) |
|
Actual accumulated surplus |
168,142 |
166,214 |
3.12 While the recent formula financing adjustment has provided some temporary relief, the Government could be required to make difficult choices in terms of spending and taxation, while maintaining financial discipline, to stay the course. The Government is going though a period of increasing financial vulnerability where revenues are threatened while costs continue to increase. Strategically, the Government will need to develop plans for how it will deal with this problem. In hard times, the Government has relatively few options, usually limited to increasing revenues, cutting costs, or borrowing.
3.13 At present, the Government gets about 68 percent of its total revenue from Canada by way of a formula funding grant. The formula for calculating the grant is complex and various factors cannot be known with certainty until several years later. One key element is the territorial population, which has been decreasing in recent years. This has a downward effect on the amount of the grant. Increasing this grant from Canada is not an easy task.
3.14 Local taxation (including fees charged for various services) provides only 13 percent of total revenues, which is not a large portion of government revenues. With minimal flexibility to increase revenues, the Government may have to look at its costs. Cost cutting may mean sizing back some programs, cutting some out entirely, or freezing cost elements.
3.15 In terms of the services they provide, governments have built a model which is not flexible in the immediate term. Unlike a business that can vary its inventory and staff according to customer demand, government programs are more difficult to change when user demands increase, decrease, or become less affordable. The Government does not have many program areas that could be considered to be low priority. Putting programs into some order of importance may become crucial if hard decisions have to be faced.
3.16 Other considerations to control costs include cutting staff. Staff cost is a large expense, but increasing or decreasing the numbers of civil servants is complex, subject to specific rules and agreements, and fundamentally inflexible. Reducing staff is difficult in small market areas, often unacceptable to the community, and negative in terms of the local economy. This means that making decisions becomes a difficult process.
3.17 Other program costs also have many complex rules for entitlement, service, financial control and accountability. They are not easily changed without weakening some key aspects of program design. Programs are in competition with each other for government dollars, and program redesign may take years to accomplish.
3.18 The Government is made up of departments, Territorial corporations, and other agencies. Some services are carried out by third parties funded by Government grants. They are all to one degree or another established by legislation. With a few exceptions, all require ongoing financial support from the Government.
3.19 However, as noted elsewhere, the Government had an annual deficit in 2002 and a small annual surplus in 2003. Previous forecasts of larger deficits have not materialized, but the accumulated surplus could decrease quickly with poor results in consecutive years.
3.20 Significant replacement revenue sources are unlikely to be found in the short-term and in hard times, people have to make tough choices. Setting priorities becomes more important, and optional expenses are often the first things to go. In government, essential programs have to be maintained but sometimes with reduced levels of service.
3.21 Given the changing expectations of Yukoners, the declining economy and the ageing population, the Government is under increasing pressure to manage its resources well.
Chapter 4 — Managing Capital Agreements
4.1 The Government enters into agreements with various parties for cost-shared capital developments. We noted some fundamental flaws in the way these projects are managed; although there are agreements between the parties, these are not followed in some cases we reviewed. This results in weakened accountability, and results that are not clear.
4.2 One of our basic concerns is when the Government makes payments for a project before the payment is actually needed. We have noted this previously in our 1999 report, but the practice still continues. Giving money before cash is required allows the recipient to invest the amount that is not needed. This effectively increases the amount paid by the Government (although the Legislative Assembly votes only the actual cash amount stipulated in the agreement).
4.3 Also, making payments for a project in advance is a way around the clawback provisions of the Formula Financing Agreement. If the Government invests the money itself, the funding from Canada would be reduced by the amount of interest earned, so there is no incentive to earn interest. This was the situation at the time the payments discussed in this report were made. However, in times when cash is scarce, and the Government has to borrow, it makes less sense to pay earlier than required.
4.4 We noted two capital projects with the City of Whitehorse: waterfront landscaping and a shopping mall development, where management practices should have been better.
4.5 Waterfront Landscaping. On 4 August 1999, the Yukon Government entered into a capital funding agreement with the City of Whitehorse for waterfront landscaping. The two parties agreed to spend $1.25 million with the Government's share being $740,000 and the City's $500,000. The agreement was not clear about what actual work was to be done. The Government paid $740,000 in advance, a mere five days after signing the agreement
4.6 When we reviewed the situation in detail, however, we found that there were many different projects being undertaken by the City over several years in the area, referred to as the riverfront project. The City estimates that it will spend $4.7 million on these projects and that it has spent $4.1 million to date. While it is apparent that the City has spent considerable sums on the project, it is not clear which of these different projects were to be funded by the Yukon Government and when. It is also not clear whether both the City and Government are satisfied that the terms and conditions of the capital funding agreement have been completed in a manner satisfactory to both parties.
4.7 Whitehorse Shopping Mall Development. The second project involved a partnership among the Yukon Government, the City and a developer. While the waterfront project and the shopping mall project were separate, the monies that the Legislative Assembly voted for waterfront landscaping were also spent on the shopping mall development. The Legislative Assembly did not approve this change in funding.
4.8 The Yukon Government had agreed to contribute $750,000 for the development and paid the City in full on 31 December 1999. The City would hold the title to that part of the completed work, expected to be 31 October 2001. The City would then make payments to the developer from the Government's contribution, and the City would make its contribution through refunds of property taxes collected on the development.
4.9 There were several delays in the project. In September 2000, the Yukon Government waived several conditions in the agreement, and the City subsequently forwarded to the developer all remaining funds that the Yukon Government had provided to the City.
4.10 The project was still incomplete when the Yukon Government entered into an agreement with the developer on 31 May 2001, under which the Government became responsible for $1.76 million of infrastructure costs. The developer was supposed to pay back $705,000 of the Government's contribution, and the City would pay its $750,000 to the Government out of property taxes received on the development. The mall opened a year behind schedule in November 2002. The City has paid $400,000 to the Yukon Government to date and is expected to pay its full contribution. However, the developer has not yet paid any of its share to the Government.
4.11 The Yukon Government should learn some important lessons from these projects. Management needs to be more precise in entering into agreements with other parties, so that each party is clear on its responsibilities. It must exercise more discipline in holding others to their part of the arrangements.
Recommendations
4.12 In order to keep members of the Legislative Assembly informed, the Government should communicate any reallocation of funding from Estimate levels to the Legislative Assembly.
4.13 When advances are required under contribution agreements, the Government should schedule advance payments based on reasonable cash flow statements from the recipient in order to avoid providing funds in advance of need.
Management response
4.14 The Government agrees with the recommendations.
Chapter 5 — Lack of Compliance With Authority
5.1 In the course of our 2000, 2001, and 2002 audits, we noted four instances where the Yukon Government did not act according to the authority granted to it. This means that when the Government spent, collected, borrowed, or handled money in these instances, it did not always adhere to the limits and purposes authorized by the Legislative Assembly. None of these was considered so significant as to qualify our opinion in the Auditor's Report on the Government's financial statements, but they are important enough to be brought to the attention of the Legislative Assembly.
5.2 We are concerned that these violations of authority continue to occur because they reflect poor spending restraint, inadequate budgets, or a lack of respect for budget authority. The Government should have systems and processes in place to ensure that these situations do not arise.
- The Government paid over $700,000 towards two properties before Management Board approved the payments. The payments were to ensure that the properties were not sold to others, but the Government never bought the properties.
- The Yukon Government transferred almost $700,000 in trust funds to two first nations without an adequate process to monitor the use of these funds.
- The Government paid $1.86 million in fund monies without assurance of appropriate spending.
- Notes to the Government's consolidated financial statements for the past four years have disclosed overexpenditures of different votes for various amounts.
Payment of Alaska land options without proper authority
5.3 In 1999, the Department of Economic Development set the wheels in motion to buy two parcels of land on the Alaskan coast, to provide ongoing docking access for Yukon businesses. The Department was concerned that, with cruise ships increasing demand for docking facilities, Yukon resource development might be limited by bottlenecks at Alaskan ports. While it is not common for the Department to be involved in land transactions, it is even more unusual for a government to consider the purchase of foreign property. We would have expected that the Department would have sought approval of this approach from Cabinet.
5.4 The Government purchased options to buy the land, meaning that no other offers to buy the land could be accepted by the owners for a specified period. In August 1999, the Government agreed to pay CDN $15,000 for the option to lease the land, or lease to purchase land in Skagway, Alaska. In October 1999, the Government signed another option for land in Haines, Alaska with two U.S. landholders. The Government paid US$200,000 for this second option.
5.5 However, the Department of Economic Development entered into these option agreements and transferred the funds to the landholders without proper authority. For any purchase contract or real property lease, the Department of Government Services should be the Yukon representative for the agreement, unless it delegates such authority, in writing. Government Services was not involved, and did not formally delegate authority. Economic Development advised us that this was not necessary as the transaction was an option, rather than an outright lease.
5.6 Regardless, the almost CDN$300,000 option for the Haines property exceeded the $100,000 signing authority of the official who entered into the agreement. The only other alternatives would have been for the Minister of Government Services to sign the agreement, or for the Department of Economic Development to obtain approval from Management Board. The Department of Economic Development made a submission and received retroactive approval from Management Board in late October 1999. The approval was received only after both agreements had been signed and payments were made, meaning that Management Board had had no choice in the matter.
5.7 The Department of Economic Development was looking to obtain these two properties in anticipation of long-term needs. However, its haste in entering into these agreements did not pay off. Extensive due diligence work needed to be done prior to any purchase of the Haines property. The Department had to extend the six-month term of the agreement several times, incurring additional costs.
5.8 Care was not taken to clarify the terms of the Skagway property deal. Though a detailed agreement had been prepared, only a cursory agreement was signed. This provided little on the terms of the agreement, which were necessary to protect the Government's interest. When the Department readied itself to purchase the land, the asking price had increased by over US$100,000.
5.9 In total, the Government spent over CAN $700,000 on options, extensions, and due diligence work before the plan to purchase the two properties was abandoned. Significant amounts of money may have been saved if the proposed purchase had been adequately planned and if proper authority had initially been sought.
Recommendation
5.10 To ensure that the Government avoids entering into unusual transactions and making unproductive payments, departments should only enter into agreements where they have proper authority. Payments should not be made until this authority has been secured.
Management response
5.11 Agreed.
Use of Kotaneelee Trust Funds for intended purpose
5.12 Prior to 1998, the Federal Government held the royalties it had collected from Yukon oil and gas extraction in a trust. The money was held on behalf of First Nations who are signatories to the Umbrella Final Agreement between the Federal Government, the Council for Yukon Indians, and the Government of the Yukon. According to the Umbrella Final Agreement, First Nations would have been entitled to receive the funds only after they signed a Yukon First Nation Final Agreement.
5.13 These trust funds were transferred to the Yukon Government and placed in the Kotaneelee Fund, established in a 1997 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Yukon Government and First Nations. The stipulation that First Nations must have signed final agreements in order to receive funds was amended in the 1997 Memorandum of Agreement between the Yukon Government and Yukon First Nations. The Memorandum allowed advance payment of the funds if First Nations wished to "conduct a review ... of any aspect of Oil and Gas matters." The Memorandum allows the First Nations and the Yukon Government to move forward in considering how oil and gas exploration and development will take place. This removed a financial incentive for the First Nations to sign a final agreement.
5.14 Two First Nations that had not signed final agreements received advance payments from the Kotaneelee Fund amounting to over $691,000 during the 1999-2000 fiscal year. By 31 March 2001, there were only small balances remaining in the Kotaneelee Fund accounts for these First Nations.
5.15 We were advised that the two First Nations planned to use the funds to support an Economic Table where interested parties and experts meet to discuss economic issues. The Government of Yukon also provided $100,000 as stipulated in a separate Economic Table Agreement dated 20 August 1999. The second Table dealt with several industries other than the oil and gas industry; it also covered support (for example, capacity building) for those industries. The Government of Yukon planned to set up a process to verify that the funds were used as agreed. However, the Government advanced these funds without such a process in place. The First Nations have submitted an annual report to the Government of Yukon, listing their accomplishments during the Table's first year of work. While some of the listed activities include the activities to support development of their oil and gas resources, none of this work is tied directly to the provision of the Agreement under which the funds were advanced to them. Without the cost breakdown, it is not possible to determine what portion of the $691,000 advance was used towards a review of the oil and gas matters.
5.16 The Government of Yukon neglected to ensure that the requirements of the subsequent 1997 Memorandum of Understanding were met. Without this information, it is unclear whether the disbursal of the funds in any way furthered the Agreement's aim of promoting oil and gas exploration in the territory. At the writing of this report, the two First Nations involved had not yet signed a Yukon First Nations Final Agreement.
Recommendation
5.17 Contribution agreements should include means for the Yukon Government to verify that funds have been spent as intended.
Management response
5.18 The Government agrees with the recommendation.
Yukon Aboriginal Business Fund monies paid without assurance of appropriate spending
5.19 In the early 1990s, the Yukon Government entered into an arrangement to rent office space in a complex to be built by the Champagne and Aishihik First Nation and the Inuvialuit Development Corporation. The Government later withdrew its commitment. The Taga Ku Development Corporation/Group, which had initiated the joint venture, took the Yukon Government to court to recover damages. In 1996, the parties arrived at a settlement agreement, which was signed by the Government Leader on behalf of the Yukon Government.
5.20 One provision of the agreement was the establishment of a Yukon Aboriginal Development Fund, allowing the Champagne and Aishihik First Nation and the Inuvialuit Development Corporation to invest in ventures of benefit to Yukon Aboriginal groups. The Yukon Government was to contribute $1,860,000 to the Fund, to be paid in five annual installments from April 1997 to April 2001. The Fund was to be managed by representatives of the Champagne and Aishihik First Nation and Inuvialuit Development Corporation, who were themselves to provide yearly auditor's reports on transactions of the Fund.
5.21 The Yukon Government has been making payments to the fund managers, and as of 31 March 2003, had paid all of the five annual $372,000 installments that it was required to pay under the agreement. It has made these payments even though it had no record of the fund managers submitting a single auditor's report. The language of the agreement is vague. It does not specify who is responsible for setting up the Fund, and which department within the Government was to fulfill its side of the agreement and receive the auditor's reports.
5.22 When we brought this to the attention of the Government, it contacted the Inuvialuit Development Corporation. The Corporation has confirmed that it has received all of the payments and that no auditor's reports were submitted. It also disclosed that no withdrawals have been made from the fund, but that it continues to seek investment opportunities in the Yukon under the terms of the agreement. Monitoring of future withdrawals will be required to determine whether funds are being used for the purposes outlined in the agreement.
Recommendations
5.23 The Government should ensure that when it enters into agreements, it identifies a responsible party within the Government that is to administer the agreement in order to hold that party to account.
5.24 The Government should ensure that it receives required financial statements and auditor's reports on multi-stage agreements, and reviews them to verify compliance with the terms of the agreements, before releasing funds and to ensure that funds are being used for the purposes intended in the agreement.
Management response
5.25 The Government agrees with the recommendations.
Overexpenditures
5.26 Each year, the Government presents proposals, through its estimates, for its expenditures for the coming year. This includes items (or "votes") approved by the Legislative Assembly that have not already been approved under existing legislation. The following votes were overexpended in fiscal years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003:
Exhibit 5.1 — Overexpenditures by department for the year ended 31 March 2000
|
Vote or item approved by the Legislative Assembly |
Departmental operations and maintenance expenditures |
|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Health and Social Services |
Public Service Commission |
Renewable Resources |
Women's Directorate |
|
|
Main estimates, total by vote |
$ 113,076 |
$10,060 |
$14,134 |
$ 427 |
|
Supplementary estimates |
$700 |
|
$231 |
|
|
Total appropriation |
$113,776 |
$10,060 |
$14,365 |
$427 |
|
Actual expenditures |
$116,996 |
$10,710 |
$14,450 |
$433 |
|
Overexpenditure before standing appropriation |
$3,220 |
$650 |
$85 |
$6 |
|
Less: standing appropriation |
- |
- |
$83 |
|
|
Overexpenditure |
$3,220 |
$650 |
$2 |
$6 |
5.27 The Department of Health and Social Services attributed its overexpenditure to unanticipated costs and volumes for this mandatory program. This was, in part, due to billings from other provinces for treatment of Yukon citizens.
5.28 The Public Service Commission explains its overexpenditure as being due to the increase in the employee termination benefit liability, as determined by an actuary, which was larger than the amount estimated by management.
Exhibit 5.2 — Overexpenditures by department for the year ended 31 March 2001
